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PREFACE
The research for this study entailed a thorough 
canvass of records in the National Archives in Wash­
ington, D.C., primarily those of the State Department, 
the Office of Strategic Services, and the Military 
Intelligence Division. Manuscript collections which 
proved to be most useful were the Henry L. Stimson 
Diary at Yale University and the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Papers at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde 
Park, New York. The William Castle Papers in the Her­
bert Hoover Library at West Branch, Iowa were consulted 
as were the Cordell Hull Papers at the Library of Con­
gress in Washington, D.C. The Jefferson Caffery 
Papers at the University of Southwestern Louisiana and 
the Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Papers at Hyde Park yielded 
little useful information.
An important source for this study also were 
the interviews with Salvadorans who lived during the 
Martinez era. Ambassador Hector Escobar Seri'ano provided 
detailed accounts for the period during which he served 
as Ambassador to Mexico 1937-19^0 and as Minister of 
Finance in 19*j4. The son-in-law of General Martinez,
Sr. Victor Barriere, kindly shared his recollections of
ii
the General and the events during the period as well 
as his role as a participant in the negotiations during 
the Bondholder's dispute in 19^3® Sr. Jose""Antonio 
Penate, an Army officer during the period, discussed 
his role and that of his father, an Army Major and 
confidant of General Martinez. The attitudes and 
feelings of the common man during the regime of General 
Martinez were reflected in conversations with Sr. and 
Sra. Felix Dominguez Revelo (an engineer), Sra. Amana 
Calderon (a student at the time), and Sra. Lolita Barauna 
(a teacher at the time)*.
The completion of this study marks the culmination 
of several years of graduate study during which time the 
author has incurred a large number of debts which cannot 
be adequately repaid. I want to thank all who assisted 
along the way. To Dr. Jane de Grummond, who filled in 
after Dr. J. Preston Moore's departure, I wish to express 
my slncerest gratitude. To Dr. Leonard Cardenas, for 
his invaluable assistance, thank you. Likewise, I wish 
to thank Drs. Miles Richardson and S. Lee Richardson 
for their guidance and assistance during my graduate 
studies. And lastly, I want to thank Dr. Burl Noggle 
for reading the manuscript. To Mrs. Miriam deHart, who 
did so much of the leg work during my years at the 
Latin American Studies Institute, thank you. To my
iii
sisters, Sonia, Fenita and Marling who typed the 
drafts, my wife Nelia and my family for their support, 
salamat.
While all of the above mentioned assisted me 
greatly, the responsibility for this study is mine.
iv
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ABSTRACT
This is a case study of relations between El 
Salvador and the United States during the presidency 
of General Maximlliano Hernandez Martinez, 1931-19^*
Of all the Caribbean and Central American nations, El 
Salvador had steered the most independent course in 
its relations with the United States since the turn of 
the century*
While there existed a lack of drama in the ear­
lier relations between the two nations, the Martfnez 
era, 1931-19^ *  reflects the traditional ingredients 
of Latin American domestic politics pitted against 
changing national priorities in a changing world situa­
tion, the threat of European intervention and more 
significantly, a test for the Good Neighbor policy of 
the United States.
In 1906 and again in 1923* encouraged by the United 
States, the Central American nations signed treaties 
designed to insure regional political stability. Non­
recognition was the instrument to deter would-be rebels 
from carrying out their plots. On the other hand, a 
1922 financial agreement became a source of problems 
for both nations. El Salvador, on the brink of bank­
ruptcy, had borrowed over sixteen million dollars from
viii
private lenders in the United States. These issues 
shaped events during much of the rule of General 
Maximlliano H. Martinez.
When General Martinez became president in 1931» as 
a result of a. coup the United States, bound by the 1923 
Treaty, refused to recognize his government. Non­
recognition combined with the economic depression and 
the subsequent collapse of coffee prices had serious 
economic and political repercussions• As a result, a 
Communist-inspired revolt occurred in January 1932.
The attempted overthrow failed, but severe retaliatory 
measures taken by General Martinez resulted in the death 
of over ten thousand Salvadorans. Furthermore, the 
economic and political crises prompted El Salvador to 
suspend payment on its 1922 loan. Non-recognition and 
default strained Salvadoran-American relations.
The presence of ill-prepared United States repre­
sentatives in El Salvador, the emergence of Hitler*s 
Germany and Mussolini*s Italy in Europe and the attrac­
tion of General Martinez to totalitarianism and 
authoritarian rule, provided a potential breaking point 
for the proclaimed Good Neighbor policy of the United 
States. However, unlike the experience of Nicaragua, 
Cuba and the Dominican Republic, El Salvador was spared 
external intervention in its domestic affairs by the 
larger nation,
ix
A common interest in hemispheric defense against 
possible European subversion during the years 1939-1944, 
helped to overcome major differences between the two 
nations. World conditions prompted the United States 
to modify its policy on the recognition of governments, 
while economic considerations tempered General Martfnez’s 
admiration for authoritarian rule and a corporate 
economy. The United States generously assisted El Sal­
vador through Lend-Lease, Export-Import Bank loans, and 
the Inter-American Coffee Convention of 194-0, while El 
Salvador cooperated fully with the United States in the 
war effort.
The Martfnez Era represents an accommodation of 
interests by nations of unequal size and power in the 
light of world realities. Plagued initially by serious 
differences, the Martinez period marks a stepping stone 
in the expression of good-will by the United States 
towards El Salvador and by extension, to Latin America 
during those critical years.
x
CHAPTER I
SCOPE OF STUDY
Although formal diplomatic relations are only a 
part of the whole pattern of international relations, 
commercial, cultural and political intercourse between 
nations can be severely restricted without them*
Because of the great influence of the United States in 
the Western Hemisphere, a Latin American government 
with no diplomatic relations with the United States has 
traditionally found it difficult to engage freely in 
the community of nations. Normal diplomatic relations 
presuppose formally declared acts of "recognition of 
governments®"
The national interest, powerful domestic interests, 
or a changing world situation have dictated the criteria 
applied to the recognition of new governments® In the 
early years, the United States found such fairly 
objective requirements as de facto control of the state 
and the ability to discharge International obligations 
sufficient to establish normal diplomatic relations with 
a foreign nation. Continued and uninterrupted diploma­
tic relations with Latin American states were important 
to the expansion of private trade and investment
1
activities in the region.
However, real and imagined abuses by foreign 
creditors in Latin America and the chronic financial 
difficulties faced by many of the nations there, sug­
gested the possibility of European intervention and 
a threat to the security of the United States. Because 
the domestic affairs of Latin American countries now be­
came a matter of United States concern, the kind of 
government to be recognized assumed a new Importance. 
Subsequently, the "willingness" of a new government to 
fulfill the commitments of previous regimes was demanded 
and, in many cases, followed by precise and detailed 
agreements. Under President Woodrow Wilson a new 
government must have also come into power by constitu­
tional means and represent the will of the people before it 
could be recognized by the United States. It was the 
emergence of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" 
policy that marked a return to less demanding conditions 
for the initiation of diplomatic relations, thereby
decreasing tensions in United States-Latin American 
1
relations.
United States relations with El Salvador during
C. Neale Ronning, Law and Politics in Inter- 
American Diplomacy (New York; John Wiley and Sons, 1963), 
PP. 1-5.
the presidency of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez
1931-19^» provides a good subject for a case study of 
relations between two nations of the Western Hemis­
phere, one large and the other small# El Salvador is a 
good example because of all the Caribbean and Central 
American nations it had steered the most independent 
course in its relations with the United States since 
the turn of the century# It had avoided serious entan­
glements with its powerful neighbor to the North and 
had escaped the direct intervention in its internal 
affairs unlike the experience of Nicaragua, Cuba and 
the Dominican Republic.
While there had existed a lack of drama in the 
earlier relations between the two nations, the Martfnez 
era 1931-19^4, has provided students of Salvadoran 
history with events of significance. It was General 
Martfnez who, in his effort to uphold his position and 
his country's national integrity, resisted United States 
pressure to resign during the early 1930’s. By his 
successful resistance, he proved decisively that the 
outmoded non-recognition policy of the United States 
was untenable and thus forced the United States to 
abandon it.
On the other hand, it was also during the Martfnez 
era that the United States proved its sincerity in the
4application of the ’’Good Neighbor” policy during the 
bond default controversy when it decided (much to the 
dismay of American bondholders) not to intervene in 
the internal affairs of El Salvador,2
Later during the Martfnez era* as the war in 
Europe expanded, both nations cooperated freely with 
one another in the effort to maintain the security of 
the Western Hemisphere, The cooperation was such that 
General Martfnez, enamored as he was with authori­
tarian ideas and totalitarian rule, tempered his 
personal ideological beliefs sufficiently to work with 
the United States for the best interests of the region. 
The United States made cooperation much easier with 
very generous programs of assistance such as Lend-Lease, 
coffee ”subsidies” through the Inter-American Coffee 
Agreement and loans from the Export-Import Bank, As a 
result, the two nations, the smallest and the largest 
in the hemisphere, one totalitarian, the other democra­
tic, worked with a great deal of unanimity of interest 
during the war years.
The study which follows relates the development 
of the diplomatic, economic and war-time relations 
between El Salvador and the United States during the
1931-19^ period — the Martfnez era,
2The term American, as used in this study, refers 
strictly to the United States of America.
CHAPTER II
THE SETTING
Roots of the Problems
At about 10 P.M. on December 2, 1931* elements of 
El Salvador’s First Infantry began firing at the 
Presidential Palace directly across the street from 
the infantry barracks. The shots marked the begin­
ning of the revolt which made General Maximlliano 
Hernandez Martfnez the ruler of El Salvador. The 
gunfire also marked the start of a new era in 
Salvadoran-American relations.
To many American observers, the sudden rise of 
General Martfnez to power was characteristically 
Central American, in nature. To them, power acquired 
through a coup d ’etat was as natural in Central Amer­
ica as considering the banana to be the main export.
But such coups d ’etat were also often followed 
by another characteristic which in itself was Central 
American in nature. This was American intervention
Minister Charles B. Curtis (El Salvador) to 
Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, December 5» 1931» 
file 816.00 Revolutions/35, R.G. 59, N. A.
5
6in the internal affairs of the revolutionary governments. 
Such meddling in Central America occurred numerous times 
during the early twentieth century. Invariably such 
Interventions were the result of lingering problems that 
had plagued the Meso-American region for many years.
Part of the blame for the misunderstandings can defi­
nitely be placed upon the shoulders of the United 
States because whatever her motives, she did intervene 
in the internal affairs of some nations in the area.
Some of the reascns for American activities which 
caused misunderstandings can be explained. First, 
the United States desired a secure and stable Caribbean 
area to insure free passage through the Panama Canal
and hopefully, at the same time, to assist the economic
2
and political progress of the nations there.
Secondly, the United States competed with Mexico and 
Europe for political and economic dominance In the 
region. A third factor, more difficult to gauge but 
still significant In some cases, was the detrimental 
effect of the way some American officials and private 
citizens conducted themselves during their stay in
^William Appieman Williams, The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Co.,
1971), pp. 172-7841 Bryce Wood, The Making of the 
Good Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1961), pp. 14-15.
3
the area.-' To be sure, there were other factors, 
however, those mentioned prompted the errors in 
judgements in the early twentieth century which later 
caused more serious difficulties.
The effort to achieve stability was a commend­
able objective for the United States, but the problems 
which emanated from these efforts were such that 
animosity rather than goodwill often resulted.
After the United States acquired the territory 
for the Panama Canal, concern for the security of 
the future waterway influenced the relations between 
America and the countries in the surrounding area.
Early in the century, American leaders were greatly 
concerned with the threat of European intervention in 
the region. To allay this fear of European Involvement, 
the United States acted to stabilize the area by re­
ducing political tensions among the various Central 
American nations. Accompanying this desire to 
minimize unrest in Central America for security reasons
•^Interview with Ambassador Hector Escobar Serrano, 
December 1975* San Salvador; New York Times, August 16, 
1929; Dana Munro, The United States and the Caribbean 
Republics, 1921-1933 (Princeton; Princeton University 
Press, 19W ,  P» 8.
Raymond Leslie Buell, Research Director of the 
Foreign Policy Association discussed the American attempts 
to stabilize the area ini New York Times. January 11, 
1931.
8was the hope that through stability, political and 
economic progress might be achieved by these nations.
For these reasons, in 1907* the United States, along 
with Mexico, called for a conference of the Central 
American nations to find ways to ease tensions which had 
arisen from rivalries between leaders® The most serious 
problems stemmed from the bitter conflict between two 
strongmen, Jose Santos Zelaya of Nicaragua and Manuel 
Estrada Cabrera of Guatemala®
The Central American leaders agreed to meet in 
order to lessen tensions, but at the same time they 
harbored ulterior motives for participating® The 
Americans and Mexicans were also less than totally 
idealistic in calling for the peace conference® The 
Americans planned to use the meetings to prepare the 
ground for the economic penetration of the area® The 
Mexicans wanted to hold the conference in order to 
establish a peaceful Central America, but one in which 
the four smaller nations would be strengthened against 
Guatemala while looking toward Mexico for leadership.-’ 
Moreover, the Central American leaders saw the confe-
Charles L. Stansifer, "Application of the Tobar 
Doctrine to Central America," The Americas. 23 
(January 1967), p. 252; Linton Wells, "Mexico's Eld 
for Supremacy in Central America," New Republic® 50 
(May 18, 1927), PP. 3^8-350.
9rence as an opportunity to entrench themselves in 
6power.
Despite divergent motives for attending the
conference, the participants cooperated sufficiently
so that the resultant 1907 Central American Treaty of
Peace and Amity contained praiseworthy ideas® One
was the creation of a Central American Peace Court as
a vehicle to settle differences® It had jurisdiction
7
over interstate disputes. 1 The treaty also contained 
clauses which dealt with the issue of recognition, a 
subject brought up at the conference by the Central 
Americans themselves® The recognition clause was based 
upon the ideas developed by the noted Ecuadorian jurist, 
Dr. Carlos Tobar® The essence of the "Tobar Doctrine'* 
was that no diplomatic recognition would be granted 
to any government which had gained power by means of 
a coup d'etat or revolution until freely elected repre-
Q
sentatives had constitutionally reorganized the country®
^Stansifer, "Application of the Tobar Doctrine to 
Central America," pp. 25^-255®
"^Chester Lloyd Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1936), p. ¥25;
Wilfred Hardy Callcott, The Western Hemisphere: Its
Influence on United States-PoliciestotKe End of World 
War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968), p® 102.
Q
Theodore P. Wright, "Free Elections in the Latin 
American Policy of the United States," Political Science 
Quarterly, 75 (March 1959)* p. 93*
10
The United States, although not a signatory to the treaty,
felt "morally bound" to it
The effects of the treaty on the Central American
nations were minimal. The Court of Justice proved
ineffective because of the highly political nature of
the cases brought before it. Moreover, the Judges
seemed unable to keep their individual national interests
out of the decisions. Before the ten years had expired,
10the court had lost its usefulness.
However, it was the recognition clause of the
treaty which created the greatest difficulty between
the United States and Central America. At the signing
of the treaty, the incumbent presidents were very
pleased with the recognition clause because it provided
them with "a guarantee of the status quo and a perpe-
11tual leasehold on office." Furthermore, those 
governments in office could simply pay lip-service to the 
matter of free elections since they in fact controlled 
all elections. Thus the recognition clause of the 
treaty served to defeat the intent of the United States 
to have free and democratic elections. On the other
^Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900, p« 425.
10Ibid., pp. 425-426.
■^Wright, "Free Elections in the Latin American 
Policy of the United States," p. 93.
11
hand, while it did keep the area's politics relatively 
stable, the price paid came in the form of oppressive 
dictatorships which were perpetuated in office® Thus 
the Central Americans were deprived of the right to 
revolt against abuse by the ruling government® Such 
was the case of the Melendez-Quinones dynasty in El Sal­
vador which ruled the country from 1913-1927• The long 
rule of Manuel Estrada Cabrera in Guatemala was also 
perpetuated to some degree by the 1907 treaty® Overall,
however, the treaty did serve to lessen tensions between
12the Central American nations for a while•
By 1920, when political conditions began to 
deteriorate again, the idea of a united Central America 
was revived and El Salvador proposed a conference among 
the five Central American states to revise the 1907 
treaty and consider a union. As in previous attempts, 
the union plan failed and by 1922 tensions between the 
neighboring nations had become intense, especially along 
the Nicaragua and Honduras border. New hostilities 
erupted and again an effort to pacify the area was made. 
The result was another conference held in Washington,
D.C. from December 1922 to February 7, 1923®
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes served as the 
host with Sumner Welles steering the conference
1 ?
Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900, p. *J40.
12
most of the way. Again, the United. States, though not
a signatory to the resultant 1923 Central American Treaty
13of Peace and Amity, felt morally hound to abide by it.
The major difference between the 1923 treaty and the 
one it replaced was the "strengthening" of the recog­
nition article in the newer version. Article II of 
the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923 reads 
as follows;
Desiring to make secure in the Republics 
of Central America the benefits which are de­
rived from the maintenance of free institutions 
and to contribute at the same time toward 
strengthening their stability, and the prestige 
with which they should be surrounded, they 
declare that every act, disposition or measure 
which alters the constitutional organization 
in any of them is to be deemed a menace to the 
peace of said Republics, whether it proceed 
from any public power or from the private 
citizens.
Consequently, the Governments of the 
Contracting Parties will not recognize any 
other government which may come into power in 
any of the five Republics through a coup d'etat 
or a revolution against a recognized Govern­
ment, so long as the freely elected repre­
sentatives of the people thereof have not 
constitutionally reorganized the country. And 
even in such a case they obligate themselves 
not to acknowledge the recognition if any of 
the persons elected as President, Vice-President 
or Chief of State designate should fall under 
any of the following heads:
1) If he should be the leader or one of 
the leaders of a coup d'etat or revolution, or
13^Munro, The United States and the Caribbean 
1921-1933. p p . 118-125; New York Times. January 11. 
1931.
13
through blood relationship or marriage* be an 
ascendent or descendent or brother of such 
leader or leaders.
2) If he should have been a Secretary
of State or should have held some high
military command during the accomplishment 
of the coup d*etat. the revolution, or while 
the election was being carried on, or if he 
should have held this office or command 
within the siz months preceding the coup d ’etat, 
revolution* or the election.
Furthermore* in no case shall recognition 
be accorded to a government which arises from
election to power of a citizen ezpressly and
unquestionably disqualified by the Constitution 
of his country as eligible to election as 
President, Vice-President or Chief of State 
designate.1 1^
Thus, the sanction of non-recognition was deliberately
designed to function as a coercive measure to promote
1 *5stability and constitutional rule. J
The idea for strengthening the recognition article 
was proposed and insisted upon at the Washington 
conference by the Costa Rican delegation. The head of 
the delegation was ez-president Alfredo Gonzales Flores, 
whom Federico TInoco had ousted in a coup In 1917. 
President Woodrow Wilson in turn, using the tactic of
i it
Conventions, Protocols and Declarations signed 
at the Conference on Central American Affairs, 
Washington, D.C., February 17, 1923* ”General Treaty of
Peace and Amity,M American Journal of International 
Law. Supplement XVII (l923), PP. 117-123. ” ”
1-^Raymond 01Connor, Force and Diplomacy. Essays 
Military and Diplomatic (Coral Gables, Florida: 
University of Miami Press, 1972), p. 108.
1^
non-recognition, forced Tinoco to resign from office two 
years later. The objective of the Costa Rican delega­
tion at the 1923 conference was thus to show other 
would-be revolutionaries that, like Tinoco, their 
efforts would end in failure. Costa Rica's own presi­
dent at the time, Julio Acosta, was a strong supporter 
of the article.1^
The 1923 Treaty was unanimously approved by all
the participants. El Salvador’s national assembly
ratified it, but with reservations on parts of the
agreement, including Article II which dealt with the
17recognition issue. ' This objection to Article II was 
later used by General Martfnez in claiming his legal 
right to be president and thus entitling him to full 
recognition by the United States. Undoubtedly, the 
1907 and 1923 Central American treaties had placed 
serious responsibilities upon the shoulders of the 
Americans.
The difficult task faced by the United States in 
Central America was also due, in part, to its own de­
sires to expand its economic influence in the area.
1 6
Richard V. Salisbury, "Domestic Politics and 
Foreign Policy: Costa Rica's Stand on Recognition,
1923-193^»" Hispanic American Historical Review, 54- no. 3 
(August 197*0. pp. ^55-456. ’
17 New York Times. November 22, 1932; Munro, The 
United States and the Caribbean,1921-1933. P- 126
15
This was evident in the Increased number of loans made 
by American bankers to Central American nations. For 
the most part, American bankers replaced Europeans in 
this part of the world. However, while American 
activities increased in Central America, so too did the 
efforts of Mexico to exert more influence in the 
region. This spreading of influence by a rival na­
tion concerned some American government officials
1 fi
during the 1920’s. The rivalry between the two nations 
led them to take opposite positions on many issues 
dealing with Central American affairs. Nowhere was 
this contest more evident than on the question of 
recognition of revolutionary governments. The Mexican 
support of governments which the United States refused 
to bless with recognition created serious difficulties 
for American officials.
Moreover, many of the problems faced by American 
diplomats in Central America were made even more 
difficult by the Individual shortcomings of the offi­
cial representatives assigned there. Within the 
American diplomatic corps, it was generally believed 
that a post to Central America was the least desirable
1 8Wells, ’’Mexico’s Bid for Supremacy in Central 
America," pp. 3^8-3^9; Wood, The Making of the Good 
Neighbor Policy, pp. 1^-15.
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appointment possible. This prompted the New York Times
to comment thats "Many men feel they are forced to do
penance if they are stationed in one of the Central
American c a p i t a l s . " ^  This disdain was apparent in the
actions of some individuals sent to the area. El
Salvador had the misfortune of having one such man
who served there as American Minister during the period
1921-1925* Montgomery Schuyler exemplified what has
come to be called the "ugly American" by his conduct
there. He considered himself a "President maker" and
"let it pretty generally be known that what he said 
20was law." Schuyler was also held responsible for
the resignation of the Salvadoran Minister of Foreign
Affairs Francisco Paredes in 1922, because of their
disagreement over America's role in Salvadoran internal
affairs. Schuyler has been described as a man "muy
21duro, muy violento." To the sensitive Salvadorans, 
this type of conduct was very insulting.
An editorial in the New York Times clearly
•^New York Times, August 16, 1929.
20
Minister Warren D. Robbins (El Salvador) to 
Assistant Secretary of State William Castle, May 6 , 1929, 
folder "Salvador 1929-1931," Box 8, William Castle 
Papers, Herbert Hoover Library•
21Interview with Ambassador Serrano, December 1975, 
San Salvador.
17
perceived the effect of such conduct on the Latin
Americans; 11 It is doubly true in our relations with
Mexico and Central America that in diplomacy the ’tone1
is everything ~  that it makes the song, as Lord
Palmerston said®..what we need to correct is not so
22much our intentions as our manners."
The arrogant conduct and condescending attitudes 
of some Americans in El Salvador and other Central 
American countries, although not always acting in 
official capacities, often contributed to the problem. 
Many businessmen and their wives were often guilty of 
this attitude, some of them not bothering to learn to 
speak Spanish in spite of their lengthy stay in the 
region. Such conduct made the task of badly under- 
staffed American legations much more difficult. Thus, 
undesirable attitudes and behavior of some Americans 
were in part responsible for the tarnished image many 
Latin Americans had of the United States.2-^
99
New York Times. January 14, 1927.
2^Frank P. Corrigan, "Notes on Good Neighborli­
ness," Frank P. Corrigan Papers, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt Library; Interview with Sra. Amana 
Calderon, July 1971, San Salvador; Interview with 
Ambassador Serrano, December 1975» San Salvador; 
Munro, The United States and the Caribbean Republics. 
1921-1933; Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor 
Policy,"p. 299.
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Diplomatic and Economic Relations During the 1920’s
World War I was a watershed in the diplomatic 
relations of the United States with the nations of the 
world® By the early 19201s, Woodrow Wilson’s policy 
of non-recognition of governments established by force 
had become entrenched in the conduct of American 
diplomacy® During his tenure as Secretary of State 
Charles Evans Hughes attempted to correct some of the 
mistakes of the past and establish a "Pas Americana’1
Oh,
based on mutual respect and good will® The 
Washington conference of 1922-1923 attempted to deal 
with the problems of international relations parti­
cularly in the Central American region. However, it 
was not until the late 1920’s, under the stewardship 
of President Herbert Hoover and Secretary of State 
Henry L. Stimson, that an evident change had begun to 
evolve in America’s Latin American Policy® Basically, 
the Hoover-Stimson doctrine was a reversal of the 
interventionist policies fostered by.the Roosevelt 
Corollary and the moralistic non-recognition policy 
advocated by Woodrow Wilson® The change acknowledged
oh.
Alexander de Conde, Herbert Hoover’s Latin 
American Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1951)» P« Joseph Tulchin, The Aftermath of War: 
World War I and U. S. Policy Toward Latin America 
(New York: New York University Press, 1971» P« 98.
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the problems with non-recognition in the past. Later, 
in a speech before the New York Council of Foreign 
Eelations, Secretary Stimson maintained that in all of 
Latin America, except the five Central American 
republics, the United States policy was to grant 
recognition when it became apparent that the new govern­
ments were in control of the administrative machinery 
of state, with the apparent acquiescence of their 
people, and that they were willing and able to discharge 
their international and conventional obligations. In 
the case of the five Central American nations the 1923
2«5
Treaty prevented the implementation of the new policy. J
To be sure, this was just the beginning of the
transition since American intervention in Central
America was still evident in Nicaragua. But the lesson
had been learned that such interventions served little
purpose. As the new policy evolved the Central
Americans, appreciative of the improvements, returned
the courtesy by receiving President Hoover graciously
27during his tour there in 1928. ' Excelsior. Mexico's
^New York Times . February 7, 1931 •
26Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, 
pp. 24-25; Federico Gil, Latin American-United States 
Relations (New York: Hareourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc•, 
1971), P. 154.
^Diario del Salvador, November 17. 1928; 
de Conde, Herbert Hoover's Latin American Policy, passim.
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leading newspaper and a frequent critic of American 
activities in Latin America, acknowledged some of 
Hoover's diplomatic successes at the end of his term
pO
in office in 1932. Still, much more needed to he 
done to correct mistakes of the past.
The economic prosperity experienced by the United 
States during the 1920’s helped to foster closer 
economic ties with Central American nations. During 
the period Americans became lenders to the world 
replacing the Europeans. American bankers practiced 
a free loan policy so that many of them, unaccustomed 
to international finance, lent money where more expe­
rienced European bankers would have been reluctant to 
lend. Furthermore, many such loans were contracted 
with somewhat onerous terms to offset the risk inherent 
in dealing with politically unstable republics. While 
these measures protected the bankers, they also made 
default almost Inevitable in a financial crisis.^
Because economic and political considerations
Excelsior. November 9, 1932.
29^ Max Winkler, ”Investment and National Policy of 
the United States in Latin America,” American Economic 
Review, XXII; Supplement (March 1932), p. l44; The 
company which handled the Salvadoran bonds, F.J. Lisman 
and Company, did very well with the 1922 loan. While 
the average profit on all loans made to Latin America 
during the 1920-1930 period was 5*06 percent, Lisman 
made 11.36 percent on the Salvadoran loan. Tulchin,
The Aftermath of War, p. 76.
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are closely intermeshed in a nation's foreign policy, 
the State Department inevitably became involved in the 
free lending practices of the bankers* Although the 
State Department officially disclaimed passing judgement 
on loan proposals, it was active in dictating general 
terms for many loans to Central American governments*
The setting of conditions for the loans by the Depart­
ment, and participation in the negotiation of proposals, 
was interpreted by many bankers and prospective bond 
purchasers as tacit approval or disapproval of the 
loans. Moreover, unscrupulous banking houses, 
despite State Department's disclaimers, advertised and 
sold bonds as though the State Department guaranteed 
them. In a 1936 review of bond sales Minister Frank 
Corrigan found that even in Britain buyers were under 
the impression that the bonds had the full backing of 
the United States government*^1 A 1937 Securities and 
Exchange Commission investigation of the practices of
^°New York Times, July 20, 1923; de Conde, Herbert 
Hoover's Latin American Policy, p. 68; Tulchin,
The Aftermath of War, p. 170.
•^Minister Frank P. Corrigan (El Salvador) to Hull, 
April 3, 1936, file 816.5IC 39/^8, R.G. 59, N. A.;
Fred Lavis, "The El Salvador Bondholders Protective Com­
mittee Report," January 1937, file 816.51C 39/^93,
E.G. 59, N. A*; Tulchin, The Aftermath of War, p. 182; 
Munro, The United States and the Caribbean Republics. 
1921-1933, P. 151.
22
American "bankers characterized some of the financiers
as being "reckless and inept" and accused others of
indulging in "outright chicanery" in their foreign
32lending practices.
El Salvador, like many other Latin American coun­
tries, fell victim to the easy credit available during 
the time. It was among the very first to benefit 
from the extravagance of foreign loans from American 
bankers. In 1922, the nation's economy was on the 
verge of bankruptcy? the salaries of public servants, 
the military, school teachers and the police were 
badly in arrears. Furthermore, the Salvadoran debt 
to Great Britain was in default and the fear existed 
that unless the situation was remedied the British
might be forced to intervene in the internal affairs
33of the country. ^ In a desperate effort to solve its 
financial crisis El Salvador turned to the United 
States for assistance.
32
J Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on 
the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities. 
Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization 
Committees. Pursuant to Section 211 of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 193^» Part V Protective Committees 
and Agencies for Holders of Defaulted Foreign Government 
Bonds (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937)*
p. 8.
33^^Lavis, The El Salvador Bondholders Protective 
Committee Report".
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Montgomery Schuyler, the new American Minister to 
SI Salvador, was anxious to help in order to avert 
Salvadoran bankruptcy, as well as to assist American 
financial institutions in expanding their operations 
in the area® The result of his efforts to aid 
President Jorge Melendez was the signing of a consoli­
dated loan between El Salvador and Minor C® Keith® 
Although the loan was negotiated in 1922 it was not 
consummated until the following year® The loan was 
acquired for the following purposes: (1) to retire
the nation*s internal debt; (2) to retire the debt to 
Great Britain; and (3) to fund a public works program. 
Included in the latter project was the construction 
of sanitation facilities in the capital city of San 
Salvador, asphalting of roads throughout the country, 
and the subsidizing of a railway from the port of 
La Union at the southeastern tip of El Salvador to the 
capital. The railway later became part of the Inter­
national Railways System of Central America (I.R.C.A.)
which connected El Salvador to the Guatemalan town of
I kPuerto Earrios on the Caribbean side®^ This port was
J The I.R.C.A. was a very Important adjunct of the 
United Fruit Company throughout Central America. Fred 
Lavis to Corrigan, February 16 , 1937® Corrigan Papers, 
Franklin D® Roosevelt Library. Lavis succeeded Keith 
to the presidency of the I.R.C.A. in 1929• Later on, 
he became head of the Salvadoran Bondholders Protective 
Committee®
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El Salvador’s outlet on the Atlantic coast.
The bonds were issued under a loan contract 
between El Salvador and Minor C. Keith the President 
of I.R.C.A. and a founder of the United Fruit Company 
of New York. Keith had played a principal role in 
the negotiations and at the conclusion earned a 
substantial sum for his services.^ Moreover, his 
railroad company, along with United Fruit, greatly 
benefited from the loan to El Salvador. The bonded 
debt consisted of the following items:
(1) An Eight Percent Customs First Lien 
Sinking Fund Gold Bonds of 1923- 
Series A- $6,000,000 U.S. gold.
Due July 1, 1948.
(2) A Six Percent Second Lien Sinking 
Fund Gold Bonds of 1923- Series B-
1,050,000- British pound sterling.
Due July 1, 1953.
(3) A Seven Percent Third Lien Sinking 
Fund Gold Bonds of 1923- Series C- 
$10,500,000 U.S. dollars.
Due July 1, 1957.36
The bonds were guaranteed by a lien on seventy
'Tlunro, The United States and the Caribbean 
Republics, 1921^1933, PP." 149-151.
36
Walter Thurston (Division of Latin American 
Affairs) Memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State 
McGeorge Bundy, September 3* 1931, file 816.51/643, 
R.G. 59» N. A.; Lavis, "The El Salvador Bondholders 
Protective Committee Report."
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percent of all customs receipts on both imports and 
exports. Further, if seventy percent of the receipts 
was not adequate to service the loan, the total customs 
receipts would then be utilized. Should that not be 
sufficient, the deficiency was to be covered by El 
Salvador from other sources of revenue® As an added 
security measure, the Metropolitan Trust Company of New 
York was designated by Minor Keith to act as fiscal 
agent for the loan. The agent, in turn, appointed a 
fiscal representative to reside in San Salvador to 
certify and supervise the collection of revenues in 
each of the customs houses in El Salvador, The actual 
collection of duties was carried out by a Salvadoran 
agency and only in the contingency of a default was the 
American fiscal representative authorized to undertake 
customs collection. This arrangement was different from 
the Nicaraguan and Santo Domingo plans in which customs 
revenues without reference to default were placed 
directly under the administration of an American 
Collector General with several American deputy collectors.
Provisions were also Included to cover the even­
tuality of a dispute between the contracting parties.
In such a dispute the final referee was to be the Chief 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Should 
the Chief Justice be unable to act the American 
Secretary of State was then empowered to designate some
26
other member of the Federal Judiciary of the United
States to act in his place* The contract also provided
that in the event that El Salvador, for any reason,
default for thirty days in the fulfillment of its
obligations, the Fiscal Agent was empowered to create
a customs administration and appoint a Collector
General approved by the Secretary of State and the
37
government of El Salvador * Through a series of
exchanges with the attorneys of Minor Keith, the
Secretary of State's office became committed to carry
out its obligations in the contract. The commitment
was confirmed in a letter from Assistant Secretary of
State Robert Woods Bliss to Messrs* Robert Lansing
(former Secretary of State) and Lester H. Woolsey
(former Solicitor General) dated July 15* 1922, in the
following terms?
In this connection, I may inform you that 
the Secretary of State on his part is 
prepared to carry out the stipulations 
...of the loan contract, should it become 
necessary to do so.38
In other exchanges between the American Legation at San
37-"Thurston to Bundy, September 3, 1931, file 
816.51/643, R.G. 59, N. A.
•^Fred Lavis, "The El Salvador Bondholders 
Protective Committee Report."
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Salvador and the Salvadoran government In June and
July of 1922, the willingness of the State Department
30
to carry out Its obligations was further confirmed. 7
During the period after the acquisition of the 
loan, El Salvador was fortunate in that it had 
adequate customs revenues to service the loan.
Although the Salvadorans did not like the stipulations 
of the contract which required the presence of the 
fiscal representative in San Salvador, no protests 
arose primarily because of the tact and ability of 
the representative, William Renwick, who "fell in love 
with El Salvador" and ingratiated himself with the 
people by his excellent conduct and unobtrusiveness. 
During his long stay in El Salvador he married a 
Salvadoran lady. During the 1930‘s however, the 
situation changed drastically and the loan became a 
source of difficulties for the United States and the 
regime of General Martfnez.
The loan of 1922 was the only source of signifi­
cant economic problems between the United States and 
El Salvador during the period. Unlike the situation 
in other Central American countries, there were no
■^Thurston to Bundy, September 3» 1931, file 816.51/ 
643, R.G. 59. N. A.
40Interview with Ambassador Serrano, December 
1975. San Salvador•
28
large American landholdings or industrial investments 
in 21 Salvador. A healthy trade flourished between 
the two nations. 21 Salvador exported to the United 
States coffee* "balsam of Peru," sisal* reptile shins 
and hardwood lumber. In return* El Salvador imported 
cotton materials* wheat products, processed meats, 
rubber products, chemicals, medical instruments and 
small machinery. During the 1925-1929 period, the 
United States maintained a favorable balance of trade, 
exporting an average of $8*000,000 to the Salvadorans 
while importing an average of only $3*000,000 from 
them. Of 21 Salvador's exports to her Northern 
Neighbor, the largest proportion consisted of coffee, 
which during the 1920’s increasingly became almost the 
only Salvadoran export. During the 1920-1929 period 
the proportion of coffee in the total Salvadoran 
exports rose from sixty-nine percent to ninety-three 
percent. The economic prosperity of the 1920’s thus 
caused the Salvadorans to become dependent on coffee 
sales as the primary source of Income. When 1929
Ai
Henry C. Wallich and John H. Adler, Public 
Finance in a Developing Country; El Salvador - A Case 
Study (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1951)* ~
p. 31» New York Times. February 20, 1937®
IAj o
Max P. Brannon, El Salvador, esquema estadjfstlca 
de la vlda nacional (San Salvador, 193o), pp. 23-24.
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brought an end to the boom, El Salvador suffered severe 
social and economic dislocations with corresponding 
political repercussions. A successful coup d’etat 
took place on December 2, 1931* which ushered in a 
new era for El Salvador under the dictatorship of 
General Maximiliano Hernandez Martfnez.
The Emergence of General Martjfnez
From the viewpoint of the United States, which 
had for many years attempted to stabilize the turbulent 
Central American nations by promoting freely held 
elections, it seemed ironic that the violent coup d ’etat 
of December 2, 1931 was triggered by such an attempt.
The ballots cast had barely been counted when the seeds 
of discontent were sown. But the revolt which brought 
General Hartfnez to power had actually been brewing for 
some time. It started with El Salvador’s change from 
a stable albeit repressive dictatorship and ended with 
the ill-fated experiment with democracy.
In 1927 Dr. P10 Romero Eosque was elected president 
of El Salvador, the choice of the Melendez-Quinonez 
families which had ruled the country since
30
k3
1913* Romero Bosque, however, disappointed his 
benefactors® His rule helped to unleash the 
frustrations of Salvadorians who had suffered many 
years of repression under the Melendez-Quinonez 
dynasty® During his term in office he allowed a 
free press to function, restored the constitutional 
rights of individuals, and generously allowed poli­
tical exiles to return. Unlike his predecessors, 
he was honest and even shared power with other politi­
cal groups, much to the dismay of the oligarchy and 
44the army.
One of the reasons for Romero Bosque’s willingness 
to break with the family which had placed him in the 
presidency was the degree of economic success which 
the nation experienced at the start of his term in 
office® In the previous year (1926), the value of El
^The family rule began with Carlos Melendez from 
1913-1919* He was succeeded by his brother Jorge 
Melendez from 1919-1923* Jorge’s brother-in-law, Dr. 
Alfonso Quinonez-Molina continued the rule^from 1923- 
1927® Under the Constitution of 1886, Quinonez could 
not succeed himself, so he chose a close friend,
Dr® Pfo Romero Bosque, to be his successor, but also 
dictated to the National Assembly that he be chosen 
Vice-President with the intention that he would oust 
Bosque and get back in power® Jones, The Caribbean 
Since 1900® p. 442; New York Times, October 5» 1930•
44 ^Thomas P. Anderson, Matanza: El Salvador’s
Communist Revolt of 1932 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1971), p. 8.
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Salvador’s coffee export was the highest in the nation’s 
history.^ The prospect for more years of record 
exports encouraged President Bosque to feel more 
secure in carrying out his political reforms*
Unfortunately, Bosque’s early economic successes 
were followed by a disastrous ending* By 1929® the 
price of coffee had begun to decline rapidly and by 
1930 had reached critical levels. The effect on El 
Salvador’s one-crop economy was devastating. The end 
of Bomero Bosque’s tenure had become a nightmare. The 
vitally needed customs receipts were dangerously low 
while police and military salaries were badly in 
arrears# Moreover, as El Dia, a Salvadoran paper, 
commented, the country needed more than liberal re­
organizations. "What is most apparent in the country 
is the disorganization of the services of state. On 
all sides disorganization is felt...everybody does as 
he likes and the soil hardly produces a small part of 
that which it should." Still, in keeping with his
^Brannon, El Salvador, esauema estad£stica de 
la vida naclonal. p. 24. The value of the colon 
fluctuated between 2 and 2*5 per dollar during the 
time, but since 1934 has remained constant at 2.5 per 
dollar.
^Charge’ d’Affaires W. W. Schott (El Salvador) 
to Stimson, February 3® 1930, file 8I6 .OO/766;
August 24, 1930, file 816.00/773, R. G. 59, N. A.
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promise to carry out free elections, he once again 
betrayed the oligarchy which had put him in office 
by not ''appointing" his successor as had been the 
common practice in the paste
The liberal reforms instituted by Romero Bosque 
during his term in office appeared to backfire on 
the Salvadorans when a combination of economic distress, 
a restless military and police, and a welter of 
candidates for the presidency gave the pending elec­
tions the appearance of being anything but "free and 
democratic." The American Minister in San Salvador, 
Warren D. Robbins had taken an active part in the 
campaign. He strongly urged President Bosque to carry 
out his election reform pledge and hold constitutional 
elections. He suggested that "in light of what had 
happened elsewhere in Latin America, it would make El 
Salvador famous." The free elections would be es­
pecially signigicant coming on the heels of a successful 
revolution in neighboring Guatemala. Minister Robbins 
observed that the State Department's refusal to recognize 
Orellana in Guatemala had helped to maintain stability 
in El Salvador because "there was a military clique here 
that would have immediately followed the example set
U  rp
there" (had they been recognized). ' His suggestions
h,n
Minister Warren D. Robbins (El Salvador) to 
Stimson, January 2, 1931 * file 816.00/782, R.G. 59» N. A.
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were not lost on the Salvadoran leaders.
Thus, the American involvement in El Salvador's 
election, although indirect, was significant. As 
early as 1930, aspiring candidates had consulted with 
the American Minister to determine his views regard­
ing their candidacies. Because of the power and 
prestige of the United States every American word or 
deed regarding an issue or controversy was bound to 
be interpreted as favorable or unfavorable to one side 
or the other. Arturo Araujo, one of the candidates in 
the election, bluntly summed up the value of the 
American Minister's support when he said that "the 
slightest manifestation of interest by the United
States Minister in any of the candidates would pretty
LlQ
much insure his success." The official position 
of the State Department was that there should be no 
participation by American representatives which could 
be construed as "intervention" in the affairs of 
another country. Yet, it was not out of order, when 
advice was sought, to suggest the proper course of 
action to be taken. Such action, however, was usually 
based on the desire of the United States to maintain 
political stability in Central America and thus keep
Schott to Stimson, February 13# 1930, file 
816.00/767, H. G. 59, N. A.
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the area safe from the danger of revolution or outside 
L q
intervention. 7
The first ‘'free" presidential election ever held 
in El Salvador took place without Incident during 
January 11-13* 1931* Of the six candidates who had 
entered the campaign initially, two, Dr. Alberto C-omez- 
Zarate, the former Minister of War, and Arturo Araujo, 
an engineer and respected coffee planter and rancher 
became the front runners.-’0 One of the military can­
didates, General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez, 
agreed to withdraw at the last minute and gave his 
support to Arturo Araujo. For his support, General 
Martinez expected and later received the Vice Presi­
dency and a very important cabinet position as 
Minister of War.'’1
The election results indicated that although
bright, “Free Elections in the Latin American 
Policy of the United States,“ pp. 91-92; VJood,
The Making of the Good Neighbor Polic?/. pp. 142-143; 
Munro, The United States and the Caribbean. 1921-1933.
-^Schott to Stimson, January 16, 1930, file 
816.00/765, E.G. 59* N. A.
5 1
Robbins to Stimson, January 10, 1931* file 
816.00/784, E.G. 59* N. A.; Anderson, Matanza: El
Salvador^ Communist Revolt of 1932. pp. 50-51.
♦
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Arturo Araujo had a clear majority over his closest
rival, he did not have a simple majority of all the
votes cast. Thus, the election had to be decided
from amoug the three top candidates by the National
Assembly as stipulated by the Constitution.^2 On
February 12, 1931 Araujo was unanimously chosen by
the legislative body. His victory In the assembly
was insured when he was able to get the support of
deputies loyal to Gomez-Zarate and Enrique Cordova.
The price Araujo had to pay for the support was high.
He had to promise to reimburse the men their campaign 
53e x p e n s e s . T h e  price he paid was much too high in 
light of his short tumultuous stay in office.
President Araujo entered office a man highly respected 
for his honesty and integrity. American Charge*
W. W. Schott described him as a "splendid gentleman 
who has done much for the progress of his country...
In his section of the country he is greatly admired 
and respected and his people have a passionate 
attachment to him." Yet, despite his honesty and
-^Bobbins to Stimson, January 16, 1931. file 
816.00/791. R.G. 59. N. A.
-^Charge* d*Affaires Harold D. Finley (El Salvador) 
to Stimson, Jnue 2, 1931. file 816.51/618, R. G. 59, N.A.
ejh,
Schott to Stimson, February 3. 1930, file 
816.00/766, R.G. 59. N. A.
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Integrity he proved to be a poor choice during such 
a critical period in Salvadoran history.
President Araujo's problems began soon after he 
took office on March 1, 1931® He found himself facing 
an empty treasury, a floating debt of about $4,000,000 
and with no apparent income® The customs revenues, 
after the loan of 1922 had been serviced, had already 
been pledged by the preceding government to certain 
external c r e d i t o r s.Although he was the candidate . 
of the Labor Party during the election, labor problems 
became prevalent when he took office. The campesinos 
who were promised higher wages and better working 
conditions during the election sought the immediate 
fulfillment of the promises. When nonsmaterialized, 
their discontent became vocal and their protests 
became more vigorous.-/ Even his fellow coffee planters 
were apprehensive because of their fear of Communist 
activities in the countryside and the seeming inability 
of the government to guard their fjmcas.
-^Finley to Stimson, May 27, 1931* file 8l6.51/6l4, 
E.G. 59* M . A.
J Robbins to Stimson, March 27, 1931* file 
816.00/801, E.G. 59* N. A.
<7
* - flncas - coffee farms. Finley to Stimson,
June 2, 1931, file 816.51/618, R.G. 59, N. A.
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The problems of the Araujo administration resulted 
not only from a lack of administrative skill on his 
part, but also from corruption involving his family 
and friends who were able to get federal funds for their 
personal use, Araujo himself squandered large sums of 
money for lavish entertainment at the Presidential 
Palace, This extravagance during a severe depression 
caused a great deal of resentment among the Salvadoran 
population,
In an indirect way, the United States was involved 
during the critical period in El Salvador just prior 
to the coup d'etat. Ever since the "loan of 1922” 
became effective, an American fiscal representative 
had been present in San Salvador to oversee the proper 
collection of customs duties. In effect, he managed 
the finances of El Salvador, When the price of coffee 
fell to the point where almost all of the customs 
revenues was being used to service the loans and left 
little for the national treasury, many Salvadorans 
blamed the United States for their problems. The pre­
sence of the fiscal representative alone was enough 
to prompt newspaper criticisms. Even the able Mr, 
Eenwick was overwhelmed by the attacks. He was accused
^Minister Charles B® Curtis (El Salvador) to 
Stimson, December 15. 1931* file 816.00 Revolutions/^, 
E.G. 59. N. A.
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of meddling in the internal affairs of El Salvador 
because of his role as an expert advisor in helping the 
Minister of Interior, Auditor-General and even the 
President (at their request) to draft decrees and
K Q
legislation affecting the finances of the country. ^
In an attempt to shore up the faltering finances of 
the nation* President Araujo began to negotiate with 
the external creditors. A plan to declare a two-year 
moratorium on the amortization but not on the interest 
of the external loan was considered. However, this 
plan was abandoned when the creditors provided alter­
native plans of their own. After considering several 
proposals. President Araujo verbally accepted a plan 
presented by Earnest Berger of the Foreign Trade 
Securities Company of New York. The Berger plan called 
for a $4,000,000 loan to El Salvador against which five 
year notes at seven percent interest would be taken by 
the lending company at a nine percent discount. The 
loan was to be secured by a first mortgage on revenues 
from the manufacture and sale of aguardiente, the local 
rum. Also, during the term of the loan Berger's 
company was to have an option on all future financing
*59Interview with Victor Barriere, December 1975» 
San Salvador; Finley to Stimson, May 27, 1931. 
file 816.51/614, R.G. 59, N. A.
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of the government of El Salvadoi and act as the 
republic’s foreign purchasing agent. Berger was 
assisted in his Salvadoran ventures by another American, 
Ricardo Kriete who owned an aguardiente factory in 
El Salvador. It was rumored that President Araujo was 
to become a partner in the new aguardiente concern.
This enabled him to vertically integrate his business 
since he already owned a sugar plantation. The Berger 
loans ran into a great deal of opposition. Demonstra­
tions were held protesting the ”1922 loan” as well as 
the ’’Berger loan” which was being negotiated.
Moreover, the President was accused of ’’selling out 
the sovereignty of the country to the Colossus of the 
N o r t h . T h e  December coup finally killed the plan.
It was apparent, however, that although the 
criticisms and protests allowed the Salvadorans to vent 
their frustrations, nothing they did could improve their 
economic condition. The effect of the world-wide 
depression on the price of coffee was severe. Brazil’s 
effort to shore up the price by its valorization plan
^°Finley to Stimson, May 27, 1931* file 8l6.5l/6l4; 
July 3, 1931, file 816.00/807; July 15, 1931, file 
816.00/808, R.G. 59, N. A.
^0
6lhelped only temporarily. The trend in coffee prices
was downward. While coffee exports remained strong, the
price at which it was sold continued to decline. By
late 1931» it had become clear that the following year
6 2was going to be economically disastrous. With the 
collapse of the price of coffee, the only prop to the 
Salvadoran economy was seriously weakened. The result 
was a military coup d* etat.
The revolution began when disgruntled soldiers in 
the First Infantry barracks, angry at not being paid, 
fired upon the Presidential Palace across the street.
The barracks were ideally located on elevated ground 
overlooking the President’s mansion. Still, President 
Araujo managed to escape through a side door. He 
attempted to rally some of the loyal forces in the 
neighboring departments of La Libertad and Santa Ana, 
but his efforts failed and he was forced to seek refuge 
out of the country. On December he escaped to
6l Lavis, "The El Salvador Bondholders Protective 
Committee Report."
6 2
y New York Times, December 20, 1931; Anderson,
Matanza: El Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932. p. 68.
41
Guatemala with a small retinue of followers.^ There 
he was given sanctuary by his friend9 President Jorge 
Ubico. Araujo later attempted to use Guatemala as a 
base of operations for a counterattack but was pre­
vented from doing so by Ubico who ultimately forced
64him to leave the country.
The suddenness of the revolt surprised many 
people, including the American representatives. Only 
eleven months before, Minister Robbins had reported 
that "I cannot help but believe that in this very 
thickly populated country where practically every acre 
of land is owned by rich and poor, there is much chance 
of a revolution for the reason that there are too many 
property owners who have much to lose.”^  Similar 
observations had been made before regarding the wide­
spread ownership of land and therefore the belief that 
no revolt would take place. Furthermore, although 
it was well known that there was a great deal of
^Curtis to Stimson, December 5, 1931, file 8l6 .00 
Revolutions/35; December 8, 1931. file 816.00 
Revolutions/36; December 9. 1931* file 816.OO 
Revolutions/37, R.G. 59, N. A.
64 ✓Anderson, Matanza; El Salvador8s Communist
Revolt of 1932. p. 63. "
^Robbins to Stimson, December 18, 1930, file 
816.00/781, R.G. 59, N. A.
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discontent In El Salvador, most Informed observers 
believed that because Araujo had the loyalty of a 
strong Minister of War, no military revolt would take 
place.
The e x a c t  role of General Martfnez in the revolt 
remains unclear. His supporters contend that General 
Martinez did not take over the presidency but was 
chosen as president by the military junta after the 
latter had consulted the best legal minds of El Sal­
vador. Moreover, they contend that the junta acted 
under the dictates of the Constitution which stipulated 
that the vice-president take over after the president 
has left the country. The detractors of General
Martinez contend that he was responsible for the revolt
66right from the start.
Most commentators agree, however, that if he did 
not have a role in initiating the uprising, he quickly 
capitalized on the events that led him to the presiden­
cy.^ By December 4, he was in full control of the 
situation.
66 Interview with Ambassador Serrano and Sr. Jose" 
Antonio Penate, December 1975, San Salvador.
^Kenneth Grieb, "The United States and the Rise of 
General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez," Journal of 
Latin American Studies. 3, 2 (November 1971)* PP« 154-156; 
Anderson, Matanza; El Salvador^ Communist Revolt of 
1932, pp. 50, 62.
General Martinez was unlike other military 
dictators of that period. Whereas Rafael Trujillo 
(Dominican Republic), Anastasio Somoza (Nicaragua), 
and Fulgencio Batista (Cuba) were strongmen who derived 
their power as much from their machismo as from their 
political skill, the Salvadoran dictator was a thought­
ful, frugal, somber-looklng man, more the unassuming 
scholar than the flamboyant dictator. General Martinez 
was also unusual in that he had become a vegetarian at
age 40 while in the military® Moreover, he was a
teetotaler who drank only water even at fiestas. His 
most unusual characteristic however, was his belief in 
"cromoterapia11 or cure by the colors. He prescribed 
to his friends water that had been placed under the 
sunshine in colored bottles to cure some illnesses. He
was also a believer in Theosophy and the reincarnation
of the human soul. His unorthodox beliefs earned 
him the nickname El Bru.jo from his detractors.
Although he ruled a Catholic country, he did not 
join the Catholic Church until late in life. He was 
brought into the Church by his wife who was devout in 
her faith. The death of his son because of a ruptured
Interview with Victor Barriere and Jose'" Penate, 
December 1975* San Salvador.
appendix also led him to find consolation through con­
ga
version to the Catholic faith. 7 In spite of his 
unique personal characteristics, his leadership ability 
was never in question.
The role of the United States before and during the 
December coup had significant implications for 
Salvadoran-American relations. Minister Bobbins had 
been very active in San Salvador during the presidential 
campaign to the point of calling for a battleship to 
stand by in Corinto, Nicaragua, in case of trouble.
While his involvement in Salvadoran affairs did not 
result in any serious problems, the conduct of his 
successor, Charles B. Curtis, during and after the 
revolt led to a strained relationship between the two 
countries.
The action of Minister Curtis during the crisis 
exemplified the type of problem faced by the United 
States when it did not have the best man on the post. 
Unfamiliar with what his role should be in the event 
of a revolt, he became deeply involved in the matter. 
Based on his part experience, he advised the rebels that
go
^Military Intelligence Division Memorandum,
May 27, 1941, Item no. 3100, folder 3000-4000, Box 817, 
El Salvador 2400-3020, G-2 Regional file 1933-1944,
R.G. 165, N. A.
General Martfnez would be their best choice for presi­
dent.^7® Under Article II of the 1923 Treaty. General 
Martfnez clearly was not "recognizable. "'71
Secretary of State Stimson was very disappointed
with the way his Minister had acted during the emergency,
and placed the blame on the fact that Curtis was
"a promotion from the career men," and that "I took him
72on their recommendation. " ' Curtis had served as 
American Minister in Santo Domingo where, according 
to Stimson, "he had done badly." His tenure in El 
Salvador was disappointing as well, prompting Stimson 
to write in his diary that; "It only shows that when 
you have a man who isn't quite up to snuff, the 
lightning is sure to strike wherever you put him."^ 
Secretary Stimson may have been too harsh on Minister 
Curtis who had been on the job less than two months and 
the revolution had been brewing long before then.
70Interview with Ambassador Serrano, December 1975* 
San Salvador.
^Charge* d*Affaires W. J. McCafferty (El Salvador) 
to Stimson, May 18, 1932, file 816.00 General Conditions/ 
31, R.G. 59. H.A.
"^Henry L. Stimson Diary, December 4, 1931. lale 
University Manuscript Collection.
73Ibid.
4-6
A special representative was sent in to assess the 
situation. Former Minister to El Salvador Jefferson 
Caffery and his aide H. Freeman Matthews were dispatched 
to the troubled country with instructions to "inquire 
into the situation and make suggestions to the Depart­
ment concerning the steps to be taken..• in order that 
a constitutional government may be formed which will
not be barred from recognition... under the terms of the
oh,
General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923." Secretary 
Stimson described Caffery1s trip as a "rescue mission 
to S a l v a d o r . T h e i r  quick survey resulted in a recom­
mendation not to grant recognition to the Martinez 
regime and marked the start of an excruciating episode 
in Salvadoran-American relations. The United States, 
restricted in its actions by the 1923 treaty, became 
entrapped in the dilemma of opposing a revolutionary 
government, while no longer willing to use force to 
remove it.^
"^Stimson to Caffery, December 16, 1931* file 816.01 
Caffery Mission/6 , R.G. 59» N.A.
"^Stimson Diary, January 8, 1932.
^Stansifer, "Application of the Tobar Doctrine to 
Central America," p. 272.
SUMMARY
The deteriorated status, in late 1931* of the 
once cordial relationship between the United States and 
El Salvador caused a great deal of consternation in the 
foreign affairs offices of each country. Both sides 
however, shared the blame for bringing about such a 
state of events. As must be expected, in the relation­
ship between two nations, each in effect becomes an 
adversary of the other because the foreign policy of 
every nation dictates that its goals and interests take 
priority over all other considerations. If such goals 
and interests are complementary, then the relationship 
between them will not be strained. The problem arises 
when there is a divergence in their objectives.
Early in the twentieth century, the relationship 
between the United States and El Salvador began on a 
cordial footing. Although the United States was at the 
time gaining a tarnished image because of its interven­
tion in other Latin American nations, her good relations 
with El Salvador were never seriously threatened. On 
the matter of political stability in Central America, 
a matter which greatly concerned the United States, each 
nation agreed with the terms of the 1907 and I923 
Central American Treaties of Peace and Amity although
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El Salvador took exception to Article II of the 1923 
Treaty which dealt with non-recognition of revolutionary 
governments* Apparently, the future implications of 
such a policy were not foreseen and, as a result, no 
big issue was made of it*
The economic views of both nations coincided 
during the early twentieth century* In 1922 each had 
something to contribute to the other's benefit* El 
Salvador, in dire financial straits, needed the funds 
that United States bankers offered* The Americans, 
aware of the growing Mexican and European influence in 
the area, wanted to expand their economic influence 
there* One result was the 1922 loan of over $16,000,000, 
the bulk of which was bonds sold to the American 
public* The terms were such that default was most 
likely during times of financial crisis® In 1923* 
however, El Salvador's coffee exports were substantial 
enough that no one foresaw any problems arising from 
the loan.
The difficulty that the American Foreign Service 
had in finding qualified individuals for assignment 
to Central America, proved to be a source of problems. 
Unfortunately, many in the diplomatic service considered 
an assignment to Central America a demotion. As a 
result, the region did not have the full benefit of able 
men with positive attitudes toward their assignments.
El Salvador had the misfortune of having two men of low 
caliber assigned to head the United States mission to 
that countrye During the early 1920's the American 
Minister9 Montgomery Schuyler served in a manner that 
did not endear him (and therefore the United States) to 
the Salvadorans® He is remembered as a man who was 
"muy duro, muy violento.1' His poor performance was 
overshadowed somewhat by his successors Jefferson Caffery, 
who endeared himself to the Salvadoran people* In 1931 
however, the United States suffered another setback 
with the appointment of Minister Charles B. Curtis*
His personal shortcomings were vividly revealed with 
his erratic conduct during the December 2-4, 1931 
coup d'etat*
With the occurrence of the coup the dormant 
political and economic problems between the United 
States and El Salvador erupted as Article II of the 
1923 Treaty prevented the United States from granting 
recognition to the new regime of General Maximiliano 
Hernandez Martinez. Moreover, the already inflamed 
situation was worsened when the severe drop in coffee 
prices forced El Salvador to default on its 1922 loan 
from the United States* Thus, with the presidency of 
General Martinez, an agonizing period in the relations 
between the United States and El Salvador began*
CHAPTER III
TEE EARLY YEARS: FOCUS ON RECOGNITION
Non-Recognition as a Tool
On December 20, 1931 the United States officially 
informed the four other Central American nations of 
its decision not to recognize General Maximiliano H. 
Martinez as the President of El Salvador, The reason 
was that the United States would follow the dictates 
of Article II of the 1923 Central American Treaty of 
Peace and Amity, But because recognition by Washington 
was considered vital for the survival of any Central 
American government, the position taken by the United 
States meant, literally, the death sentence for the 
new government. In the past, other regimes had collapsed 
under similar pressures.1 In fact, it was with this very 
thought in mind that Central American delegations signed
•^Excelsior.January 6, 1932. Federico Tinoco of 
Costa Rica was ousted in 1919 and Manuel Orellana of 
Guatemala was forced out in 1930. For an extended 
analysis of the recognition issue from the United States 
point of view, see: Kenneth Grieb, "The United States
and the Rise of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez," 
Journal of Latin American Studies, 3* 2 (November 1971)» 
pp. 151-172.
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the 1907 and 1923 treaties. The initial paragraph of 
Article II of the 1923 Treaty gave the rationales
Desiring to make secure in the 
Republics of Central America the benefits 
which are derived from the maintenance of 
free institutions and to contribute at the 
same time toward strengthening their stabi­
lity, and the prestige with which they 
should be surrounded, they declare that 
every act, disposition or measure which 
alters the constitutional organization in 
any of them is to be deemed a menace to the 
peace of said Republics, whether it proceed 
from any public power or from the private 
citizens.^
Thus, the signatories used the non-recognition article 
as an instrument to preserve stability, as a threat 
to any would-be revolutionary that his efforts were 
doomed to failure because he would not be granted 
recognition by the United States as well as his 
neighbors. In theory, the idea seemed worthwhile; but 
in reality, as General Martinez would prove, it was not.
Privately, Secretary of State Henry Stimson ex­
pressed doubts about the wisdom of the non-recognition 
policy and took pride in the fact that the United States 
had, for all intents and purposes, abandoned the non­
recognition policy for all area of the world except 
Central America.^ Yet, in a speech before the Foreign
2
Memorandum by Chief of Latin American Division 
Edwin C. Wilson, February 4, 1932, file 816.01/283, 
R.G. 59, N. A.
3
"stimson Diary, December 8, 1930.
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Relations Council of New York on February 6, 1931* he 
praised the concept for having stopped bloodshed and
Ip
for helping to establish more democratic governments*
In a later assessment of the policies of the period, 
historian-diplomat Dana Munro credited the non­
recognition policy with helping to curtail revolution­
ary efforts in the area*^ On the other hand, Raymond 
Leslie Buell, Research Director of the Foreign Policy 
Association of New York, charged the policy with 
perpetuating dictators who could not be ousted in any 
other way than by revolution.^ Ee further urged that 
the State Department "lean over backward" to recognize 
General Martinez and prevent revolution in El Salvador.
He feared such a revolt would ultimately spread to 
neighboring republics. The only solution to the 
problem,he felt, was to amend the 1923 Treaty "in order 
to give greater flexibility to its non-recognition 
terms."' Another diplomat, Lawrence Dennis, who had 
served in Honduras and Nicaragua, also criticized the 
non-recognition policy. In an article In Foreign Affairs,
Nex'f York Times. February 7, 1931 •
^Munro, The United States and the Caribbean, 
1221=1222. p* 280.
^New York Times, January 11, 1931•
7
Raymond Leslie Euell to Edwin C. Wilson,
February 25, 1932, file 8l6.0l/ll6^, R.G. 59, N . A.
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he urged that the United States abancon its adherence
Q
to Article II of the 1923 Treaty* His article was 
immediately criticized by Chandler Anderson* a 
prominent international lawyer who proclaimed the 
virtues of the 1907 and 1923 treaties *9 BU-t the point 
of Dennis’ article was clear: the value of Article II
had diminished to the point that it was potentially more 
embarrassing than useful to the United States* Accor­
ding to Dennis, the potential danger lay in the
eventuality that a revolutionary government may defy
10the United States and still manage to survive* It was 
the ezact situation that the Martfnez affair turned out 
to be* The United States, although not a signatory to 
the 1923 Treaty, had become its strongest supporter in 
1931, Thus, the politics of recognition had become a 
dilemma for American diplomats. The feeling was summed
8Lawrence Dennis, "Revolution, Recognition and 
Intervention," Foreign Affairs* IX (January 1931)» 
passim. Dennis served as the American Charge' d ’Affaires 
in Honduras and Nicaragua during the Sandino Affair.
9
^Chandler P. Anderson, "Our Policy of Non-Recogni­
tion in Central America," American Journal of Inter­
national Law. 25 no* 2 (April 1931)» passim. Anderson 
was an international law specialist active in Latin 
American boundary disputes during the 1920’s.
10Dennis, "Revolution, Recognition, and Inter­
vention, " pp. 207-208.
up by Edwin C. Wilson, Chief of the Latin American
Division of the State Department, who exhibited his
exasperation with the recognition issue and the position
in which it placed the United States where f,we are
11dammed if we do and dammed if we don't,"
The position in which the American diplomats had 
been placed was the result of previous actions by their 
predecessors in Latin America, The desire for sta­
bility in Central America had been the predominant 
reason President Theodore Eoosevelt and Secretary of 
State Elihu Root called for the 1907 conference which 
resulted in the Treaty of Peace and Amity of that year. 
The same desire, plus a bit of moralizing, prompted 
President Woodrow Wilson to abandon the Jeffersonian 
doctrine of de facto recognition to stable governments. 
In 1913» when he refused to recognize the government of 
General Victoriano Huerta in Mexico, President Wilson 
hoped to teach the Mexicans that they could not 
establish governments through revolution. He used the
same tactics to oust Federico Tinoco from power in Costa 
12Rica in 1919® During the presidency of Herbert Hoover 
11Wilson to Minister Sheldon Whitehouse (Guatemala) 
November 4, 1932, file 816.01/258, R.G. 59, N. A.
12Munro, The United States and the Caribbean, 1921- 
1933, P® 118? Raymond O'Connor, Force and Diplomacy, 
Essays Military and Diplomatic (Coral Gables, Florida: 
University of Miami Press, 1972), p. 107®
Secretary Stimson used non-recognition to topple the 
regime of General Manuel Orellana in Guatemala in 1930.
Thus, non-recognition was a tool used by American
officials to achieve specific goals in Central America,
namely, to maintain political stability, which in turn
enhanced the security of the Panama Canal and other
American interests in the area# Moreover, it was used
as a coercive device to force the Central Americans to
maintain social and political order through the use of
democratic and free elections® By using these methods,
it was hoped that they would ultimately be able to
13progress economically and politically® When the 
efficacy of such methods became questionable, the non­
recognition policy was abandoned by Secretary Stimson 
in 1930 for all of the world except Central America. 
There, the 1923 Treaty remained paramount. Therefore, 
guided by the treaty, on December 20, 1931 the United 
States decided not to recognize General Martinez as 
President of El Salvador.
13O' Connor, Force and Diplomacy, p. 106; Munro, 
The United States and the Caribbean. 1921-1933. p. 381; 
Wright, ‘‘Free Elections in the Latin American Policy 
of the United States," p. 99.
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Reaction to American Non-Recognition
The reaction from the press of Latin American
nations was expectedly vehement* The Mexican press
was especially vitriolic in attacking the position
taken by the United States. Excelsior criticized the
American non-recognition policy with such phrases as
"being too elastic for the United States" and "it
recognizes whenever it sees fit." The paper also
accused the United States and certain Central American
countries of treating El Salvador like a "vassal."1^
El Universal Grafico, another Mexican daily, joined in
the protest, condemning the manner in which "...Yankee 
imperialism interprets that treaty, which in its hands 
acquires the aspects of fantastic elasticity." It 
compared the plight of El Salvador in early 1932 with 
that of Mexico two decades past when "once the Govern­
ment of Revolution was installed, it was not recognized 
by the supreme censor, the United States." Moreover, 
the paper criticized the other Central American repub­
lics of "servility" for "not recognizing the new 
Salvadoran Government merely because the White House
1 ^
Excelsior. December 28, 1931* 
•^Excelsior, January 6 , 1932.
16has not given the example of assent.11 The official
stand of the Mexican government was based on her own
"Estrada Doctrine" whereby Mexico neither gave nor
denied recognition to a new government, but simply
maintained or recalled its representatives. It did
not pass judgment on the internal conduct of other 
17nations• '
The press in the Dominican Republic likewise
disparaged the American policy regarding El Salvador.
La Opinion, a leading daily, conceded that the 1923
Treaty was "very good," but,
...in the hands of the North American 
Governments which have liked to carry 
out an imperialistic policy, it has 
operated very capriciously because it 
has served very seldom to secure the 
high and noble purposes which seemed 
to inspire it.
In short, it has served only to 
keep in power in each of the Central 
American republics people who were 
acceptable to North American policy 
since, if managed skillfully, this Treaty 
permits the United States to take dif­
ferent attitudes in different cases.
In fact, when the United States in 
spite of the Treaty has wanted to 
overthrow a Government, there have 
occurred mysterious and apparently 
’legal movements which have culminated .g 
in the success of the movement desired.
^ B1 Universal Grafico, January 9» 1932.
17'Callcott, The Western Hemisphere, p. 255* 
•^La Opinion, December 2^, 1931*
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Costa Rica, the nation which had been the leading
proponent of Article II at the 1923 conferences had
reversed itself by 1932. However, it faced a dilemma.
Because of an internal political situation which
existed in early 1932, it could not openly support
the regime of General Martinez without jeopardizing
its own stability. In early 1932, a heated campaign
for the presidency of Costa Rica took place. Two men
✓
vied for the office, Ricardo Jimenez and Manuel Castro
Quesada. Many Costa Rican officials feared that if
they rewarded the "revolutionary" efforts of General
Martfnez by recognizing him, the loser in their own
election might be encouraged to take similar measures.
Therefore, Costa Rica followed Honduras and Nicaragua
19and refused recognition. 7
However, of all the Central American neighbors 
of El Salvador, it was Guatemala which took the hardest 
line against General Martfnez. Certain Guatemalan 
officials suggested to American Minister Sheldon 
Whitehouse that the Communist threat was exaggerated 
by General Martfnez. Moreover, they suggested that 
the other Central American nations and the United 
States take "definite steps" to make General Martinez
1^Salisbury, "Domestic Policies and Foreign 
Policy: Costa Rica's Stand on Recognition 1923-193^,"
p. 469.
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abide by the convention of 1923 and that "action
20beyond breaking diplomatic ties" were necessary.
It was ironic that at the same time these officials
were protesting to Whitehouse, the President of
Guatemala, Jorge Ubico, was a comrade-at-arms of
General Martfnez in the struggle against Communism
in Central America. In fact, in January of 1932
Ubico warned General Martfnez of the plans leftist
radicals had formulated to instigate coordinated
21uprisings in both Guatemala and El Salvador. But 
the rivalries of the past had once again surfaced 
and ill-feelings between El Salvador and Guatemala 
were aroused once more.
Many supporters of General Manuel Orellana, 
former President of Guatemala, also had second thoughts 
about his resignation. They had seen him forced out 
of office in 1930 by Secretary Stimson through the 
use of non-recognition. After seeing the apparent 
success of General Martfnez, they believed that he too 
could have remained in office had he resisted the
Whitehouse to Stimson, February 8, 1932, 
file 816.00/84-2, R. G. 59, N. A.
91
Interview with Ambassador Serrano, December, 
1975* San Salvador.
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22American efforts. In 1932, however, all that they 
could do was to jealously vent their anger at General 
Martfnez whose resistance to the United States pressure 
made him a hero to many in other parts of Latin America.
To many Salvadorans, non-recognition was a sad 
disappointment. They saw that General Martfnez was 
able to provide stability after a period of chaos. 
Furthermore, by his actions, many of them were able 
to avoid mortgage foreclosures as well as benefit 
from a moratorium on the repayment of debts. Likewise, 
prices of the most basic commodities went down because 
of the efforts of General Martfnez*s administration.
Yet, in spite of such successes, the United States 
could not see fit to recognize him.
After-Effects of Non-Recognition
The good-will between El Salvador and the United 
States cultivated during the late 1920*s by Ministers 
Jefferson Caffery and Warren D. Bobbins quickly
22Whitehouse to Wilson, October 19, 1932, file 
816.01/858, E. G. 59, N. A.
^Interviews with Ambassador Serrano, Sr. Penate,
Sr. Barriere, Sr. Domfnguez, December, 1975* San Salvador, 
McCafferty to Stimson, January 16, 1932, file 816.00/
General Conditions-27, R. G. 59» N. A.
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disintegrated because of non-recognition. The 
American stand "consequently resulted in considerable 
ill-feeling" particularly from the Salvadoran press 
and the students. On December 3 1 ,  1931» the latter 
group organized a demonstration against the United 
States and its Charge1 W. J. MeCafferty. The Salva­
doran government had to intervene to prevent any
disagreeable incidents from arising out of the demon- 
2 Ll
stration. In the months which followed, the anti-
American feeling manifested itself through continued 
press attacks as well as through economic measures taken 
against Americans by the Salvadoran government.
On February 23» 1932 El Salvador defaulted on its 
1922 loan from American bondholders. While the economic 
pressures on El Salvador were sufficient to warrant 
such extreme action, it may also be speculated that it 
resulted partly from General Martinez1s anger with 
not being recognized by the United States. Evidence of 
this can be seen in other economic actions of the 
Salvadoran government. On June 23» 1932, an American 
firm, R. W. Hebard & Co., was notified by the Salvadoran 
Minister of Interior that its contract to construct 
sanitation facilities in the department of Santa Ana 
as well as an agreement to build a system of highways
24 x
MeCafferty to Stimson, January 16, 1932, file
8l6•00/General Condltions-2?, R. G. 59» N. A.
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in El Salvador had both been cancelled by the Council of .
Ministers effective June 30, 1932. The reasons given
for the decisions were the financial problems El Salvador
had experienced and also because the contracts were
illegal. The position of the Salvadoran government
was that the administrative contracts were revocable
at the will of the government. According to the
American Charge' W. J. McCafferty, "since the government
is prepared to undertake the work itself, the contracts
are legal. It is apparent that this is mere subterfuge
2=!to evade its obligations." J
Pan American Airways, Inc. also experienced similar 
problems as the Salvadoran government invalidated a 
previous agreement which allowed Pan-American to serve 
as the transporting vehicle for alr-mail from El Salvador 
to other nations. These actions by the government 
allowed the Salvadorans a release for their frustration 
in not receiving recognition from the United States and 
American businesses in El Salvador suffered.
It strengthened their resolve when, despite non­
recognition, the regime of General Martfnez remained 
in office. Moreover, matters were taken a step further
2^McCafferty to Stimson, July 9. 1932, file 
816.00/General Conditions-33, R. G. 59. N. A.
26Ibid.
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when Salvadoran officials boasted that they had been
able to prove "groundless the fear which has existed
from time immemorial that no Central American government
could remain in power without the approval or consent
27of foreign governments*" f
While non-recognition placed a heavy burden on 
the government of General Martfnez, an indirect but 
immediate benefit may have resulted from it in neigh­
boring Honduras* According to Minister Julius Lay in 
Tegucigalpa! "the refusal of the Department to 
recognize Martfnez has had a very strong restraining 
effect on revolutionary leaders in this country. In 
fact it may have prevented an attempted coup d’etat 
in Honduras during the last few months*.. I have reason 
to believe that these leaders will not be associated 
with any such uprising because they realize its futility 
in the face of the definite refusal of our government
p Q
to recognize Martfnez."
In El Salvador itself, leaders of the radical left 
saw an opportunity to subvert what they considered to 
be a weakened regime. They believed that, like other 
unrecognized governments in Central America’s past, the
27Ibid.
p O
Minister Julius Lay (Honduras) to Stimson, 
February 18, 1932, file 816.10/852, R. G. 59, N. A.
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government of General Martfnez would also collapse under 
such pressure from the United States. On January 22,
1932 a small group of radicals led by Alfonso Luna, Mario 
Zapata and Farabundo Martf, decided to increase the 
pressure on General Martfnez and initiated an uprising 
in the western provinces of El Salvador, Without realiz­
ing it, they had given General Martinez an opportunity to 
show the United States how strong his anti-communist 
beliefs were. When the ’’Communist” uprising broke out 
on January 22, 1932, he reacted violently.
Thus, to El Salvador in 1932, non-recognition by 
the United States had far greater implications than 
the mere non-acceptance into the world community. The 
leftist rebels initiated an uprising on the mistaken 
idea that the government of General Martinez was 
weakened by non-recognition. In turn, the uprising 
they initiated was crushed by a president rendered 
nervously insecure, but ever alert. The result was 
the matanza, the senseless slaughter of thousands of 
innocent Salvadoran peasants.
Anti-Communism as an Instrument to Gain Recognition
General Martfnez followed many avenues in his 
efforts to get recognition from the United States.
Among them were his claims to be an ally in the fight
65
against Communism. When the January revolt occurred, 
he saw an opportunity to improve his image in the eyes 
of his "neighbor to the North." Through his anti­
communist endeavors, he hoped to convince them of his 
worth as an ally in the same cause® It was a reasonable 
effort by General Martfnez because many in America 
likewise fought the expansion of Communist ideas.
In the United States, the depression had brought 
about many changes in the minds of Intellectuals and stu­
dents. The social and political conditions in the 
United States at the time seemed conducive to the 
germination of new, radical ideas. Because of the 
American government's inability to solve the economic 
difficulties, some individuals began to openly question 
the efficacy of the capitalistic system. Others went 
beyond and found their solutions in socialism. When 
they saw that the Soviet Union was not badly affected by
the worldwide depression, they concluded that socialism
2a
was the answer. 7
Thus, the American leaders, like General Martinez in 
El Salvador, had to deal with the same kind of radicalism 
in their own country. Knowing this, the Salvadoran leader 
hoped to have their sympathy and, ultimately, gain their
29
7Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: 
The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 196>0), pp. 1^7-153•
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30recognition. Although American officials were sym­
pathetic with his efforts against Communism* they
31nevertheless refused to recognize his regime. The 
result of the non-recognition was the continued lack 
of credibility of General Martfnez's administration.
The seemingly unstable government of El Salvador* 
further weakened by the economic distress brought 
about by the depression* whetted the appetite of the 
radical groups. Agitators subjected various segments 
of the population to a barrage of propaganda. Labor 
unions and unemployed farm workers were especially 
attractive targets to the radical groups. The social 
agitation by leftists during the 1920’s had begun to 
bear fruit as the depression-bred problems made many 
poor Salvadorans quite responsive to the overtures of 
the Communists during the 1930’s.-^ 2
 ^David Shannon» Twentieth Century America (Chicago: 
Rand McNally* 1967)» pp. 386-387; New York Times.
February 2, 1932. General Martfnez was not the only one 
to attempt to gain favor from the Americans by being a 
staunch anti-Communist. The Grau regime in Cuba tried 
the same measure in an effort to gain recognition.
Charles A. Thomson* ’’The Cuban Revolution*” p. 154, in 
Ramon Eduardo Ruiz ed., Interpreting Latin American Histo­
ry from Independence to Today (New York; Holt, Rinehart” 
and Winston, Inc• 1970).
31 ^ Stimson Diary, January 25, 1932.
-^2New York Times. May 29, 1931J Callcott, The 
Western Hemisphere, p. 253; Rollie Poppino, International 
Communism in Latin America: A History of the Movement
1917-1963~TLondon: The Free Press of Glencoe, 19^),
p. 1^ 1-143.
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Host of the propaganda efforts emanated from 
Mexico and Guatemala# In fact* the Soviet Union 
legation in Mexico City had become so active in training 
agitators that the Mexican government was forced to 
break off relations with Moscow.-^ The flow of pro­
paganda materials however* continued to enter El Salvador 
from Mexico which in turn received most of its 
literature from Communist organizations in the United 
States.
The activities of radical groups in El Salvador 
during 1930-1931 caused a great deal of concern among 
government officials. According to the Chief of Police, 
General Enrique Leitzelar, "the Soviet government has 
decided upon El Salvador as the Central American center 
for its activities." Although President Eosque at the 
time confirmed the suspicions of his Chief of Police, no 
evidence of such a Soviet Union decision was ever 
presented to the American Minister Warren D. Robbins. 
Still, the fears continued as captured correspondence bet­
ween a labor organizer in San Salvador, Miguel Angel 
Martinez, and the "International Labor Defense," an
^New York Times, February 23, 1931; Callcott,
The Western Hemisphere, pp. 25^-255•
■^Finley to Stimson, May 20, 1931, file 8l6.00 
B/38, R.G. 59, N. A.
-^Robbins to Stimson, October 31, 1930, file
816.00 B/22, R.G. 59, N. A.
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American Negro labor group, was made public. The 
American group urged its comrades in El Salvador to 
unite and organize against "capitalists and imperial­
ists," and urged that they boycott American 
manufactured goods. The Salvadoran government made 
numerous requests of the American legation to do some­
thing to stop the flow of propaganda material emanating
37from the United States.-''
The fear of Communism in El Salvador existed not 
only because of the disseminated propaganda literature, 
but also from actual incidents of Communist activities 
which occurred sporadically near the capital and along 
the countryside. The arrest of a known Communist 
leader, Agustin Farabundo Marti', confirmed the existence 
of radical agitators in the area.'*® Marti had previously 
been exiled for his efforts in agitating the campesinos. 
He had also served with Agusto Sandino in Nicaragua.
To be sure, what were termed Communist outbreaks 
were oftentimes merely labor disputes which arose from
®®Robbins to Stimson, January 12, 1931* file 8l6.00 
B/29, R.G. 59» N. A; McCafferty to Stimson, April 2, 
1932, file 816.00 General Conditions/29, R.G. 59* N. A.
-^Curtis to Stimson, November 19, 1931* file 816.00 
General Conditions/2o• R.G. 59* N.A.
38Finley to Stimson, May 12, 1931, file 816.00/802, 
R.G. 59, N . A.
6 9
the economic dislocations brought about by the worsening 
39depression.  ^ Also, many Salvadorans whose intentions 
were merely social reform were likewise labeled 
Communists when in fact they harbored no Communist 
ideas. As elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, the 
leftist radicals became excellent targets for accusing 
fingers and were blamed as the culprits in many 
incidents for which they had no responsibility. The 
Communist rebels sporadically clashed with the forces 
of General Martinez in the early part of 1932 and cul­
minated in one of the bloodiest confrontations in 
Latin American history.
At midnight on January 22, 1932, bands of Indian 
campesinos began to attack isolated fincas in the 
western part of El Salvador. The uprising was for the 
most part confined to the region between San Salvador, 
Ahuachapan and Acajutla, the coffee growing center of 
El Salvador. Towns and villages were taken and sacked 
by Indians armes with machetes and other small weapons. 
There was no fighting in the capital city but there
existed the fear that some troops would be disloyal
Ilq
to the government.
■ ^ M c C a f fe r t y  to Stimson, F e b r u a r y  5* 1932, f i l e
816.00 General Conditions/29, R.G. 59, N . A.
^McCafferty to Stimson, February 5» 1932, file
816.00 General Conditions/28, R.G. 59* N . A.
The rebellious Indians were the descendants of 
the Pipiles, the original inhabitants of the region.
Like in other countries, their lands were taken away 
from their e.iidos during the latter part of the nine­
teenth century and they became impoverished workers on 
their own lands. Moreover, the treatment of the 
workers helped to worsen the situation inasmuch as they 
were abused and exploited by the finqueros. In 1932 
many of them were convinced by the Communist agitators 
that they had a justifiable case against the finqueros1 
oppression. They were promised a portion of land for 
their families by the radical agitators. Moreover,
they were to share in the redistribution of wealth after
42the revolution. Thus, the Indians attacked the 
symbols of their oppression, the authorities and any 
ladino. The descriptions of the atrocities, looting 
and general madness of Indians stimulated by alcohol 
terrified the entire Salvadoran population. The 
government, which had been forewarned by Jorge Ubico 
of the impending Communist-led rebellion, reacted 
quickly and plans for counterattacks were immediately
41 Ibid.
42 ~Interview with Sr. Penate, December 1975, San
Salvador•
laid. General Jose Tomas Calderon was given the respon­
sibility of crushing the revolt. On the whole, the 
Salvadoran population supported General Martinez's
k3
actions because they too feared Communism. ^
As news of the attacks reached each village, panic 
ensued as escaping ladinos described their eyewitness 
accounts of maiming, eye gouging, and other brutal 
activities of the rampaging Indians. But the military 
suppression of the uprising was quick and violent.
Towns and villages were retaken by well armed troops 
whom the villagers welcomed as "saviours." Brief but 
violent confrontations occurred as soldiers machine 
gunned "waves of onrushing Indians." All suspected 
rebels were executed on the spot by firing squads.
Many were suspected simply because they were Indians 
and were summarily executed. Many who had given support 
to Communist programs in the past were likewise executed. 
The basis for suspicion became so flimsy that many 
people feared for their lives simply because they
A  3 _
^Interviews with Ambassador Serrano, Sr. Penate,
and Sr. Dominguez, December 1975» San Salvador.
Ll Ll
Interview with Sr. Penate, December 1975, San 
Salvador. Sr. Penate was one of the soldiers assigned 
to retake the town of Sonsonate from the Indians. He was 
as terrified by the ferocity of the attacks as the 
villagers although he was behind the machine gun.
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appeared to be Indians. Between January 23 when the 
government counterattack and reprisals began and 
April 10 when order was completely restored, over 
ten thousand Salvadorans were killed. There were no 
official counts of the number of people killed, but 
some estimates place the total number killed at over 
twenty-five thousand. J
Because of his quick and effective action, General 
Martinez became the champion of anti-Communism 
throughout Central America. He and his soldiers became 
the "saviours'’ of the towns and villages in El Salvador. 
He used the opportunity to strengthen his relationship 
with his troops and solidify his position as President. 
Moreover, he used the threat of further Communist out­
breaks as an excuse to increase the strength of the mili<=*
l±6
tary and police.
^Jorge Schlesinger, Revoluci6n communista.
Guatemala en peligro? (Guatemala: Union Tipografica
Castaneda Avila y Cla 1946), p. 4; Poppino, Interna­
tional Communism in Latin America, p. l4l; Interviews 
with Sr. and Sra. Felix Dominguez Revelo, Sra. Amana 
Calderon, July 1971® San Salvador; Sra. Lolita Barauna, 
June 1975, New Orleans. The interviewees all agreed that 
General Martfnez exceeded the force required to crush 
the revolt. At the same time, however, they also agreed 
that they were terrified by the atrocities and felt the 
need to crush the uprising at any cost•
46McCafferty to Stimson, February 2, 1932, file 
816.00/845, R.G. 59, N. A.
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The United States’ concern with the activities
of Communists everywhere helped to soften the harsh
reality of the massacre* The efforts of General
Martfnez to put down the uprising received a favorable
reaction from the State Department® Although American
and Canadian cruisers and destroyers were sent to
nearby ports, no foreign troops set foot on Salvadoran
soil. Secretary Stimson was relieved that no American
troops landed, but noted in his diary that General Mar-
tfnez, "the man who is president and who is the only
pillar against the success of what seems to be a nasty
proletarian revolution®..we are unable to recognize
L 7
under the 1923 rule." ' Thus, in spite of the sympathy, 
recognition was not granted. The change in the 
American position did not take place until 193^ when 
the New Deal changed many old ideas.
The Good Neighbor Grants Recognition
When the term of President Herbert Hoover ended in 
March of 1933* a new era in United States-Latin American 
relations was ushered in— the era of the '"Good Neighbor" 
policy. The serious economic condition of the United
^Stimson Diary, January 25, 1932.
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States at the arrival of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the
presidency did not leave him much time for foreign policy
matters. Domestic problems required his full attention.
Thus, his advisors, primarily Secretary of State Cordell
Hull and Assistant Secretary Sumner Welles, were respon-
4-8sible for establishing the foreign policies. In Latin 
American affairs the Influence of Sumner Welles was sig­
nificant. During the pre-Inauguration period of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s term, Welles presented his views on Inter- 
American Relations in a memo to his newly-elected friend. 
The memorandum provided the guidelines later followed by 
the Good Neighbor policy and was an important keystone 
to Salvadoran-American relations during the 1930’s and 
194-0’ s. Welles stated that:
The creation and maintenance of the most 
cordial and intimate friendship between 
the United States and the other republics 
of the American Continent must be regarded 
as a keystone of our foreign policy. The 
erroneous interpretations given to the 
Monroe Doctrine over a period of many 
decades have constituted a constant cause 
for apprehension and for misrepresentation 
of the true purposes of the government of 
the United States. The Monroe Doctrine 
declares that the United States will not 
permit any non-American nation to encroach 
upon the political independence of any 
American republic; and that the United
4-8Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy
of the United States: An Historical Interpretation
(New York: Hareourt Brace and Company, 194-3. p. 258.
States will not consent to the acquisition in 
any manner of the control of additional 
territory in this Hemisphere by any non- 
American Power* These principles have until 
now been proclaimed solely on the authority 
of the United States and they will not be 
abandoned* But they are essentially principles 
of continental self-defense. And they are as 
vitally important to every other republic of 
this Hemisphere as they are to the United 
States itself. I would welcome their adoption 
by every American republic as a portion of its 
national policy* Tn that manner alone, in my 
opinion, can there be permanently abolished 
the impression which has persisted that these 
simple principles of self-defense can involve 
a threat to the sovereignty or to the national 
well-being of any republic of the Western 
Hemisphere.
In addition, Welles suggested that the United States 
should not resort to armed intervention, should promote 
commerce and when a question arose, consult with other 
American republics.^ The views of Welles were well 
taken by President Roosevelt, and he incorporated 
some of the ideas in a major speech on Pan American Day 
in April 12, 1933 and thus launched the Good Neighbor 
policy.
In addition to Welles, the influence of Josephus 
Daniels, Roosevelt's old mentor at the Department of 
Navy, was also significant. In his new position as
^Charles G..Griffin, "Welles to Roosevelt: A
Memorandum on Inter-American Relations, 1933,” Hispanic
American Historical Review, XXXIV (May 195*0, PP-
190-192.
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ambassador to Mexico, Daniels helped to guide President 
Roosevelt to take a milder, more humanitarian position 
in the area of United States-Caribbean relations.-’0 
The old "big stick" and "dollar diplomacy" of the past had 
to be replaced with a better policy.
The actual practice of"good neighborliness" was 
probably best exemplified initially by the new Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull at the Montevideo Conference 
in 1933* Hr. Hull, long a student of international 
commercial relations, had been concerned about the 
adverse effects of high tariff walls which the United 
States had bult around itself. At the same time, it 
had "withdrawn from the market as a customer of certain 
Latin American nations.. . As a result, Hull went to 
the conference with the objective in mind that an 
attempt to resolve the economic ills of the world could 
be successful if tariff walls were brought down. The 
Resolution on Economic, Commercial and Tariff Policy, 
also known as the Hull Plan, was one of the accomplish­
ments of the Montevideo Conference. For its part, the
^°E. David Cronon, "Interpreting the Good Neighbor 
Policy: The Cuban Crisis of 1933," Hispanic American
Historical Review, 39 (November 1959)» PP* 560-567.
-^Benjamin Muse, "The Montevideo Conference,"
Speech, July 7, 193*1, before the Institute of Public 
Affairs, University of Virginia, in folder 3^8,
Monetary and Economic Conferences - Montevideo Conference 
Box 78, Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress.
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United States through the Resolution, announced its 
desire to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with 
the nations of the world.
The American success at the Montevideo Conference 
was in part due to the efforts of Secretary Hull 
himself. His dignified, yet sympathetic and friendly 
manner, enabled him to win respect and admiration from
C O
the other delegates.-' The fact that he represented a
new administration, not identified with the old
imperialism, helped to convince the wary Latin American
delegates of his sincerity.-'-' As it turned out, the
conference proved to be a notable juncture in United
States-Latin American relations. As soon as it ended,
the State Department set about to establish a course for
stable relations for the future and remedy the wrongs 
<5 Zl
of the past.-' Among the problems which needed to be 
remedied was the bothersome issue of non-recognition.
However, before any positive action was taken by 
the United States on the non-recognition matter, the 
policy was subjected to a great deal of criticism at 
home and abroad. The criticisms emanated from different
52Ibid.
-'■'Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, 
pp. 1^-18.
L
J  Laurence Duggan, The Americas: The Search for
Hemisphere Security (New Yorks Henry Holt and Company, 
Inc. 19^9)» P« 65.
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corners of the United States and for different reasons. 
President Lawrence A. Lowell of Harvard University 
attacked the policy during a speech on February 1, 1933* 
He agreed with other critics that the policy lowered 
the stature of the United States in the family of 
nations and that it continued the outdated big stick 
practices of the p a s t O n  April 30, 1933# an investor 
from Maryland wrote an angry letter to Secretary Hull in 
which he suggested that the State Department recognize 
the Salvadoran government uso U. S. bondholders may 
receive their interest.” He blamed the problem on "old 
pot belly Hoover and his crazy religious gang of 
bigots." He further warned that the situation be 
corrected "at once" or else "Roosevelt will be blamed,"-^ 
Other correspondence with the State Department, in less 
threatening tones, also urged recognition of General Mar- 
tfnez for economic ressons.-^
On the other hand, one of President Roosevelt's
-^Stimson Diary, February 1, 1933®
-^Mr. Embebee (Berlin, Maryland) to Hull, April 30, 
1933. file 8l6.51c39/229, R.G. 59, N. A.
-^Memorandum of conversation between Col. J. F. H. 
Johnson (President of Botany Worsted Mills) and Edwin C. 
Wilson, April 14, 1932, file 816.51c39/138, R.G. 59.
N. A; Matthew Salsinger to State Department, April 24, 
1932, file 8l6.51c39/l44, R.G. 59. N. A.
appointees, also urged the State Department to 
recognize SI Salvador. Josephus Daniels, Ambassador 
to Mexico urged that recognition be granted "with a 
view to restoring the friendly relations which pre­
viously existed between the United States and El 
Salvador."-^ While these requests for recognition 
came from individuals not directly involved with 
Salvadoran affairs, the bulk of the inquiries regarding 
recognition came from individuals acting directly as 
agents of General Martinez.
Immediately after taking office, General Martinez 
actively solicited the aid of various individulas in 
an attempt to sway the State Department: to grant 
recognition. He requested the executives of American 
companies in El Salvador to express to Washington 
their satisfaction with the de facto government7
The efforts of Salvadoran "agents" to gain 
recognition from the United States were based upon 
the following rationales: (1) that General Martinez
57•"Memorandum of conversation between Col. J. F. H. 
Johnson (President of Botany Worsted Mills) and Edwin C. 
Wilson, April 3>, 1932, file 816.51c39/l38, R. G. 59,
N. A. Matthew Salsinger to State Department, April 2^, 
1932, file 816'.51039/1^, B. G. 59, N. A.
Ambassador Josephus Daniels (Mexico) to Hull,
June 16, 1933, file 8l6 .01/302, R. G. 59. N.A.
-^McCafferty to Stimson, February 5» 1932, file 
816.00 General Conditions/28, R. G. 59* N.A.
was not involved in the 1931 coup and therefore he 
became president by virtue of his being vice-president; 
(2) Articles 81 and 92 of the Salvadoran constitution 
guaranteed him the position; the constitution of El 
Salvador was the ultimate law in the country and the 
United States had violated it through the use of the 
1923 Treaty; (3) the danger of Communism was real;
(4) the general population supported the de facto regime 
and wanted the government to continue because of its 
efficiency and honesty; (5) the 1923 Treaty could be 
circumvented if he were allowed to serve as vice pre­
sident for a period then rise to the presidency after 
the interim head (first designate) stepped dox^ n.
The arguments were used by Salvadoran representa­
tives in an effort to gain recognition for General 
Martinez. Antonio A. Vidaurre, Salvadoran Minister 
to Costa Rica, attempted to convince American Minister 
in San Jose, Charles Eberhardt of the Communist threat. 
He pointed out that the January 22 uprising was insti­
gated by non-Salvadorans, Moreover, he believed the
successful efforts to quash the Communists deserved
/  ^
recognition from the United States, In another
Memorandum from Minister Charles Eberhardt 
(Costa Rica) to Stimson, February 25, 1932, file 816.01/ 
110, R. G. 59, N. A.
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instance Justice Gustavo Guerrero of the World Court 
and Salvadoran delegate to the 1907 conference, spoke 
with Secretary of State Stimson in an effort to con­
vince him that General Martinez was not involved in the
6 11931 revolt which placed him in office. The result 
was a negative response from the United States in each 
instance.
The most active representative of the cause of 
General Martinez, however, was a Costa Rican. Luis 
Anderson, a prominent international lawyer and also a 
delegate to the 1907 conference, attempted to convince 
many influential Americans of the constitutionality of 
General Martinez's actions. He brought his case before 
the United States Minister in Costa Rica, as well as 
Senators and State Department officials in Washington. 
While they sympathized with his arguments, the American 
position remained unchanged. The efforts of all of 
General Martinez's agents failed to convince the State 
Department officials of the need to grant recognition. 
The 1923 Treaty remained paramount.
6 1
Stimson Diary, April 22, May 3» 1932.
^ 2
Memorandum of a telephone conversation between 
Senator William King and Assistant Secretary of State 
Francis White, February 20, 1932, file 8l6 .01/119,
R. G. 59» N. A. Senator King had been asked by his 
friend Luis Anderson to seek recognition for General 
Martinez® His efforts failed. Eberhardt to Stimson, 
February 25, 1932, file 816.01/110, R. G. 59, N. A.
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While the United States felt morally hound to 
the treaty, European nations did not. Eased on 
reports from their representatives in El Salvador, the 
threat of further disorders due to continued Communist 
activities seemed real indeed. They x?ere convinced 
that General Martinez was the only one ahle to keep 
the nation peaceful and economically stable. Britain 
among the European nations took the initiative in this 
re-examination of the recognition matter. The British 
Charge* in San Salvador, Robert Goldie, was very much 
Impressed with General Martfnez* s suppression of the 
Communists and his control of the nation, but was 
fearful that continued non-recognition meant that his 
control would be gradually undermined and instability 
would return. The British had unofficially granted 
what was tantamount to recognition when the British 
Minister in Guatemala, on September 5. 1932, addressed a 
telegram to the Salvadoran Minister of Foreign Affairs 
requesting provisional recognition while the new British 
Charge’ in San Salvador awaited his credentials by mail.^ 
Another important matter which the British had to con­
sider in the recognition issue was economic. A commer­
cial treaty between the two nations was due to expire on
^McCafferty to Stimson, October 4, 1932, file
8l6 .00 General Conditions/36, R. G. 59. N. A.
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September 23, 1932. The British Minister in Guatemala
"forced” his Charge* in San Salvador to recognize
General Martinez because he was "bluffed" into believing
6 h
that recognition was a prerequisite for a renewal.
On September 23, 1932 the British officially recognized 
EL Salvador. Shortly thereafter, the treaty was renewed 
for another year.
France was likewise anxious to renew a Preferential 
Tariff Treaty. In addition, she wanted to sign a 
special convention for the protection of rights to 
names of certain products sold in El Salvador. Both 
objectives were reached by France after she granted 
recognition to the government of General Martinez on 
September 19* 1932. Charge’ McCafferty observed that "it 
seems fairly certain that the recognition of the Martinez 
regime by France has been used as a bargaining considera­
tion..."^ Other European nations follox'red the actions 
of Britain and France shortly thereafter.
64Minister Sheldon Whitehouse (Guatemala) to 
White, October 19, 1932, file 816.01/258, H. G. 59, 
N. A. Whitehouse accused the British Minister to 
Guatemala of being "a complete jackass" and held him 
responsible for hurrying up the British recognition 
of El Salvador.
^McCafferty to Stimson, October 4, 1932, file
816.00 General Conditions/36, E. G. 59, N. A.
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Among El Salvador's sister states, Mexico and 
Costa Rica took the initiative in the attempt to get 
recognition. Mexico, by virtue of the "Estrada 
Doctrine" did not withhold recognition at all and thus 
helped to encourage General Martinez to resist American 
pressure. Ironically, Costa Rica, formerly the major 
advocate of the non-recognition article of the 1923 
Treaty, was in 1932 the leader in calling for its 
abrogation. New leaders had emerged in Costa Rica 
who shared Martinez's fear of Communism in Central 
America. Leonidas Pacheco, Costa Rica's Foreign 
Minister, urged the other Central American nations to 
denounce the 1923 Treaty which "though noble in its 
intents, failed to accomplish the goals it had set up."^ 
When her neighbors refused to cooperate, Costa Rica 
decided to act independently and formally denounced the 
treaty on December 24, 1932. Two days later, El Salvador 
likewise denounced the treaty.
With the denunciations, the beginning of the end 
had come for the 1923 Treaty and the United States was 
placed in a very delicate situation. Honduras, Guatemala 
and Nicaragua looked to America for leadership on the 
matter, but the United States could not officially act
^ N e w  York Times, November 19* 1932.
until the Central American nations took the initiative*
The impasse was finally broken after Costa Rica
officially recognized El Salvador on January 1, 193^»
The following day a plan for recognition, drawn up by
Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles, was sent
to American ministers throughout Latin America for
their consideration. The procedure was as follows:
...That agreement be reached between the 
Presidents of Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua providing in effect that, in 
view of the denunciation by Costa Rica 
and El Salvador of the treaty and pending 
a revision of that treaty, the three 
Presidents declare that their Governments, 
while regarding the treaty as being in 
force with respect to the relations main­
tained by the three states with each 
other, do not regard it as being in force 
with respect to the relations of those 
states with Costa Rica and El Salvador.
Following the signature of such an agree­
ment, the three Governments in question 
would extend recognition to the Martinez 
Government; the United States would extend 
recognition simultaneously. The agreement 
between the three Presidents would also 
provide for the calling at a later date 
of another Conference of the Central 
American states to consider a revision 
of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity...
Our thought is to broach this plan Informally 
to President Sacasa of Nicaragua through 
Minister Lane, with the suggestion that 
Sacasa, if the idea appeals to him, either 
might put it forward as his own initiative 
with the Presidents of Guatemala and Hon­
duras ...
It would be our consistent purpose 
throughout the suggested negotiation to 
have the initiative taken by the Central
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American States and to have any sugges­
tions emanating from us regarded as 
strictly confidential...°7
The decision to finally grant recognition was justified 
by the American Charge* in San Salvador who wrote to 
Secretary Hull that "the Martfnez regime has shown 
itself honest and conscientious and has endeavored to 
carry on the government in an efficient manner in 
spite of the great, difficulties brought on by the 
world depression." On January 26, 193^ the United 
States officially recognized General Martfnez as 
President of El Salvador. Thus, a source of diffi­
culty in the relations between the United States and 
El Salvador was removed. While some improvement 
subsequently occurred, the economic problems brought on 
by the depression created additional difficulties 
between the two nations. But by then the Good Neighbor 
policy had become well established as the guiding light 
for Salvadoran-American relations.
^Acting Secretary William Phillips to American 
Legation (Chile), January 2, 193^, file 816.01/3^ A, 
R. G. 59, N. A.
ZT Q
McCafferty to Hull, January 4, 193^, file
816.00/93^, R. G. 59, N. A.
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SUMMARY
Throughout the first thirty years of the twentieth 
century, in diplomatic relations with new Latin American 
governments, the United States traditionally emphasized 
the use of the formal act of recognition. This seal of 
approval from the United States had over the years 
become so important that without it no nation in Cen­
tral America could be expected to survive. The collapse 
of the Tinoco regime in Costa Rica in 1919 and the 
Orellana regime in Guatemala in 1930 were both attribu­
table to the non-recognition policy of the United States. 
Thus, recognition and acceptance into the world community 
was of vital importance for new governments in the area.
Because of the significance of this sanction by 
the United States, the new governments faced the diffi­
cult task of trying to determine their national priorities 
vis-a-vis their neighbors. What was good in the eyes of 
the United States or for that matter, the whole of 
Central America, was not necessarily good for the 
individual state. If the fundamental premise in the 
foreign policy of every nation is the preservation of 
national integrity, then the fulfillment of requirements 
for acceptance into the community of nations must remain
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secondary to national self-interest. The effectiveness 
of the foreign policy of a nation must therefore he 
judged by how well its leaders preserve the integrity 
and sovereignty of the nation.
On December 20* 1931s El Salvador faced a serous di­
lemma. Because of the 1923 Treaty, the United States 
refused to grant recognition to the government of 
General Martinez. Yet, the Salvadoran constitution 
guaranteed General Martfnez the right to hold his office. 
Moreover, because the Salvadoran Congress (in 1923) had 
ratified the treaty with certain reservations on the 
non-recognition article (II), General Martfnez concluded 
that it did not apply in his case. Despite these 
rejoinders, the United States maintained its non­
recognition position and stood by Article II of the 
1923 Treaty. Indeed, Article II was included to prevent 
such occurrences as the coup of 1931 in El Salvador.
But in 1923» the treaty authors depended upon the fact 
that the existence of United States military and economic 
power (and the willingness to use it) was adequate to 
force any would-be rebel to take heed before acting.
But by 1931 the traditional big stick policy of the
United States had been mellowed somewhat and America
was no longer willing to use force to enforce its policies.
Thus, the State Department was itself placed in an
awkward position of standing by a policy but not willing
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to take the next step of using force to carry out its 
wishes.
Thus, the non-recognition policy had become an 
albatross around the neck of the State Department and 
was subjected to criticism from many sides. Even 
Secretary of State Henry Stimson expressed his doubts 
(to his diary) about the efficacy of such a policy 
although he never publicly stated it. Likewise,
Haymond Leslie Buell of the Foreign Policy Association of 
New York, a noted authority on Latin America and 
Lawrence Dennis, a former diplomat assigned to Central 
America, also criticized the non-recognition policy. 
Dennis1 article in Foreign Affairs accurately pointed out 
the problem of the eventuality of a revolutionary 
government defying the United States and still managing 
to survive. Such was exactly the case of General 
Martinez's regime. Still, the United States, because it 
had become the staunchest supporter of the 1923 Treaty, 
had no choice but to maintain its non-recognition 
position.
Because of this stand, the United States became the 
subject of criticism throughout Latin America. The 
press of Mexico was especially vehement in its attacks on 
American policy. On the other hand, Mexico self- 
righteously proclaimed that because of its Estrada 
Doctrine, it did not judge the acceptability of a new
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government. El Salvador's Immediate neighbors, because 
they had been signatories to the 1923 Treaty and because 
of internal political considerations, stood by the 
United States position® The pressure on El Salvador 
was intense, especially from Guatemala which urged the 
United States to use force to oust General Martinez.
The tension which had arisen out of the non­
recognition issue manifested itself in the strained 
economic relations between the United States and El 
Salvador. The most significant act was the 1932 Sal­
vadoran default on its 1922 loan from the United States, 
although it was probably justifiable because of the 
dramatic drop in coffee prices in the previous year.
There were, however, other acts of economic harassment 
of American firms with government contracts which the 
Salvadoran government voided illegally and on very short 
notice causing the companies great losses. While the 
American losses were extensive, the loss of lives 
suffered by the Salvadorans in the matanza was even worse. 
Some attribute it to the non-recognition stand of the 
United States.
Radical leftists had been in El Salvador since 
the early 1920's agitating the campesinos on the coffee 
fincas. To be sure, they had just causes to bring out to 
the open because for years the finqueros had exploited 
their workers. On January 22, 1932 the leftists,
91
convinced, that the unrecognized government was unstable 
and therefore ripe for a revolt, organized the campeslnos 
to attack fincas and towns in the western, coffee growing 
region of El Salvador. General Martinez, however, was 
ready and immediately launched a massive counterattack 
on a scale far beyond what was necessary to quell the 
rebellion. As a result, more than ten thousand peasants 
were killed in the bloody matanza which ensued.
Because the action was shielded behind a struggle 
against the expansion of Communism, the harsh reality 
of the massacre x^ as softened in the eyes of the American 
officials. Although they sympathized with their anti­
communist neighbor, they still refused to recognize his 
government. In his efforts fco gain recognition General 
Martfnez also utilized the services of intermediaries 
to plead his cause to American officials. Still, no 
recognition was granted. It was not until the enunciation 
of the "Good Neighbor" policy that a change of position 
occurred.
With the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt came 
the change in the United States policy toward Latin 
America. The big stick and dollar diplomacy of old 
were replaced as were the men associated with such poli­
cies. Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles took charge of 
United States foreign policy toward Latin America. They 
were forced to act favorably on the Salvadoran issue by
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other nations not bound to the 1923 Treaty but in the 
past, out of respect for the United States, had 
supported the non-recognition policy. By late 1932 
however, economic realities along with fears that 
continued non-recognition only increased the danger of 
further instability, caused the European nations to 
act in contravention to United States policy. In 
September of 1932 Britain and Prance led the other 
European nations and recognized El Salvador. By 
December 24, 1932 Costa Rica officially denounced the 
treaty and two days later El Salvador followed suit.
Thus, with the denunciations, the end had come for 
the policy. On January 26, 1934 the United States 
recognized the Salvadoran government and ended a very 
difficult period for the two nations.
CHAPTER IV 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Perils of a One-Crop Economy
One of the premises of the emerging Good Neighbor 
policy under Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt was the 
notion that United States power would be used less to 
advance the interests of private investors in the 
Western Hemisphere. This was tested in Latin America 
during the early 1930‘s when many nations defaulted on 
their obligations to American bondholders. The economic 
difficulties caused by the worldwide depression became 
the focus of attention in relations between the United 
States and Latin American nations. Relations with El 
Salvador were no different.
El Salvador was a one-crop agricultural country, 
its economy based on the production and export of 
coffee. As late as 19^0, it could still be said that 
“with the exception of Venezuela, where petroleum pre­
dominates, no other country in Latin America is so 
dependent on the export of a single product than
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El Salvador."1 While it produced sufficient food 
crops for its needs, industrial development other 
than that related to agriculture was virtually 
negligible. As a broad but true generalization, it 
may be said that El Salvador exported coffee and 
imported everything else save basic foodstuffs for 
the bulk of its people. Exports of coffee in great 
measure determined the value of Salvadoran imports 
since there were few other sources of foreign 
exchange. Moreover, shifts in the prices of/or
markets for coffee were immediately reflected in both
2the foreign and domestic trade of El Salvador.
Because of the small nation1s economic depen- 
dence on coffee, it suffered greatly from the 
collapse in price during the economic crisis of 
the 1930’s. Between 1929 and 19^0, the price of 
coffee dropped more than seventy percent from 20.39 
cents per pound to 6.17 cents per pound.
■^United States Tariff Commission, The Foreign 
Trade of Latin America, Part II Commercial Policies 
and Trade Relations of Individual Latin American 
Countries .^Section 12. El Salvador (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 19^1), p. 5»
2Ibid.
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Table I
Decline In the Price of Coffee, 1929-19^0^
Period 1929 1932 1936 1937 1938 1939 19^0
Price
(F.O.B.)
(cents/
TirtllwH I
20.39 9.11 7.70 8.87 6 .9^ 6.93 6.17
The significance of coffee to Salvadoran-American 
relations centered on the fact that after 193^* the 
bulk of El Salvador's coffee exports were to the 
United States. Moreover, the proportion of coffee in 
the total exports of El Salvador increased substan­
tially from sixty-nine percent in 1920 to ninety-five
h
percent in 193^. Although the percentage decreased 
somewhat in the period just before World War II, it 
remained relatively high, averaging above eighty 
percent of the total exports.
3
-'United States Tariff Commission, Latin America 
as a Source of Strategic and other Essential Materials. 
A Report on Strategic and Other Essential Materials, 
and Their Production and Trade, with Special Reference 
to Latin American Countries and to the United States. 
Eepbrt^no'. 1 W , Second^Serres~Twaihin^on^; Government 
Printing Office, 19^1), p. 256.
^Brannon, El Salvador, esquema estadfstlca de la
vlda naclonal, pp. 23-24.
9 6
Unlike some of the other coffee growing nations 
of the world, El Salvador was fortunate in that much 
of the coffee it produced belonged to the mild, "blue" 
variety (coffea arabica) which commanded a higher price 
than Brazilian coffee. American importers used the 
mild coffee as a blend to temper the stronger type 
imported in large quantities from Erazil. As a result, 
El Salvador enjoyed a relatively secure market in the 
United States. Moreover, El Salvador's major export 
entered the United States free of duty.-'’ The 1926 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Eights 
facilitated the trade between the two n a t i o n s B e t ­
ween 1926 and 1932 the United States purchased an 
average of twenty percent of El Salvador's total coffee 
exports annually. At the same time, however, the bulk 
of its coffee exports went to Germany, Scandinavia,
^United States Tariff Commission, The Foreign Trade 
of Latin America, p. 5? Wallich and Adler, Public 
Finance in a Developing Country; El Salvador- A Case 
Study, pp. 28. 203; Ellis to Eull,' November 28, 19^1, 
Item no. 7008, Office of Strategic Services, R. G. 226, 
N. A.
^Translation of a Report by Dr. Juan Ernesto 
Vasquez, Delegate of El Salvador to the Meeting of 
Finance Ministers of the American Republics, held at 
Guatemala City, November 14-21, 1939* Military Intel­
ligence Division, February 1940, Item no. 4000, Folder 
3860-End, Eox 819, El Salvador 3850-4130, G-2 Regional 
File 1933-1944, R. G. 165, N. A.
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and other European nations which purchased an average
of fifty-four percent of her total coffee exports 
7
each year. These European nations preferred the 
milder tasting coffee from El Salvador and Colombia 
to that of Brazil. While El Salvador had no difficulty 
in selling its coffee to the United States and Europe, 
the price at which it was forced to sell during the 
depression was disastrous for the economy. The price 
of coffee had been articifially stabilized by Brazil 
during the 1921-1930 period by means of a valorization 
plan whereby the government withheld from the market 
surplus stocks when the crops were large and prices 
low. These stocks were later released when crops were 
small and prices rose. While the plan-helped to 
stabilize coffee prices, it also stimulated production 
in other coffee producing nations and encouraged the 
development of new coffee lands in Brazil thus increasing 
future supply and aggravating the problem. The stabi­
lization plan ended in 1931 when Brazil imposed a 
prohibitive tax on new coffee tree plantings and an 
export tax to provide funds for the purchase and des­
truction of large coffee stocks. The result was a severe 
drop in the price of coffee in world markets. With
7
Wallich and Adler - Public Finance in a Develop­
ing Country; El Salvador - A Case Study, p. 31•
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the onset of the severe coffee price crash between 
1929 and 19319 when the price of the commodity dropped 
more than forty percent, the foundation of El Salva-
O
dor's economy was all but shattered. In an effort
to save the faltering economy President Araujo sent
the fiscal representative, William Renwick, to New
York to negotiate a short term loan using liquor
a
revenues as security. However, before the negotiations 
were completed disgruntled, Salvadoran military forces 
had taken matters into their own hands with the 
December 1931 coup d'etat. As a result of the revolu­
tion, President Araujo was driven out of the country 
and a new government under General Martinez took 
control of the shaky Salvadoran economy.
The new government faced severe economic problems 
brought on by the depression as well as the financial 
maladministration of the preceding administrations.
The crisis was exacerbated by a "Communist" uprising
Q
United States Tariff Commission, Heport no. 1*J4, 
p. 258. The price of the commodity dropped in spite 
of Brazil's valorization efforts. During the period 
between 1931-1932 Brazil destroyed more than thirty- 
two percent of its coffee production to keep the price 
artificially high.
9
'Memorandum of a conversation between Edwin C.
Wilson and William Renwick. Wilson to Stimson, Decem­
ber 5. 1931, file 8l6.00/820* R. G. 59, N. A.
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in January 1932 which caused panic among the coffee 
planters in the western departments* Because of the 
economic crisis, many planters were unable to pay 
their debts and were in danger of losing their mort­
gages on their flncas. The rebuilding task faced by 
the new regime was indeed difficult. General Mart£nez 
was fortunate to have had the able assistance of 
Miguel Tomas Molina, Minister of Finance, who set out 
to reestablish confidence in the financial integrity 
of the country. Several measures were taken to stabilize 
the economy. First, a drastic cut was made in the 
budget to balance it with the anticipated reduced reve­
nues. Secondly, legislation was passed declaring a 
moratorium on all operations with interest for a 
period of four years. Moreover, interest rates were 
reduced by forty percent and extensions were granted 
to delinquent loans. Thirdly, to appease the campesinos. 
General Martinez reorganized and expanded the land 
distribution program.10 Lastly, General Martinez, in 
his effort to stabilize the economy, defaulted on his 
nation’s obligations to foreign lenders.
On February 23, 1932 El Salvador stopped payments 
on its 1922 loan from American and British investors.
10McCafferty to Stimson, September 26, 1932, file 
816.00/902, R. G. 59» N. A.; Interview with Ambassador 
Serrano, December 1975, San Salvador.
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It was to toe the first of several payment suspensions 
during the regime of General Martinez. The default was 
mitigated however* toy the fact that SI Salvador was 
only one of many Latin American countries to fall 
toehind on its financial obligations to United States 
bondholders. Moreover* SI Salvador was not the first 
to suspend payments; Eolivia defaulted on January 1*
1931; Peru on April 1* 1931; and Chile on June 1* 1931*
By 1935. of a total of $1,538,^31.980 outstanding loans 
in Latin America* $1,175,383,^00 were in arrears.
This represented over seventy-six percent of the total 
amount in default.11 During the 1930’s, eight out of 
ten Latin American nations with obligations to American 
bondholders defaulted.1^
The failure of El Salvador to live up to its 
financial obligations was significant in United States- 
E1 Salvador relations not only because it further 
complicated the non-recognition matter, but because it
11 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the 
Study and Investigation of the work, Activities.
Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganiza­
tion Committees. Pursuant to Section 211 of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 193^. Part V Protective 
Committees and Agencies for Holders of Defaulted Foreign 
Government Bonds (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1937). P* 6.
12Dr. Max Winkler (President and Director of Re­
search, American Council of Foreign Bondholders, Inc.) 
to Roosevelt, May 11, 1935, 0. F. File M9^. F . D. R. 
Papers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library.
had the potential of developing into a much more 
difficult problem* The dilemma stemmed from a clause 
in the 1922 loan contract. Article XVT of the finan­
cial agreement stipulated that if a default occurred, 
the Fiscal Agent (Manufacturers Trust Company of New 
York) would then be authorized to create a customs 
administration and appoint a collector general for 
customs subject to approval by the Secretary of State 
and and the Salvadoran government. Because El Salvador1 
economy depended wholly on foreign trade, the implemen­
tation of such an arrangement would have placed the 
total financial administration of El Salvador in the 
hands of an American. The State Department hoped to 
avert such a delicate situation, and decided not to 
honor its contractual obligation to act on behalf of 
American creditors. It did not want to Intervene in 
the affairs of El Salvador. The parties which had 
negotiated the 1922 contract had not forseen this even­
tuality.
The Effect of Default on Salvadoran-American Relations
The default by El Salvador was more than just an 
effort to stabilize the nation's finances. It may also 
have been an attempt by General Martinez to test how 
far he could go with the new American policy of non-
10 2
Intervention. Although the total government revenues
were down substantially in comparison to the preceeding
five years, the income from customs duties were adequate
1 3to service the loans, although barely so. J
In El Salvador, as in other Latin American coun­
tries, social and economic dislocations brought about 
by the depression of the 1930's caused a wave of economic 
nationalism to sweep through the nation. In an effort 
to find an ogre to blame for their problems, many in 
Latin America resorted to the standard accusations of 
exploitation and imperialism. In some countries the 
protestors found the very visible American companies 
to be easy targets. Although there were no American 
companies in El Salvador with the tarnished image of 
a United Fruit Company or a Standard Oil Corporation, 
Salvadorans found that they could vent their anger at 
the fiscal representative of the bondholders as well as 
the American diplomats because of the non-recognition 
position taken by the United States. Thus, the default 
on the bonded debt was seen by some Salvadorans as a 
protest against economic dependency on the United 
States as well as a realignment of their national
^Wallich and Adler, Public Finance in a Developing 
Country: El Salvador - A Case"Study, pp. 46^17; New
York Times. March 20, 1932; David R. Raynolds, Rapid 
Development in Small Economies: The Example of El Sal­
vador (New- York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19^7)* PP»" 81-82.
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priorities. Some of them believed that the terms of 
the 1922 loan were too burdensome and jeopardized the 
national integrity of the nation. According to Victor 
Barriere, former Director of Budget and son-in-law of 
General Martinez, "the terms were onerous because it 
placed the collection of public funds in the hands of a 
foreign authority. The collection of taxes is an act 
of sovereignty that cannot be delegated to any power...1 
Moreover, he added that "it was a matter of patriotic 
pride not to accept the presence of a fiscal represen­
tative in El Salvador collecting the public funds 
1A
directly."
Sensing this feeling in El Salvador, along with the 
realization that many other nations had done the same 
without serious reprecussions, the State Department was 
loath to carry out the dictates of Article XVI of the 
loan contract. Under the terms of the agreement, the 
State Department was obliged to select and transmit to 
El Salvador the name of one of the collector general 
nominees recommended by the fiscal representative.
The dilemma faced by the State Department was based 
on how the transmittal of the name would be perceived 
by El Salvador. Washington feared that it would be seen
14-Interview with Sr. Earriere, December 1975»
San Salvador.
10^
as tacit recognition of El Salvador's government * On 
the other hand, it was feared that the failure to 
approve and transmit the .name would be interpreted by 
American bankers and bondholders as an abandonment of 
the State Department's contractual obligations.
T h e  d e p a r t m e n t ' s  l o g a l  a d v i s o r  s o u g h t  t o  r e s o l v e  
t h e  d i l e m m a  b y  a l l u d i n g  t o  s o m e  p r e c e d e n t s  d a t i n g  b a c k  
t o  1 8 7 5  w h e r e i n  s u c c e s s f u l  c o n t a c t s  w e r e  m a d e  b y  A m e r ­
i c a n  o f f i c i a l s  w i t h  u n r e c o g n i z e d  c o u n t r i e s .  M o r e o v e r ,  
h e  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  t r a n s m i s s i o n  
o f  t h e  n a m e  o f  t h e  n o m i n e e  t o  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  E l  S a l v a ­
d o r  v e r s u s  t h e  t r a n s m i s s i o n  o f  a  n a m e  t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
o f  G e n e r a l  M a r t i n e z .  I n  t h i s  m a n n e r ,  c o n t a c t  c o u l d  b e  
m a d e  w i t h  t h e  s t a t e  o f  E l  S a l v a d o r  w i t h o u t  i n  a n y  w a y  
g i v i n g  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  o f  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
o f  G e n e r a l  M a r t i n e z . 1 -*
The State Department, however, refused to follow 
the advice of its legal counsel and took the position 
that since the United States did not recognize the 
government of General Martinez, it could not transmit the
recommendations of the fiscal agent. It could in no
1 6
way participate in the proceedings. The decision was
1 6-\Legal Advisor (J. R. B.) to Wilson, February 26, 
1932, file 816.51039/131, R. G. 59, N. A.
16
Fred Lavis, "The El Salvador Bondholders Protective 
Committee Report," January 1 9 3 7 *  file 8 1 6 , 5 1 C 3 9 / ^ 9 3 »
R. G. 5 9 ,  N. A.
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made after weighing the possible consequences of
various actions, To force a collector general on El
Salvador, the smallest of the continental Latin
American nations, was bound to be seen as outright
"imperialism" especially since defaults were common-
17place throughout the world. 1 Furthermore, it had
become the policy of President Hoover and Secretary of
State Stimson not to use force, or any semblance of
force, in the maintenance of contracts between American
1 R
citizens and foreign nations or their citizens.
While the State Department's decision not to 
become involved was aimed at improving the American 
image and keeping friendly relations with Latin America, 
it was not seen in that light in some quarters. In 
Guatemalan government circles, for example, it was 
believed that the American desire to force the govern­
ment of General Martinez to resume payments on the bond 
obligations was the main reason behind her refusal to
■^Winkler to Roosevelt, May 11, 1935. 0. F. File 
No. 4l9^» F. D. R. Papers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
Library; Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy 
of the United States: An Historical Interpretation
iNew York: Hareourt Brace and Company, 1943), pp. 336- 
342. In the years that followed, only two Latin American 
nations with financial obligations (Argentina and 
Venezuela) did not default on their Indebtedness.
-* Q
x Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active 
Service in Peace and War (New Yorks Harper and Brothers, 
194&J, P* 181.
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19grant recognition to that government, 7 In America, the 
action taken by the State Department resulted in angry 
protests from bondholders who concluded that their own 
government had defaulted on its obligation to support, 
them. It was their firm belief that the State Depart­
ment during the 1922 negotiations had promised to assist 
the bondholders in case of default. As a result, letters 
were sent to Congressmen and Senators pleading for 
intercession with the State Department. Other letters 
were sent directly to the Secretary of State which 
indicated the bondholders’ disappointment with the 
Department's efforts. An angry bondholder, Matthew 
Salsinger of Maryland, sent the following letter to 
the State Department:
Sirs
I purchased these "A” bonds because the 
State Department allowed the name of this 
country to appear in the contract as arbiter 
and collector (in case of default). I lived 
in Salvador and know that the country got 
full value for the funds in roads, sanitation, 
watersupply, sewage, etc.
Now, when the government of El Salvador 
gives notice of default, the State Department 
advises 'We, (The U.S.) have no relation to 
the loan except to arbitrate or point to the 
collector of customs... Thus,' I as bondholder 
to a party and contract which I have no power,
^Minister Sheldon Whitehouse (Guatemala) to
Edwin C. Wilson, October 19, 1932, file 816.01/258,
R. G. 59, N. A.
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and as a citizen of the U. S., to enforce20 
am allowed to do what I can for myself...
In a reply to an inquiry from another bondholder, 
Mrs. James Marshall in London, Edwin G . Wilson care­
fully explained the exact role of the State Department 
during the 1922 loan negotiations as well as its final 
contractual obligations. He pointed out that 11 the 
United States has no relation to this Salvadoran loan 
except with respect to facilitating the arbitration 
and determination of disputes that may arise between 
the parties, and the appointment of a collector of 
customs in case of a default.” Furthermore, he pointed 
out the disclaimers issued by the Department in 1923 to 
correct erroneous statements in the advertising and press 
releases which gave the impression that secret agree­
ments had been made by the Department of State. He 
noted that "the impression was incorrect as the agreement 
was negotiated between the Government of Salvador and 
the representatives of the bankers concerned. It is in 
no sense a treaty." He concluded that the State Depart­
ment could in no way intercede on behalf of the bond­
holders.^
20Matthew Salsinger (through his attorney C. B. 
Richards and Co. of New York) to State Department,
April 24, 1932, file 816.51039/1^, H. G. 59, N. A.
21Wilson to Mrs. James Marshall, September 2,
1932, file 816.51C39/200, R. G. 59, N. A.
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The Quest for a Debt Settlement
While the State Department was unwilling to 
intercede on "behalf of the bondholders, there were others 
who willingly gave them assistance. Immediately after 
the default, American financial interests formed bond­
holders protective committees modeled after the British 
"Council of Foreign Bondholders." But unlike their 
predecessors in England, which had been in existence 
since 1868, the American committees were driven by differ­
ent motives. Whereas the English protective committee 
functioned as a non-profit organization, the American
committees were formed to take advantage of a profit 
22opportunity. Although the organizers were experienced 
financial men, they were Inexperienced in default 
negotiations. This had been the first time, since the 
United States became the world’s creditor, that major 
loan defaults had occurred.
To further complicate matters for the holders of 
Salvadoran bonds, two rival bondholders committees were 
formed. One, "The Protecting Committee for the Republic 
of El Salvador," was headed by Montgomery Schuyler,
22Securities and Exchange Commission, Report. 
Part V, p. I k l .
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president of \he Yorkville Bank in New York and formerly
United States Minister to El Salvador. He was Joined
by J. Lawrence Gilson of Manufacturers Bank and Trust and
Henry B. Price, head of Minor C. Keith Inc. The rival
group was the "El Salvador Bondholders Protective
Committee," headed by F. J. Lisman, president of a
financial firm bearing his name which had been the
major distributor of the outstanding Salvadoran bonds.
Along with him were R. V/. Hebard of R. W. Hebard and
Company, a construction firm with large government
contracts in El Salvador as well as a large holder of
the bonds. Also in the group was Fred Lavis, president
of I.R.C.A.2-^ Lisman asserted that as a partner of the
house of issue, he was under a "moral obligation" to
assist the holders of the defaulted securities. As
it turned out, his moral obligation was a pretext for 
o kprofit making.
The American bondholders were therefore placed 
in a quandary as to what line of action to pursue.
23Securities and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part I, p. k S k ;  New York Times, March 2 k ,  1932,
March 25, 1932.
2 k Securities and Exchange Commission, Renort.
Part V, p.141. The British bondholders formed their 
own committee which worked closely with their American 
counterpart.
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On the one hand, their own government refused their 
requests for assistance and maintained a hands off 
policy and on the other, two committees, each purporting 
to have their best interest at heart, sought their 
cooperation. The primary objective of each of the 
committees was to convince the holders of the bonds to 
deposit their certificates in the respective depository 
banks. During the early stages of the solicitations 
the committees failed to gain the trust of the bond­
holders who refused to part with their certificates. 
Gradually however, the bondholders, seeing no other 
alternative, deposited their bonds with the committees. 
Lisman's group had the advantage in that Lisman*s 
company had the list of bondholders available whereas 
Schuyler's did not. As a result, within five months 
after the committee was organized, the Lisman group had 
acquired over twenty-one percent of the outstanding 
certificates while Schuyler had less than five percent. 
The State Department quickly realized that the existence 
of two rival committees only made the negotiations with 
El Salvador more complex. Therefore, at its urging, the 
two committees merged; the name of F. J. Lisman’s com­
mittee prevailed and Mr. Lawrence Gilson became the 
Committee’s chairman.^
25^Securites and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part V, p .  2 8 5 =
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T h e  p r o b l e m s  f a c e d  b y  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  f o r  S a l v a d o r a n  
b o n d h o l d e r s  w a s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  o f  b o n d h o l d e r s  o f  
o t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s .  A s  t h e  d e f a u l t s  b e c a m e  
m o r e  p r e v a l e n t *  t h e  S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t ,  i n  a n  e f f o r t  t o  
d e a l  w i t h  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  s p o n s o r e d  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
t h e  F o r e i g n  B o n d h o l d e r s ’ P r o t e c t i v e  C o u n c i l  o n  
D e c e m b e r  1 3 .  1 9 3 3 •  T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  w a s  
t o  e f f e c t i v e l y  c o o r d i n a t e  t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  
i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e i r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  
d e f a u l t i n g  n a t i o n s .  T h e  S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  m a d e  i t  c l e a r  
h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e  C o u n c i l  h a d  n o  o f f i c i a l  s t a t u s  o r  
p o w e r s  t o  n e g o t i a t e  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
g o v e r n m e n t .  B a t h e r ,  i t  w a s  a  q u a s i  o f f i c i a l  a g e n c y  
t h r o u g h  w h i c h  t h e  b o n d h o l d e r s  n e g o t i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  
d e f a u l t i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  T h e  h o l d e r s  o f  b o n d s  f r o m  
m o s t  o f  t h e  d e f a u l t i n g  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  w e r e  
r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  t h e  B o n d h o l d e r  C o u n c i l .  T h e  h o l d e r s  
o f  S a l v a d o r a n  b o n d s  w e r e  u n i q u e  a n d ,  i n  s o m e  w a y s ,  
m o r e  f o r t u n a t e  i n  t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  t h e i r  
o w n  a g g r e s s i v e  c o m m i t t e e  w h i c h  w a s  a b l e  t o  n e g o t i a t e  
f o r  t h e i r  i n v e s t m e n t s  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e l y .
2^
B e m i s , T h e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  P o l i c y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s , p p .  3 3 6 - 3 ^ 2 ;  F r e d  L a v i s ,  " T h e  E l  S a l v a d o r  
B o n d h o l d e r s  P r o t e c t i v e  C o m m i t t e e  R e p o r t , "  J a n u a r y  1937. 
f i l e  8 1 6 . 5 1 C 3 9 A 9 3 ,  R .  G. 5 9 ,  N. A .
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The problem with defaults during the 1930’s was 
only one of the many economic crises faced by the 
New Deal of President Roosevelt. But it was one 
which the President believed could have been avoided.
In fact, he was especially resentful of the way that 
bankers’ loans were used to advance private interests 
in Latin America during the free-lending years of the 
1920’s. Such loans were usually associated with 
exhorbitant rates and excessive commissions which did
27not endear the United States to her southern neighbors. ' 
President Roosevelt blamed some of the problems faced 
by the United States during the 1930‘s on such past 
mistakes and sought to correct them through the practice 
of non-intervention as embodied in the Good Neighbor pro­
gram. He felt that it was ’’important to remove any legit'
28imate grounds of criticism.’’ Thus, one of the founda­
tions of his New Deal’s foreign policy toward Latin 
America was the continuation of President Hoover’s 
non-intervention policy. The position was maintained 
during the numerous defaults throughout the 1930’s and 
1940’s.
2^Callcott, The Western Hemispheres Its Influence 
on United States Policies to the End of World War II. 
p. 290; Wood, The Flaking of the Good Neighbor Policy, 
pp. 130-131.
28Stimson Diary, March 28, 1933.
In addition to the desire to develop the Good 
Neighbor concept, another reason may have existed for 
the American tolerance of what could be considered a 
challenging attitude by some of the Latin American 
leaders. Because the depression had brought economic 
instability to many countries of the area, the New 
Dealers realized that only strict discipline enabled 
some of the Latin American governments to maintain 
political stability. As a result, they tolerated 
what were considered totalitarian regimes as they 
appeared throughout the region. The government of 
General Martfnez fell into such a classification, 
especially in light of the 1932 matanza. Moreover, his 
challenge to the United States on the matter of the 1923 
Treaty made him stand out among the Central American 
leaders. It was believed in some quarters that he 
defaulted on the 1922 loan not only because of the 
obvious economic reasons but also to test the resolve of 
the Americans. Although his authoritarian measures in 
El Salvador clashed with the basic American principles 
of democracy, the New Dealers tolerated him and others 
like him»
According to historian Frederick Pike, it is 
possible that such tolerance stemmed from the fact that 
the United States itself, "in its desperate search for 
remedies to the depression leaned toward the use of
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corporatist tactics in the early days of the New Deal;
therefore it could respond with tolerance and fore-
bearance when Latin American governments introduced
corporatist and/or socialist experiments...as they
moved toward ’statism’ and controlled economies."2^
Some who examined Roosevelt’s early New Deal closely,
saw many similarities to Mussolini’s corporate form
of government. Fortune magazine noted that, "the
Corporate State is to Mussolini what the New Deal is 
30to Roosevelt."-' Moreover, a noted economist, Calvin 
E. Hoover of Duke University said in a speech before 
the American Economic Association in 1934 that
"Roosevelt's philosophy of government-business cooperation
31followed the pattern of Italian Fascism.. . James 
MacGregor Burns in his study of Roosevelt's politics, 
Roosevelt; The Lion and the Fox, observed that "the 
NRA, with its functional representation of business and 
labor groups, and the AAA, dominated by the big farm 
groups, showed some likeness to the corporate state
29
'Frederick B. Pike, "Corporatism and Latin 
American-United States Relations," The Review of 
Politics. 36 no. 1 (January 1974), p. l46.
3°Fortune, X (July, 1934), 137-138, in John P.
Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, The View from America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p.l64.
31Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, p. 164.
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fashioned by Benito Mussolini with its syndicates of
32workers and employers.”-' Thus, the New Dealers could
not be too critical of the Central American governments
for their authoritarianism, and as a result
...those who devised and first implemented 
the Good Neighbor Policy seemed willing 
to allow Latin Americans a much freer hand 
in dealing with the economic interests of 
United States citizens. Thus, the Roosevelt 
administration refrained from directly 
assisting the Foreign Bondholders* Protective 
Council in its efforts to force Latin Ameri­
can governments to resume payments on foreign 
debt.33
For the most part, the State Department attempted 
to maintain a neutral position in the bondholders 
matter. But it was not always easy and it was espe­
cially difficult for the men in the field. In an effort 
to give the impression that they spoke with authorization 
from the State Department, the Bondholder Committee 
representatives, whenever in El Salvador, endeavored 
to associate the American legation with their negotia­
tions. Moreover, the Committee made sure that the 
Department was kept informed of all activities during 
the negotiations, although the State Department had 
publicly stated that it could not participate in any
32James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt; The Lion and 
the Fox (New York; Hareourt, Brace & World, Inc.), 
p. 198.
33-^Pike, "Corporatism and Latin American-United 
States Relations," p. 1^6.
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way other than to facilitate matters. The beleaguered
American Minister in San Salvador reported that the
Bondholder Committee representatives always attempted
to associate the Legation with their efforts and that
...each of the representatives has promptly 
reported to the Legation upon arrival in 
the country, frequent calls have been made 
upon the Minister, the Legation has been 
.kept informed of even minor steps in pro­
cedure, copies of all correspondence between 
the Government and the Committee or its 
representatives have been brought to the 
Legation personally by the representative 
of the Bondholders* Protective Committee.
In a small place like San Salvador 
such tactics unfailingly serve to connect 
the Legation with the proceedings, in the 
minds of, the Government, the press and the 
public.3^
Apparently, the Committee's tactics succeeded because 
the Salvadoran bondholders were among the first to have 
a resumption of the loan service.
Debt Payment Arrangements
On July 29, 1932, just six months after the default 
began, El Salvador and the Bondholders Protective 
Committee signed an agreement whereby the Salvadoran 
government, represented by Roberto Aguilar, agreed to 
remit to the selected New York bank fifteen percent of
'ih,
Corrigan to Hull, April 3, 1936, file 8l6 .53.c39/
448, R. G. 59, N. A.
its customs collections from August 1, 1932, through 
December 31. 1932, and twenty percent from January 1,
1933 to December 31, 193^® The amount pledged was 
substantially less than the seventy percent of the 
customs collection agreed to under the original contract 
in 1922« Because the amount remitted was not adequate 
to pay for all three series of bonds, the Committee was 
forced to allocate the available sums to the holders 
who had deposited their bonds to its hands. ^ Because 
some bondholders refused to entrust their certificates to 
the Committee, they did not receive any payments on their 
investment. The holders of Series A bonds received full 
payment on their interest due. Holders of Series B 
(English) and C received their interest partly in cash 
and partly in four percent deferred interest certificate. 
Of the $251,387*33 remitted by El Salvador during the 
life of the Aguilar agreement $176,290.33 went to the 
bondholders and $75,097®50 went to the Committee for fees 
and e x p e n s e s . A l t h o u g h  the bondholders received less 
than they were entitled to, they were more fortunate than
-^White to Bonsai, July 29, 19^1, file FVJ 816 .51/ 
1085, H. G. 59, N. A.
•^Charge1 d1Affaires R. Quincy Stanton (El Salvador) 
to Hull, April 27, 1935, file 816.60/977, R® G. 59, N. A.; 
Wallich and Adler, Public Finance in a Developing Country; 
El Salvador— A Case Study, pp. 224— 225; New York Times, 
June 16, 1933®
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many other holders of Latin American certificates who
failed to receive any payments at all. The severity of
the depression's impact on the price of coffee was
sufficient reason for many nations not to resume payments.
Although El Salvador was just as badly affected by the
economic crisis, it was the first of the Latin American
37nations to resume payments on its indebtedness.
However, after less than a year under the Aguilar 
agreement, the Salvadoran government once again sus­
pended payment on its external debt. On January 1^,
1933» the fiscal representative was ordered by the 
Salvadoran Minister of Finance Miguel Tomas Molina, to 
deposit all his collections from customs duties into 
a special account in the Banco Agricola Comercial. 
According to Molina, it was not really a suspension 
but "a temporary measure pending negotiations for a
qo
new agreement for postponement of payments.’*-5 American 
Charge1 W. J. McCafferty speculated that **the suspension 
may have been carried out in order to help defray the 
cost of expanding the Salvadoran military forces along 
with the added costs incurred in the effort to secure the
^ H e w  Y o r k  T i m e s , J u n e  2 6 ,  1 9 3 3 -
-^McCafferty to Stimson, January 18, 1933» file
816.51C39/216, R. G. 59, N. A.
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recognition of the de facto regime by the United States 
and other Central American Republics. **-^  a s a result 
of the new payment suspensions the Committee sent Fred 
Lavis to Join the Eritish Bondholders* representative 
J. C. Armstrong in San Salvador in an effort to nego­
tiate a satisfactory readjustment agreement. It was 
the first of three journeys to El Salvador by Hr. Lavis
during the nest three years on behalf of the American 
40bondholders. The result of his initial effort was suc­
cessful and a temporary settlement was signed on May 5» 
1933* 21 Salvador agreed to transmit to a selected
New York Bank9 twenty percent of its customs revenues 
for the two year period from January 1, 1933 to Decem­
ber 31» 1934 in lieu of the remittances provided for 
under the original 1922 loan contract. The sum was used 
to pay for interest on the issues as well as for committee 
fees and expenses. Under the 1933 plan, those bondholders 
who had deposited their certificates with the Committee 
received substantial payments. During the life of the 
1933 agreement, El Salvador paid the bondholders approx­
imately $2,200,000
39Ibid.
40Ibid.; Securities and Exchange Commission, Report. 
Part V, p. 149.
41Securities and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part I, pp. 202-203-
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The temporary settlement lasted only until 1935 
when again, the interest payments on all three series 
were suspended® After prolonged negotiations between 
the Bondholders Committee, represented by Fred Lavis 
and Douglas Bradford, and El Salvador, represented by 
its Minister of Finance Dr. Rodrigo Samayoa, a 
"permanent*' readjustment agreement was signed on 
April 27, 1936. Under the agreement the interest 
rates on the bonds were permanently reduced to a more 
tolerable level. The interest on Series A bonds was 
reduced from eight percent to 5*5 percent, Series B 
bonds from six percent to four percent, and Series C 
bonds from seven percent to 3*5 percent. Along with 
the interest rate reductions, the Salvadoran government 
insisted that the total amount which could be utilized
11 O
to service the loan each year be limited to $850,000. 
Although it "scrupulously avoided the appearance of 
taking any part in the negotiations or of making any 
endeavor to determine their direction," the State 
Department through its Legation in San Salvador, played 
an important role in facilitating the negotiations
11 p
White to Bonsai, July 29, 1941, file FW 816.51/1085, 
R. G. 59» N. A.; Ylallich and Adler, Public Finance in a 
Developing Country: El Salvador— A Case S~budy, p." 224.'
^Corrigan to Hull, April 3, 1936, file 816.51C39/
448, R. G. 59. N. A.
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The so-called permanent settlement, however, lasted 
only two years when again the loan service was suspended. 
But unlike the earlier suspensions, which were partly 
due to political and nationalistic motives, the No­
vember 27, 1937 default was due strictly to economic 
pressures. On November 2, 1937 Brazil, in an effort to 
stimulate exports, decided to modify its valorization 
program and cut the tax on its exports by seventy-five 
percent® The decision had far-reaching effects since 
the valorization plan of Brazil had helped to maintain 
the price of coffee at higher levels than the market 
would have allowed. To accomplish its modified valori­
zation plan, Brazil’s National Coffee Institute burned
44and dumped into the sea millions of bags of coffee.
In the period from late 1937 and throughout 1938 Brazil 
produced over 2,940,000,000 pounds of coffee but des­
troyed over 1,913»000,000 pounds or sixty-five percent 
of its total production. Although the proportion of the 
amount destroyed had increased more than twenty-two per­
cent over the previous year's figures, the price of the 
commodity went down dramatically. Still the degree of 
price decline was much less than would have been the 
case had there been no valorization plan. Brazil's
44United States Tariff Commission, Report no. 144, 
p. 258; Frank D. McCann, Jr., The Brazilian-American 
Alliance 1937-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1973), P .  24.
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decision to end export limitations on its coffee caused
the price of the commodity to drop by thirty percent
Ac
from the previous year’s price. ^
The effects on El Salvador’s economy were far- 
reaching. It became immediately apparent in early 
November 1937 that with the price of coffee at about 
equal to the cost of production, Salvadoran exports 
could be expected to drop substantially. In turn, the
country's power to purchase imports would likewise
l a
be cut drastically. As a result, the Salvadoran 
coffee industry became panic-striclcen. In order to 
assuage the fears of the businessmen, the Salvadoran 
cabinet met in emergency session and announced on 
November 10, 1937 the government plans for assistance.
The Minister of Finance, Dr. Rodrigo Samayoa, assured 
them that: (1) no speculation would be allowed and
further, that the rate of exchange (2.5-1) of the colon 
would not be modified in relation to the United States 
dollar, (2) the Salvadoran minister in Washington had been 
ordered to discuss the matter with the representatives
^Military Intelligence Division, Report no. 4000, 
June 1939. folder El Salvador 3860-End, Box 816, R. G.
165, N. A.
Minister Robert Frazer (El Salvador) to Hull, 
December 9 , 1937. file 816,51039/324.
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of Brazil, Colombia, and other coffee exporting coun­
tries of the world, (3) hank credits would he granted so 
that coffee growers9 activities would not he interrupted 
in any way, (^) commercial hanks were ordered to 
assist the government in credit and exchange control 
and (5) hank officials, government leaders and coffee
producers would meet regularly to discuss the problems 
h y
they faced. ' The most effective measure taken by the 
government however, was the drastic reduction on the 
coffee export tax which was cut by sixty-seven percent 
retroactive to November 2, when Brazil's actions had 
caused world coffee prices to collapse. The Salvadoran 
export tax x^ as reduced from $2.57 per 100 kilograms to 
.95 cents per 100 kilograms and remained at that level 
until 19^3• To counteract the serious loss of revenue 
which resulted from the sixty-seven percent reduction 
of the export tax, on January 1, 1938, the government 
again suspended debt service on the 1922 loan. In 1937- 
1938 the debt service represented twelve percent of SI 
Salvador's national budget. The funds saved in this man­
ner ($850,000 annually) were then freed to provide 
financial assistance to the coffee producers and exporters.
^Vice Consul Joseph S. Maleady (El Salvador) to 
Hull, November 10, 1937, file 816.6133/53, R. G. 59, N. A.
h o
Minister Walter Thurston (El Salvador) to Hull,
March 30, 19^3, 816.51/1139, R. G. 59, N . A.
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Furthermore, the added financial strength helped to 
stabilize the colon at the exchange rate of 2,5 to 1 
dollar as established in 1934.^
Throughout 1938 and 1939 the debt service suspen­
sion was continued although Dr. Samayoa assured the 
fiscal representative that service would be "again 
considered as soon as feasible." The American Charge' 
in San Salvador, Walter ¥. Hoffman noted that the 
finances of 31 Salvador had stabilized by the middle of 
1939 and that the Salvadoran government could service 
the external debt without making too great a sacrifice. 
All that would have to be done would be to eliminate the 
"increase" in expenditures by the government. He also 
noted, however, that political considerations were given 
priority and "domestic spending cutbacks were not."
It became more expedient for General Martinez to use the 
§850,000 saved annually for internal expansion programs 
in order to gain more support from people who might 
otherwise be alienated were he to promote a program of 
rigid economy in favor of the foreign bondholders.-^
As World War II expanded, the default by the Salvadorans
^Frazer to Hull, December 9 , 1937. file 816.51039/ 
324, R. G. 59. N. A . ; New York Times, February 21, 1938.
-^Hoffman to Hull, July 11, 1939. file 816.51/1009,
R. G. 59, N. A.
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became less of an issue to Washington although nego­
tiations between SI Salvador and the Bondholders' 
Committee continued on a very low level. But SI Sal­
vador simply would not resume payments while other 
nations, which had defaulted on much larger sums, did 
nothing to alleviate the financial burdens of the 
American bondholders. Moreover, it became clear to Sal­
vadorans that better terms might possibly be obtained if 
further negotiations were carried out.
Also, during the war, another avenue was explored 
by the Salvadorans in their effort to ease their fi­
nancial obligations to American bondholders. Because 
of the default, the open market price of the Salvadoran 
bonds dropped substantially. As a result, El Salvador’s 
Minister to Washington, Dr. Hector David Castro, was 
advised by the head of the Export-Import Bank (Mr. Pier­
son) to "purchase its own bonds at as low a price as it
*51could get.. .because everyone else was doing it."-^ El 
Salvador did not begin to "repatriate" the bonds until 
194-2 when it began to repurchase them in the open market 
a a price of "approximately 20 percent of their prin­
cipal amount." The bonds had been bought by speculators
v Copy of a memorandum of interviews by Mr. H. 
Gardner Ainsworth of the Legation with Hector Herrera, 
President of the Mortgage Bank, and William Renwick, 
fiscal representative in Thurston to Hull, March 30, 
194-3, file 816.51/1139, H. G. 59, N. A.
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during the lowest ebb of the 1938 default at substan­
tially lower levels than twenty percent of principal.-^ 2
After the repurchases by El Salvador, the 
Bondholders’ Committee realized that the likelihood of 
debt service resumption was minimal inasmuch as the 
reason given by El Salvador for its failure to comply 
to its financial obligation was the lack of government 
funds.
As a result, the Committee decided that it could 
no longer serve the bondholders effectively and dissolved 
itself on April 30, 1943® It was replaced by the Foreign 
Bondholders' Protective Council in the representation
<3
of the Salvadoran bondholders. J
Throughout the period of its existence, from 
March 1932 through April 1943 , the Bondholders Committee 
was able to get a relatively large sum for its clients 
through the three agreements of May 1933, December 1934 
and April 1936. Total remittances made by El Salvador 
for the bondholders under the agreements, exceeded 
$ 4 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 The amount was especially substantial 
when compared to the negligible sums the Bondholders’ 
Council was able to get for its bondholders. At the same
62Joseph Carter (Secretary of Bondholders Committee) 
to Chief of Financial Division Frederick Livesey (State 
Department), March 19, 1943, file 816 .5l/ll38-§, R. G.
5 9 ,  N. A.
53Ibid.
^Ibid.
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time however, the Committee was criticized for the 
large sums it deducted for its services. A comparison 
of expenses by the two organizations reveal that the 
Salvadoran bondholders had to pay a premium price for 
the services of their Committee. The Bondholders’
Council, from 1933-1936, expended a total sum of 
$252,953*39 while representing the bondholders of several 
Latin American nations. On the other hand, the Sal­
vadoran Committee representing only the bondholders 
of one country expended during the same period $400,000. 
The reason for the large difference in charges was that 
the Lisman Committee assessed its bondholders fifteen 
percent for its services while the Council limited its 
charges to one percent of the face value of the amount 
received frcm.the Latin American nations.-'-'
In an investigation of the bondholders problems in 
1937. the Securities and Exchange Commission admonished 
the Lisman Committee and singled it out as "an outstanding 
example of the manner in which a committee may exercise 
its power to... deal with the security holders arbitra­
rily and oppressively...”-^ In soliciting the deposit
55White to Bonsai, July 29, 1941, file FW 816.51/ 
1085, R. G. 59, N. A.
-^Securities and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part I, pp. 664-667.
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of certificates, the Committee stressed that the fee for 
services would he limited to one percent of the 
principal amount of "bonds deposited. However, when El 
Salvador refused to bear the burden of the committee 
fees plus expenses, the one percent was raised to 
fifteen percent by simply amending the original agree­
ment. Anyone who wished to withdraw his certificates 
had to pay a penalty fee of $10 per $1,000 deposited
and was denied any of the benefits which later accrued
tin
to the depositors. ' Thus the bondholders were forced 
to accept the amendment to the original agreement.
On another matter the Committee was criticized by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the State 
Department and Foreign Bondholders Protective Council 
for the manner in which it dealt with certain bond­
holders—  those who did not deposit their certificates 
with the Committee.-^ It was the position of the Lisman 
Committee that such bondholders were not entitled to 
share the benefits which accrued to those who deposited
57Ibid.
-^ Ibld., p. 668; Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Report. Part V, pp. 459-^60; Memorandum of Conversation 
between Francis White (Foreign Bondholders* Protective 
Council) and Philip Bonsai, Chief of the Division of 
American Republics (State Department), July 23, 19^1. 
file 816.51/1085, R. G. 59, N. A.
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with the Committee which represented about ninety-five 
percent of all bondholders. The position of the 
Committee did not change under the criticism and the 
State Department ultimately altered its position to 
coincide with the Committee1s. John Cabot of the State 
Department1s Division of American Republics agreed that 
the non-depositors be excluded because to pay them would 
probably have resulted in "numerous withdrawals of 
deposited bonds, which would probably wreck the last 
hope of a return to the Agreement of April 1936."-^
He did not wish the non-depositors to "secure all the 
advantages of the past agreement, and any prospective 
one, made by the Committee, while having none of the 
responsibility or expense."^0
On yet another matter, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission criticized the members of the Lisman Committee 
for personally profiting on the problems of the American 
investors whom they represented. Committee members used 
the inside information available to them to buy and sell 
Salvadoran bonds. Between March 1932-September 1935 Lis­
man ' s company bought $392,500 of Salvadoran Bonds and 
CD's and sold $396.500 at a profit of $5.5^8 .98.
During the same period Fred Lavis bought and sold the
-^John Cabot to Philip Bonsai, July 25, 19^1,
file FW 816.51/1085, R. G. 59. N. A.
6oibid.
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bonds and netted $56^*00 in profits. H. W. Hebard like- 
wise profited in the same manner.
Despite all of the criticisms the Salvadoran 
Committee was able to accomplish more for its bondholders 
than the Council was able to do for its clients. While 
he agreed with the criticisms* John Cabot also noted 
that the Committee "through self-interest secured a 
hard boiled realistic settlement which was of benefit 
to the bondholders* while the Council went in for
C. p
ineffectual legal hair splitting and got nowhere.”
The fruitless efforts of the Council after 19^3 when 
it replaced the dissolved Committee, bore out the truth 
of Cabot's statement. Although the debt issue took a 
backseat to the war during the early 19^0*s, negotiations 
did take place although on a smaller scale. In the 
summer of 19^3, a Salvadoran economic mission headed 
by Arturo Bustamante, Undersecretary of Finance, and 
Victor Barriere, Presidents of the Salvadoran Court of 
Accounts, met with Dr. Dana Munro of the Bondholders 
Protective Council. The meetings were held during the
61 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part V, p. 1^9.
A ?
Cabot to Bonsai, July 25, 19^1, file FW 816.51/
1085, R- G. 59, N. A.
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month of July and the first week of August 19^3* The 
objective of the Salvadoran mission was to obtain a 
readjustment of the loan. The discussions however, 
became strained when the Salvadorans insisted that the 
terms be readjusted lower in the same manner that the 
Colombian debt was restructured. J Senor Bustamante 
pointed out that El Salvador "could hardly be expected 
to do better than Colombia, which was a great, rich 
country." Dr. Munro retorted that Colombia was in many 
ways "less developed than Salvador and that the Colom­
bian debt...was very much greater than that of 
6kSalvador."
The new proposal offered by El Salvador would have 
replaced the existing series of bonds with a new thirty 
year bond bearing interest at three percent. It also 
provided for the abolishment of the office of the fiscal 
representative. The Bondholders Protective Council 
could not accept the new terms and as a result, the 
negotiations ended in failure.^ Further negotiations
^Interview with Sr. Barriere, December 1975* San 
Salvador.
6kMemoranda of conversations with Sr. Bustamante and 
Sr. Barriere of the Salvadoran Economic Mission in 
Dana Munro (Bondholders Protective Council) to Frederick 
Livesey (Chief, Financial Division, State Department), 
August 17, I9k3, file 816.51/1175, B. G. 59, N. A.
65Ibid
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were carried out in later years but the loan payments were
not resumed until 1946 and then only after the terms were
66readjusted favorably for the Salvadoran government.
The problems with the 1922 loan had taught General 
Martinez a lesson in economics which he attempted to im­
part to his fellow Salvadorans. In the "Martinez Doctrine" 
which he proclaimed in June 1937 before the Salvadoran 
Congress, he stated: "I propose as the keystone of the
national policy that the government never again contract 
new loans." The quotation was placed on a bronze plaque 
in the hall of Congress. ^
Areas of Economic Cooperation
While the loan default created some tension between 
the United States and El Salvador, other developments 
occurred which helped to facilitate closer economic ties 
between the two nations. During the period between 1920 
and the early 1930’s, the bulk of El Salvador's trade had 
been carried out with European countries. Germany and 
the Scandinavian countries were large buyers of El Sal­
vador’s "mild" coffee. Table II Indicates the destination 
of El Salvador's coffee exports during the 1929-1938
^Wallich and Adler, Public Finance in a Developing 
Country; El Salvador - A CaseStudy, p p . 224-225.
^ N e w  York Times, June 4, 1937»
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Table II
Coffee Exports from El Salvador 
to Principal Markets 1929-1938 88
(In thousands of pounds)
1929 1932 19.36 1937 1938
Percent of 
coffee in 
total exports 93 92 89 91 87
Total coffee 
exports 103,137 87,423 108,927 149,071 149,071
United States 18,928 12,058 60,646 90,856 75,265
Germany 34,759 31,254 16,555 17,582 12,781
Norway 9,161 9,314 8,669 11,316 13,473
Sweden 9,530 6,022 7,241 7,171 8,150
Italy 9,418 10,909 679 4,392 1,032
France 1,980 4,686 3,870 4,400 1,094
Finland 1,331 318 1,056 1,686 1,990
Netherlands 10,542 8,969 1,443 943 881
All other 7,488 3,893 8,768 10,725 34,405
Percent to the 
United States 18.4 13.8 55.7 60 50.5
6 8
United States Tariff Commission, Report no. 144,
p. 263.
13**
period. During the early part of the period, El Salva­
dor was the principal supplier of '‘mild" coffee to 
Germany.^ As also indicated in the table, by 1936, 
there had occurred a pronounced shift in the trade 
figures whereby the United States became the primary 
destination of exports from El Salvador. The basic 
reason for the shift was the German introduction of the 
compensation or ASKI system. ASKI was the symbol for 
Auslander-Sonderkonten fur Inlandszahlungen (Foreigners' 
Special Accounts for Inland Payments). Germany's use 
of blocked accounts began in 1933-193** as an effort 
to collect debts owed to it by nations in central 
and eastern Europe. Because of the accumulation of 
a large amount of unpaid claims and the shortage of 
foreign currency in Germany as well as her own require­
ments for raw materials, she was forced to insist on
70payment either in money or in kind.' Thus, clearing 
agreements began. Under the system developed, payments 
for products exported to Germany were in a currency 
called "Sondermark," redeemable only in Germany, as pay­
ment for German goods. Thus, Salvadoran exporters who 
shipped coffee to Germany, instead of receiving drafts
6q
7 Uni ted States Tariff Commission, Report no. 1*|4,
pp. 261,263.
70
' Securities and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part V, p. 437.
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in New York, were advised that a blocked credit had 
been opened in their accounts in German banks. The
credit on their accounts were used to pay for German
71 goods.'
ASKI system did not work well for El Salvador
because it exported much more than it imported from
Germany. In the years from 1930-1934 El Salvador
sent an average of 29.60 percent of its total exports
to Germany. During the same period it imported only
729.8 percent of its total imports from Germany. Under 
the compensation system in order for El Salvador to make 
full use of the credits earned through exports, she 
would have had to increase her imports from Germany 
threefold. As a result of the imbalance El Salvador, 
in search for new markets, turned to the United States. 
Germany turned to Costa Rica and Colombia for her new 
supplies of "mild" coffee.^ Thus, the German compen­
sation system, together with the free-trade program of 
Cordell Hull brought about the increased trade with the 
United States during the 1930’s.
71' Translation of a Report by Dr. Juan Vasquez, 
M.I.D., February 1940, Item no. 4000, folder 3860-End,
Box 819, El Salvador 3850-4130, R. G. 165, N. A.;
McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance 1937-1945, p. 24.
^^Walllch and Adler, Public Finance in a Develop­
ing Country; El Salvador - A Case Study, pp. 31-32.
73^United States Tariff Commission, Report no. 144, 
p. 26l.
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The basis of the commercial relations between the
United States and El Salvador was governed by the Treaty
of Friendships, Commerce and Consular Rights of 1926 and
by the Commercial Agreement of 1937® The latter agreement
was a reciprocal trade pact which provided for certain
tariff exemptions for products each nation imported from
the other* For El Salvador the primary exemption was her
export of coffee* Since coffee represented over ninety
percent of her exports, the agreement clearly had a favor-
able effect on El Salvador's trade. Eetween 1928 and 1938
the Salvadoran coffee exports to the United States
r>h,
Increased substantially. Tables III and IV indicate 
some of the principal exports and imports between the 
United States and El Salvador during the years 1930-1940.
During the war years, as was the case with other 
Latin American countries, El Salvador's trade shifted 
substantially from Europe to America as the naval blockade 
successfully kept trading vessels out of European waters. 
The nations at war curtailed the importation of coffee 
by their civilians. Table V shows the volume of El 
Salvador's exports to the United States during the war 
years 1940-1944 which adequately compensated for the lost 
European market.
74
1 Translation of a Report by Dr. Juan Vasquez,
M.I.D., February 1940, Item no. 4000, folder 3860-End,
Box 819, El Salvador 3850-4130, R. G. 165, N. A.
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Table III
Principal Exports by El Salvador to the United 
States (in thousands of dollars), 1930-1940
1930a I932b 1934° 1936d 1938®
. f
1940
Coffee 2,501 1,077 2,470 4,806 5,550 6,906
Ealsam* 43 25 35 55 44 59
Sisal 145 23 1 110 12 17
Total
Exports
to
United
States 2,875 1,143 2,527 5,026 5,673 7,003
^Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United 
States for the Calendar Year 1930. Compiled by Division 
of Foreign Trade Statistics”H[tfashingtons Government 
Printing Office, 1931), P» 679.
•u
Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year 
1932. pp. 342-3^3.
°Foreign Commerce and Navigation. Calendar Year 
1934, p. 343.
^Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year 
1936. p. 4ll.
eForeign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year 
1228. p. 393.
f
Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
mo, friw .----------- --- --------
*Balsam— medicinal gum used as a base for perfumes 
and medicines.
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Table IV
Principal Imports by El Salvador from the 
United States (in thousands of dollars),
1930-1940
1930s 1932b 1934° 1936d 1938e 194cf
Wheat & 
Flour 610 379 312 98 262 210
Cotton
Cloth 805 650 763 420 384 254
Cotton
Material 180 175 220 179 215 468
Total
Imports
from
United
States 4,457 2,289 3,130 2,795 3,525 4,682
1930, p. 679. 
b Foreign Commerce
c u . i v a .
and Navigation, Calendar Year
1932, PP. 342-343.
cForeign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1934, P. 343.
dForeign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1936, p. 411.
6Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1938, P. 393. 
f
Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1940, p. 336.
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Table V
Salvadoran Exports to the United States 
(in thousands of dollars), 1940-1944
1940a 194lb 1942° 1943d 1944e
Total 7,003 7,209 11,900 14,492 14,537
Coffee 6,906 7,021 11,691 14,214 1^,255
Percent
Coffee 98 97 98 98 98
Another factor contributed to the improved economic 
relations between the two nations during the period.
On November 28, 1940 the Inter-American Coffee Conven­
tion was signed by the United States and fourteen coffee 
producing nations under which for a three-year period,
a.
lo4o,
X Ui C1K XX
p. 336.
0Foreign Commerce and
iNiCtV Xpdul'JU «
Navigation,
v-»ctJLC?xiu.cij.
Calendar
•LCciX
Year
1941., p. 362.
GForeign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1942, P. 293 
^Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
19^2. Volume 1, 
Foreign
Section
Commerce
3, F 
and
1. 23.
Navigation, Calendar Year
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annual export quotas were set for each producing country, 
both for shipments to the United States and for ship­
ments to all other markets outside the United States.
The agreement was designed to stabilize and improve 
the markets by keeping the price of coffee at normal 
levels. Under the agreement, SI Salvador was allocated
79»365»600 pounds which could be exported to the United 
75States, In 1941 the quota was raised to 80.7 million 
pounds. The United States for its part, did not guarantee 
any fixed or minimum prices, but it did agree to limit 
its coffee importations for the 1940/41 coffee year to 
15.900,000 bags (132 pounds each) and it assumed the 
responsibility for setting up the machinery for the 
control of imports. By so doing, the United States made 
it possible for the coffee growing nations to keep the 
price of coffee at normal levels. In the case of SI 
Salvador, the 1940/41 crop was sold to the United States 
for approximately 38 * 525»000. Had the Coffee Convention 
not been in effect, the price at which the crop would 
have sold could not have been over 33.500,000. Thus, 
with the price of coffee artificially maintained, the 
American people indirectly subsidized the Salvadoran
7 5United States Tariff Commission, Report no. 144,
p. 259.
1^1
economy. Without the Convention the price of the 
commodity would surely have gone down.^ But the 
Coffee Convention was also beneficial to the United 
States because it helped to accomplish its goal to 
preserve the political and economic stability not only 
of El Salvador but also of the whole of Latin America.
^^ice Consul Overton Ellis (El Salvador) to Hull, 
November 28, 19^1. Item no. 7008, Office of Strategic 
Services, R. G. 226, N. A.
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SUMMARY
One of the problems faced by El Salvador during 
the 1930's was the result of its dependence on coffee as 
the foundation of its economy. As such her economic 
stability depended on the price of the commodity remain­
ing stable. Although she produced the mild coffee which 
commanded a higher price in world markets, to a large 
degree its price was still determined by the action of 
the Brazilian government which had artifically normalized 
world coffee prices with a valorization plan. In 1931. 
when other economic pressures forced Brazil to abandon 
its price support program, the price of coffee tumbled 
precipitously. El Salvador was affected in a direct 
manner and the foundation of its economy was shattered.
In an effort to stabilize her economy the govern­
ment of El Salvador enacted several measures, one of 
which was the suspension of her debt payments to 
American bondholders on February 23. 1932. The default 
had far-reaching effects on United States-Salvadoran 
relations which were already strained by the American 
non-recognition of General Martinez's government.
The State Department acted to avoid further 
deterioration of relations between the two nations 
by not carrying out its contractual obligation under
1^3
the 1922 loan agreement. Under the contract it was to 
select a person to be the collector general from among 
those recommended by the fiscal representative and then 
transmit the name to El Salvador for final approval.
The problem arose when Washington, fearful that such a 
transmission might be misinterpreted by El Salvador as 
tacit recognition, decided not to carry out its obliga­
tion. The State Department was reluctant to act because 
so many other Latin American nations had also defaulted 
and to force a small nation to submission would certainly 
be seen as outright imperialism by many.
While Washington1s decision may have improved 
America's image in Latin America, it greatly angered the 
American bondholders who felt that they had been aban­
doned by their own government.
Left to fend for themselves, the bondholders were 
organized by American financial interests who saw a 
profit opportunity arise. After some initial confusion, 
the Salvadoran Bondholders- Committee was formed to act 
as the representative body for most of the bondholders.
The Committee headed by Lawrence Gilson of Manufacturers 
Bank and Trust Company of New York and Fred Lavis of 
I.B.C.A., was able, through hard-headed negotiations, 
to reach a settlement ifith the government of El Salvador. 
Although the State Department remained neutral throughout 
the negotiations, it aided the bondholders by facilitating
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the discussions. The New Dealers of Roosevelt moreover, 
helped matters by not pressuring El Salvador too much 
and by tolerating its actions despite the fact that it 
sometimes embarrassed the Americans through General 
Martinez's resistance to non-recognition.
The effort0 of the Committee paid off on July 29,
1932 when an agreement was signed whereby El Salvador 
agreed to resume payments on the debt. Although the 
subsequent payments were less than the original agreement, 
the bondholders were satisfied because they knew that 
El Salvador was the first Latin American nation to make 
such resumptions after default. Bondholders for other 
nations were not so fortunate. The Aguilar agreement 
of 1932 however lasted only until January 14, 1933 when 
again the debt service was suspended. Another settlement 
was made by May 5» 1933 a*nd it lasted until 1935 when 
again it was suspended. A firmer agreement was not 
signed until 1936, but although it was labled a "permanent" 
agreement, it did not last after November 27, 1937.
On November 2, 1937 Brazil shook the coffee industry 
when it again modified its valorization program and lowered 
the t a x  on its coffee exports. The result was a severe 
drop in coffee prices. The effect on El Salvador was 
immediate and in reaction General Martfnez again suspended 
debt service on the 1922 loan. The 1937 suspension lasted 
for over eight years and it was not until 1946 that debt
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repayments were a g a in  resumed. By then relations between 
El Salvador and the United States had improved consider­
ably.
Although the Committee was strongly criticized by 
some bondholders and the Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion for some of its activities, it was able to do more 
for its bondholders than other organizations which 
attempted to do the same job for other nations.
While the default created some moments of appre­
hension in the overall relations between the United 
States and El Salvador, there were other areas of coopera­
tion which helped facilitate closer ties between the two 
nations. One was the action of Germany when it instituted 
the compensation or ASKI system of trade. While this 
system worked well with other Latin American nations 
(especially Brazil) it did not for El Salvador. As a 
result, El Salvador's trade shifted from Germany and 
Europe to the United States. Secondly, trade agreements 
such as the Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1937 and the 
Inter-American Coffee Convention of 1940, helped to 
facilitate closer economic ties between the two nations. 
Lastly, as the war in Europe expanded, economic relations 
between El Salvador and the United States grew closer 
together.
CHAPTER V
THE LATER YEARS*. TOTALITARIANISM AND WAR
The Movement Toward Totalitarianism
By the middle of 1937, after recognition was no 
longer an issue and the bondholder problem was 
"permanently" settled, Salvadoran-American relations 
improved considerably. The State Department seemed 
satisfied with the American relationship with El 
Salvador. The American Minister, Dr. Frank P. Corrigan, 
wrote in glovring terms of the regime under General 
Martfnez:
President Maximiliano Martfnezfs admi­
nistration has gained the approval of the 
greater part of the people. He has not been 
a Dictator in the opprobrious sense. He 
permits free expression of opinion if he 
considers it well intentioned and not sub­
versive. He is personally democratic and 
approachable. The economic condition of the 
country has greatly improved during his 
incumbency. The adoption of a sound money 
policy through the establishment of the Cen­
tral Reserve Bank and the strengthening of 
the national credit by the completion of a 
satisfactory settlement of the external debt 
are outstanding achievements of his adminis- . 
tration, the value of which is being appreciated.
1Corrigan to Hull, May 29, 1937, file 816.00/100A,
R. G. 59, N. A.
1A6
1^7
However, Dr. Corrigan’s comments on the democracy under 
General Martfnez and the settlement of the external 
debt proved to be somewhat premature as the political 
and economic climate changed in the ensuing months.
When Brazil decided to end limitations on its coffee 
exports on November 2, 1937. the price of the commodity 
plummetted. The effect on El Salvador's economy was 
such that by late November, the debt service on the 1922 
loan was again suspended and the tension between El 
Salvador and the American bondholders returned. The 
other matter regarding the democratic ideas of Martfnez 
was likewise altered when the Salvadoran leader began to 
openly praise the achievements of the totalitarian govern­
ments in Europe.
Two months after his May letter, Dr. Corrigan's 
opinion of General Martfnez's regime changed appreciably.
In another letter to the Secretary of State he expressed 
a desire to use the moral influence of the office of
Minister to discourage the "beginning of a Dictator- 
2
ship," In a telegram reply Assistant Secretary Sumner 
Welles strongly suggested that there be no involvement in 
any way in the internal affairs of the Salvadoran
3
government. ^
2Corrigan to Hull, July 29, 1937. file 816.00/1010,
E. G. 59, N. A.
-^Welles to Corrigan, August 13, 1937, file 816.00/ 
1010, E. G. 59, N. A.
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By the middle of 1938* the complexion of General
Martinez’s regime had become patently more totalitarian.
In a dispatch to the Secretary of State the American
Minister to Guatemala* Fay Allen Besportes, related that
...the British Minister to Guatemala advised 
me yesterday that he had just received confi­
dential reports from El Salvador giving 
further evidence that President Martfnez of 
that Republic has turned Fascist in the letter 
and the spirit.^
By early 1939, Dr. Corrigan’s fears (expressed in his
letter of July 29, 1937) had materialized as General
Martfnez repealed the 1886 Constitution in order to
perpetuate himself in office. In opposition to his
continulsmo. some of his early supporters abandoned his
upro-Patria Party” and joined the opposition. Such was
the case of General Manuel Castaneda, one of General
Martfnez's earliest associates, who had helped him crush
the 1932 uprising. Miguel Tomas Molina, who had helped
to re-establish economic stability during the early
1930’s, Dr. Maximiliano Brannon, Sub-secretary of Finance,
and Augustfn Alfaro, Chief Audit Officer, all left the
government to protest its totalitarian nature. Although
formerly in full accord with General Martfnez, they
agreed with the extension of his Presidential term and
^Minister Fay Allen Desportes (Guatemala) to Hull, 
August 19, 1938, file 816.00/1052, R. G. 59, N. A.
his continuation of a de facto dictatorship. Later, 
General Castaneda further accused his former chief of 
being the most "anti-democratic" leader in the Americas 
and of having delivered sections of the economy to 
"Nazi-Fascist Impe ria lis m.T hus , what had begun as 
admittedly an authoritarian but benevolent government 
had evolved into what many considered to be an oppressive, 
dictatorial regime. The tactics used by General Martfnez 
were viewed by American diplomats as fascist in nature. 
This characterization, combined with significantly 
increased imports from Germany in the years 1935"!937. 
along with the presence of German and Italian advisors 
in San Salvador, seemed to give credence to the belief 
that the influence of the Axis powers in El Salvador was 
considerable. The characterization however, was not 
wholly accurate.
The government of General Martfnez had developed 
over the years as a military regime which emphasized the 
practice of self-discipline. The previous administrations 
had failed in the effort to establish a representative 
democracy and were blamed for the economic and political
^Translation of a memorandum from, "The Executive 
Committee of the Salvadoran Popular Union" to the 
American Legation, January 20, 1939. file 816.00/1065,
R. G. 59. N. A.; Thurston to Hull, February 3. 19^. 
file 816.00/1190, R. G. 59, N. A.
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crises of 1930-1931• Moreover, the military leaders, 
along with General Martfnez, were convinced that the 
only way El Salvador could weather the crises of the ear­
ly 1930's was with the establishment of a disciplined 
population and a centralized government. It was a 
rationale for the establishment of a "corporatist" 
system of government. The success of General Martfnez 
in suppressing the "Communist” uprising in 1932 reinforced 
a belief in the need for a strong central government to 
deal with such dangers. Further support came from other 
dictatorial leaders with governments not unlike his own. 
Men such as Getulio Vargas (Brazil), Jorge Ubico (Guate­
mala) , Anastasio Somoza (Nicaragua), and Fulgencio 
Batista (Cuba) also emerged amid economic and political 
chaos in their countries. Apparently, when faced with 
anarchy or tyranny, Latin American governments opted 
for the latter. The Salvadorans were no different. In 
their desire for law and order, the people gave tacit 
support to the authoritarian rule of General Martfnez.
Like many other politicians, scholars and business­
men during the 1930's, General Martfnez was attracted by 
the successes of Benito Mussolini and, to some degree, 
by those of Adolph Hitler. He saw similarities in his 
actions and theirs. Like him, Mussolini and Hitler had 
saved their countries from Communism. And Mussolini was 
seen as a strongman, not unlike the Latin caudlllo.
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General Martfnez also supported another European
strongman whose beliefs.paralleled his, Francisco
Franco of Spain. General Martfnez was among the first
to recognize Franco's government in 1936.
Later, shortly before his exile, General Martfnez,
in a rambling discussion with an American businessman,
expressed what had been his philosophy throughout the
1930's. He admired fascist ideas and heralded its
bright future. The corporate system, he said, as
originated in Italy and developed by Germany, was the
system of the future and that it was the desirable
system for El Salvador.^
As early as 1933. General Martinez's ideas regarding
the corporate state had become evident to the American
Charge' in San Salvador W . Quincy Stanton who noted in
a dispatch to the Secretary of state that
The Administration is showing 'Fascist' 
leanings - Central American model - with 
the emphasis upon supremacy of the: 1. Military
unit, 2. a greater degree of Corporate State 
convening the coffee and sugar export control 
projects, 3» relatively heavy State participa­
tion in economic interests... *1-. suppression 
of popular legislative activities, 5. the 
necessity of maintaining the present regime 
at all costs..•
Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., Central America, A Nation 
Divided (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 215•
7
'Memorandum of conversation between a prominent Amer­
ican businessman in San Salvador, Ricardo Kriete and 
General Martfnez on May 2, 19*j4  in Thurston to Hull,
May 4, 1944, file 816.00/1323. H. G. 59. N. A.
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Patently, the philosophy of the 
Salvadoran regime is not exactly comparable 
to the European Fascists, for one reason 
because of the scanty industry in this 
country and the predominance of agriculture 
or for the inferior racial quality of its 
population.8
At the time, however, General Martfnez was no different 
from other leaders throughout the world who sought to 
find answers to the problems brought on by the depression. 
Eulers from Vargas to Ubico to Eatista compared the 
capitalist and democratic system vis-a-vis other economic 
and political systems and borrowed from each those 
elements considered vital for a country to survive the 
depression. For some, fascism was preferable to Communism. 
The early economic successes of Hitler and Mussolini made 
the corporate state system appear very attractive indeed.
German and Italian Inroads in Latin America
In 1933. as Hitler rose to power he found himself 
heading a nation on the verge of collapse. Germany was 
burdened with huge debts it could not meet and was 
seriously weakened by a very unfavorable balance of 
trade. But Hitler's efforts to restore Germany's
Q
Charge’ d’Affaires W. Quincy Stanton (El Salvador) 
to Hull, July 1, 1933. file 8l6.00 General Conditions/^,
R. G. 59. N, A.
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industrial and military prowess was hampered by a 
shortage of raw materials, a scanty supply of internation­
ally acceptable currency, and high tariff walls set up 
by Western Europe and the United States. Thus, Germany 
had to turn to Southeastern Europe and Latin America 
for its raw materials as well as markets for its manu­
factured goods. In Latin America, by the use of 
imaginative trade practices (compensation system)
Germany's market share and economic influence grew
o
rapidly over the next few years.7 In El Salvador the 
effect of the trade offensive was clearly visible in the 
increased volume of imports from Germany. As indicated 
in Figure I, during the period from 1930-193^ the 
average percentage of imports from Germany represented 
o n l y  n i n e  percent of El Salvador's total imports. During 
the 193^-1937 period the average rose to twenty-five per­
cent of El Salvador's total imports. While some of this 
increase affected American interests, the bulk replaced 
imports from Asian and-other European countries. Even 
larger increases occurred In other Central and South 
American nations notably Guatemala, Brazil and Argentina.
^Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The United States 
Army in 'World Wa.r IIs The Western Hemisphere, the Frame­
work of Hemisphere Defense (Washington; Department of 
Army, i960), p. 207; Percy Bidwell, "Latin America, 
Germany and the Hull Program," Foreign Affairs XVII 
(January 1939)» passim; Alton Frye, Nazi Germany and 
the American Hemisphere, 1933-19^1 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1967). PP* 173-195-
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FIGURE I
Percent Distribution of Salvadoran Imports 
by Country of Origin, 1930-1944.10
Percent
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10Wallich and Adler, Public Finance in a Develop­
ing Country: El Salvador - A Case Study, p. 32.
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While Germany's compensation system allowed, it to 
substantially increase total trade with, many Latin 
American countries, it was not a complete success in El 
Salvador# Because exports far exceeded imports from 
Germany in monetary terms, the ASKI system did not work 
favorably for El Salvador# As a result, by 1939 it 
diverted most of its exports from Germany to the United 
States as indicated by the graph in Figure II#
Italy's trade with El Salvador suffered during the 
1930's except possibly in the area of military hardware# 
Whereas the Salvadoran coffee exports to Italy averaged 
approximately 9#5 million pounds annually during the 
years 1929-1932, it averaged less than 3-2 million 
pounds in the period 1936-1938#11 The military equip­
ment purchases by El Salvador was better.
Early in 1938, Captain Juan Nunez, Chief of El 
Salvador's Air Force, announced the purchase of four 
Caproni bombers from Italy. The fourth was purchased 
"knocked down" to serve as parts. The planes were ad­
vanced light bombers to be used as either scout or 
pursuit aircraft as well as for bombing purposes.
The planes were purchased for $39»000 each with payment 
made partly in cash and in coffee payable over an
11United States Tariff Commission, Report no. 1^4,
p. 263.
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FIGURE II
Percent Distribution of Salvadoran Exports 
by Country of Destination, 1930-1944.^
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12V/allich and Adler, Public Finance in a Develop 
ing Country; El Salvador - A Case Study, p. 31.
15?
extended period of time. The coffee value was determined 
by the price of coffee on the date of shipment of the 
planes.1-* The $39,000 price included the costs of 
sending a Salvadoran pilot and mechanic for three months 
to Italy and of sending an Italian pilot to El Salvador 
to train other pilots.
El Salvador's Minister of Defense, General Andres 
Menendez, had initially tried to purchase similar planes 
from the United States but failed in his efforts.
Although the American planes cost less at $38,000 apiece, 
the negotiations collapsed because the American company, 
North American Aircraft Corporation, refused to accept 
coffee as part payment. Moreover, the company refused 
to pay for the expenses of training Salvadoran pilots and 
mechanics. With all of the extras the Italian planes
were actually two-thirds of the cost of the American
1  JLl.
planes. The Italian government was obviously eager 
to sell the planes even though it made little money on 
the transaction. As the war developed, the United States 
softened trading conditions in the effort to win the 
support of the Salvadorans and other Latin Americans.
■^Vice Consul Overton Ellis (El Salvador) to Hull, 
February 4, 1938, file 816.248/35. H. G. 59. N. A.
^Ellis to Hull, February 17, 1938, file 816.248/38, 
R. G. 59, N. A.
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In addition to the economic inroads by the Axis 
powers in SI Salvador, they also experienced some 
success in spreading Nazi-Fascist ideas through the 
exchange of military missions* Italy, in a bid to gain 
more influence in the area, accepted for training four 
aviators from SI Salvador at no cost to the Central 
American nation. They were Capt. Julio Sosa, Lt. Fran­
cisco Ponce and two second-year students from the Military 
1 5Academy. ^ Moreover, two officers, Captains Oscar Osorio
and Manuel de J. Cordova of the Artillery Regiment, were
also sent on August 5. 1938, to Italy for training at the
Academy of War at Torino. The training mission coincided
with the Salvadoran order to purchase Italian armaments
which included thirty-two tractor-drawn seventy-five (75)
mm guns and shells. The weapons cost :)12,500 each for a
total of $^00,000 and a like amount for ammunition. The
order was to have been paid with twenty percent in cash
1 6
and eighty percent in coffee. In the ensuing year 
however, the order was cancelled due to Italy's inability to
1^Naval Attach^ Captain F. H. Lamson-Scribner to 
Navy Department, M.I.D., August 17, 1938, Item no. 1003- 
300, fdlder 3360-End, Eox 819, El Salvador 3850-4l30,
R. G. 165, N. A.; Edwin Lieuwen, United States Policy 
in Latin America; A Short History (New York; Praeger, 
Inc., 1964), pp.~190-191.
1 6Lamson-Scribner to Navy Department, M.I.D.,
August 15, 1938, Item no. 906-200, folder 3860-End,
Box 819, El Salvador 3850-^130, R. G. 165, N. A.; Frazer 
to Hull, July 23, 1938, file 816.2460, R. C-. 5 9 ,  N. A.
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fulfill its obligation. Furthermore, Italy's efforts 
to reduce coffee consumption at home due to the worse­
ning crisis in the Mediterranean resulted in the
deterioration of the once friendly relationship with 
17El Salvador. ‘ Although he was still a proponent of 
fascist ideas, General Martfnez, anxious to buy guns, 
turned toward the United States for his supplies. As 
the European war developed, he was able to acquire the 
needed weaponry from the United States.
On another front, the Axis powers were able to 
make additional inroads in Latin America. They were 
able to gain some influence in cultural matters after 
they offered "numerous and generous fellowships" to 
Latin American students and professors to study in their 
schools and subsidized their own professors for placement 
on the faculties of Latin American universities. In some 
Salvadoran schools, Spanish priests with fascist views 
were brought in iiith the blessings of the government and,
at one school in San Salvador, the children were even
1 ft
taught to give the fascist salute. Another Spanish 
priest held an Important position in El Salvador— that
17Ellis to Hull, July 12, 1939, file 816.2k / 6 6 ,
E. G. 59, N. A.
1 ft
Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United 
States; An Historical Interpretation, p. 32&;
New York Times, January 17, 1938.
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of confessor to Sra. Concha M. Martfnez, the wife of
General Martfnez, Padre Mario Casariego arrived in El
Salvador during the early part of 1939 after studying
for the priesthood in Home, Like many Spaniards in El
Salvador he disliked Americans and used his position
to win over Sra, Martfnez to his cause. According to a
report by Captain C, E. Massey, the Military Attache' in
Balboa, Canal Zone, Padre Casariego, because of his
influence on Sra, Martfnez, had often been referred to
as the "Rasputin" of El Salvador,1^ General Martfnez
himself was not influenced by the Catholic priest as he
was an avid Theosophist and Mason, However, he was
influenced by a German friend, Hugo Rinher, who was also
a Theosophist and "crystal gazer," The basis of the
friendship between General Martfnez and Rinher, however,
20remained on the level of religious and occult matters.
Probably the most significant influence of the 
Axis powers in El Salvador was on the military. For 
years German military advisors had been an important 
part of the Salvadoran military administration. Other
1^Military Attache1 Captain C. B. Massey (Balboa,
Canal Zone) to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, December 14, 
19^3, Item no, 2600, folder El Salvador 2400-2950, Box 
817, El Salvador 2400-3020, R. G. 165, N. A,
Of)
Frazer to Hull, January 19, 1939, file 816.00/1052, 
R. G. 59, N. A.; Interview with Sr. Barriere, December 
1975, San Salvador.
l6l
Latin American military organizations had likewise
21utilized German military know-how. Moreover, it was
not uncommon for these nations to have an officer from
Germany or Chile to head sections of the local
military units. As an example, in 1932 the chief of
El Salvador's Guardia Nacional was General Armando Llanos 
22of Chile. By 1938, however, the negative effects of 
the European and African exploits of Germany, Spain and 
Italy caused some observers to cast a suspicious eye at 
the appointment of a German or Italian military officer 
in the armed forces of El Salvador. Such was the case 
when General Eberhardt Bohnstedt was appointed by 
General Martfnez to be the director of the Escuela Milltar 
on April 24, 1938.^ The appointment alarmed some peo­
ple because Bohnstedt was a retired Colonel from the 
German Army and had been under contract to the Salvadoran
government for several years as an Instructor and tech-
24nical advisor to the military. Moreover, his rise to 
the directorship was seen as a bad omen because at about
21 —Interview with Sr. Penate, December 1975. San
Salvador.
? p
McCafferty to Stimson, May 18, 1932, file 816.00 
General Conditlons/31, R. G. 59. N. A.
2-^Mew York Times, April 25, 1938. 
pLl
Frazer to Hull, September 8, 1939, file 816.29/51,
R. G. 59, N. A.
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the same time, Colonel Ernesto Eara was removed from
the post of Military Chief of the Department of
Chalatenango. The removal was significant to some because
Colonel Bara was of French descent and had served in the
French army during World War I. The implication
which surfaced was that General Martfnez was gradually
easing in Nazi sympathizers into the military and
government offices while at the same time forcing out
those who were pro-Allies. This, however, was not the
case. The selection of Bohnstedt was based strictly on
General Martfnez*s admiration of his excellent military
26training and not because of his political orientation.
The appointment of another German to a high 
government post in San Salvador caused some consternation 
among certain American observers. Baron Wilhelm von 
Hundelhausen was appointed as the manager of the important 
Banco Hlpotecario (Mortgage Bank) of El Salvador when it 
was organized in 1935« His selection, like that of 
Bohnstedt, was based strictly on his training and other 
qualifications. He was in fact chosen by the bank's 
president, Hector Herrera, who had become acquainted
2^New York Times, April 25, 1938.
26Interview with Ambassador Serrano, Sr. Earrlere 
and Sr. Penate, December 1975. San Salvador.
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with, him while studying in Germany during the early
1930's. The motivation behind the selection of Hundel-
hausen was simply a desire to have the best qualified
person at the post Just as General Mart fries, In his
efforts to form the Salvadoran Central Reserve Bank,
looked to English and American bankers for organizational 
27advice. 1
By 1938, however, because of the Axis activities in 
Europe, American concern with the German presence in 
Latin America became more evident. Thus, Germans who 
held high ranking positions in government were suspected 
of being Nazi agents or subversives. Although there was 
some basis for suspicion, much of the alleged "dangerous" 
activities of Germans in El Salvador were exaggerated.
Just as during the 1932 revolt anyone who advocated social 
reform or disagreed with General Martinez's regime was 
tagged a Communist, during the late 1930's and early 
19^0*s anyone with a German name or who advocated strict 
discipline was labeled a Nazi or Fascist agent. The 
American Military/- Attache's were especially active in 
seeking out alleged German and Italian agents and their 
sympathizers.
The man considered to be the number one Nazi agent
27'Interview with Ambassador Serrano and Sr. Barriere
9
December 1975* San Salvador.
In El Salvador was Baron von Hundelhausen. Cmdr. Vf. R. 
Phillips, Naval Attache' in Barboa, Canal Zone, related 
some information regarding Nazi plans to the American 
Legation In San Salvador In which it was alleged that 
Hundelhausen had held a meeting at his house In 
November 1937® Hundelhausen was reported to have
presided over a Nazi party meeting which considered the
/
"possibility of Nazis in Central America using their 
strength to assist Martinez in upsetting the government 
of Honduras and making himself president of both countries 
and from there to absorb the rest of Central America.
It was also stated at the meeting that there were 25,000 
Nazis in the Bunds of Central America and that Martfnez
pQ
was a favorite of the Nazi administration in Germany."
Baron Hundelhausen was also accused of being the major
source of German propaganda which circulated in El
Salvador in the form of handbills, pamphlets, fly leaves
and newspaper ads. Most of the propaganda material
originated in Guatemala City where the German minister
29conducted his activities freely. 7 Another German,
p a
Military Attache Cmdr. W. R. Phillips (Ealboa, Canal 
Zone) to Legation (El Salvador), August 11, 1938, file 
816.20A ? , R. G. 59, N. A.
297Confidential memorandum (unsigned) to Roosevelt, 
January 7, 19^1, Box 5^» Presidents* Secretary File, South 
and Central America, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library;
Frazer to Hull, September 8, 1939, file 816.20/51; Frazer 
to Hull, October 13, 1939, file 8l6.5017/2, R. G. 59, N. A.
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Reinhold Weitz of the Agenta Unldos in San Salvador
was alleged to have been the chief of the Nazi laborang
and lived ’’like a millionaire on a salary of $150®00 
30per m o n t h . A s  the war developed, the American 
Military Attaches carefully watched the activities of 
approximately five hundred German, Italian and Japanese 
aliens in El Salvador.
Aside from the aliens in El Salvador who supported 
Nazi-Fascist ideas, sympathizers were also to be found 
among Salvadorans themselves. This was especially true 
in the army officer corps® Of the military officers, 
two individuals stood out as prominent pro-Nazi sympathi­
zers, General Lufs Andreu and Colonel Juan Merino®
Both held very important posts and were of great concern 
to American officials in El Salvador. General Andreu 
was the Department Commander of La Union, the site of 
El Salvador’s most Important port facility on the Gulf 
of Fonseca. Colonel Merino was the Commandant of the 
National Police of El Salvador. Other individuals who 
sympathized with pro-Nazi ideas were the Chiefs of 
Police of the Departments of Santa Ana and Santa Tecla
•^Phillips to Legation, August 11, 1938, file
816.20/47, R. G. 59, N. A.
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31as well as the Commandant of the port of Acajutla.
While these men were fascist in orientation, they did 
not work to subvert the Salvadoran government for 
Germany. Indeed, their only connection with Germany was 
the similarity in their ideas on discipline and 
authority.-^ 2
Because all. of the above-mentioned individuals 
were appointees of General Martinez, there was no ques­
tion as to where he stood on the Axis matter especially 
during the last part of his first full term and the 
early part of his second term in office 1938-19^1 .
When newspapers attacked the influence of the Nazis and 
Fasc i s t o n the Salvadoran government, their editors 
were reprimanded by General Martinez. In 1938 Napoleon 
Viera Altamirano, editor of Dlario de Hoy was exiled for
33criticizing the growth of Axis influence in El Salvador.
The pages of Diario Latino and La Prensa Graffca, two 
leading Salvadoran dailies, show clearly the effect of
Military Attache' Lt. Col J. H. Marsh (El Salvador) 
to M.I.D., December 6 , 19^1* Item no. 3020, folder 
Stability Report, Box 181, El Salvador 3020-3850, R. G.
165. N. A., Frazer to Hull, October 20, 19^ -1, file 
816.00/1088, R. G. 59, N. A.
32 —
J Interview with Sr. Penate and Ambassador Serrano, 
December 1975* San Salvador.
^ N e w  York Times, August 1, 17* 1938.
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censorship as nothing critical of the government was 
ever published during the later stages of the Martfnez 
regime. Despite government censorship the newspaper 
editors were still able to express their opposition by 
clever manipulation of their articles or cartoons.
They accomplished this by printing censored items upside 
down or by purposely leaving the editorial spaces blank. 
They were further able to make back-hand slaps at 
General Martfnez by simply not covering important events 
or by not mentioning his name at all for months at a 
time.^
The successes of the Axis forces in Europe caused 
General Martfnez to be more open in his support of their 
ideas. When Italy joined the war in June 10, 1940, about 
three hundred men dressed in Italian ''Blackshirts" 
paraded through downtown San Salvador. When the Salva­
doran spectators reacted unfavorably with boos and hoots 
they were immediately suppressed by government troops.^
Despite General Martfnez?s position regarding the 
Axis powers, the majority of Salvadorans, among them 
government officials, sympathized clearly with the allied 
cause. Efforts by Axis-leaning Salvadorans to spread
34Dlario Latino. 1939-1941, passim. 
^ N e w  York Times. June 15, 19^0.
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their ideas in the schools by the importation of Fascist
Spanish priests were met with a great deal of opposition
by Salvadoran teachers,, A union of teachers was organized
to fight the spread of Fascist ideas Just as had been
done against Communism during the early 1930’s. The
opposition to Nazi-Fascist ideas was not limited only to
organized protests or editorial "backhanded*1 newspaper
attacks, It also took the form of physical abuse for
certain individuals, Baron Hundelhausen, manager of the
Banco Hipotecario and honorary German Consul In San
Salvador, was subjected to physical threats. His home and
car were stoned by bands of roving youths and he was
Insulted grossly whenever he passed the University, The
threat of bodily harm called for a guard around his 
37house.
The climax of open resistance to the threat of 
Nazi-Fascist influence was the public outcry for the 
resignations of General Bohnstedt and Earon Hundelhausen 
from their respective positions as the heads of the 
Escuela Militar and the Banco Hipotecario. Their 
resignations in September of 1939 brought a sigh of
•^Interview with Sra. Lolita Barauna, May 1975»
New Orleans; New York Times, January 17, 1938-
•^Frazer to Hull, September 21, 1939, file 816.00
N/8 , R. G. 59, N. A.
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relief from American officials In San Salvador. The 
American opposition to their presence had been well 
known by the Salvadoran government. The tide of 
opinion gradually drew the government’s position over 
to the pro-Democratic side.
Even General Martfnez, himself an admirer of German 
and Italian achievements, was a Salvadoran nationalist 
first, above and beyond whatever sentiments he may have 
had regarding fascist ideas. Thus, although he tolerated 
Nazi-sympathizers and was himself a practitioner of 
totalitarian measures, he took every opportunity to 
reiterate pro-democratic, pro-United States, pro-Pan 
American, and anti-totalitarian p r i n c i p l e s H e  was 
also enough of a politician to be able to drift along with 
the changing tides of time. When he saw that the senti­
ment among Salvadorans was toward the Allied cause, he 
too espoused their sentiments. He even allowed the 
resignations of General Bohnstedt and Baron Hundelhausen 
although he considered them valuable men. Moreover, in 
June 19^0, a law was passed which prohibited the dissemi­
nation of foreign propaganda. As a result, Nazi
-^Frazer to Hull, September 8 , 1939* file 816.00 N/8 , 
R. G. 59, N. A.
■ ^ F r a z e r  to Hull, October 20, 19^1, file 816.00/1088, 
R. G. 59, N. A.
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activities were forced underground. In July 19^0, the
withdrawal of Baron Hundelhausen was requested by the
government and he left El Salvador a short time there­
toafter. He was replaced as manager of the Banco 
Hipotecario by a pro-American, brilliant young man,
Dr. Alfonso Rochac.
Among General Martfnez1s top cabinet officers, his 
Minister of Foreign Relations, Miguel Araujo, was 
probably the strongest opponent of Fascist influence in 
El Salvador. He openly denounced the totalitarian 
powers and publicly voiced his disapproval of the local 
German diplomatic representatives. The man who replaced 
Hundelhausen as German Consul was Richard von Heynitz, 
formerly Secretary of the German Legation in Guatemala.
His patently pro-Nazi views irritated Araujo to the 
point that he refused to meet with him and insisted 
that all communications be in written form. Heynitz's 
relations with Salvadoran officials became so unpleasant 
that not long after his arrival in San Salvador, he was
h i
found dead. He allegedly committed suicide. But El
Department Report to Hull, (date missing, probably 
January 19^1), "Latin American Totalitarian Activities," 
folder 331, Latin American-London Conference-Naval 
Conference, Box 76, Cordell Hull Papers, Library of 
Congress.
4l
Although no investigation was conducted into his 
death, it was suspected that he did not commit suicide.
Ibid.
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Salvador's eventual alignment with the Allied cause was 
probably due more to economic factors than to the 
strong pro-Allied positions of Foerign Minister Araujo 
and the majority of the Salvadoran people.
American Reactions to the Spread of Fascism
The rise of Fascist ideas in Europe had an impact 
on the United States as well as Latin America during the 
1930's. The crises brought on by the depression caused 
many American to reassess their economic and political 
systems. Some turned to Socialism for their answers 
while others leaned toward Fascist ideas. Many business­
men saw in Mussolini's Italy the answers to the problems 
h, 2
of America. The man who became the "dean" of the Amer­
ican Fascist movement was a former diplomat to Central 
America, Lawrence Dennis. He utilized his personal 
experiences in dealing with American involvement in Latin 
America as the basis for his call for a reassessment of 
the economic and social structure of American society.
He concluded that the system could be saved only if stern 
discipline was Imposed. That discipline was available 
through Fascism.^
i±2Dlggins, Mussolini and Fascism; The View from 
America, pp. 164-165, 190. ‘ ”
43"ochlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics
of Upheaval, p. ?4.
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The New Deal proponents themselves had to resort 
to "corporatist" measures during the early days in an 
effort to turn the tide of the depression. Hence, they 
could not be too intolerant with their "good neighbors" 
when they too resorted to the use of such tactics in 
their struggle to bring stability to their countries.
In Central America, Jorge Ubico and General Martfnez 
were the leading practitioners of such harsh measures 
in their efforts at continuismo.
During the early 1930’s, while the American offi­
cials in El Salvador were concerned with the inroads 
made by Germany and Italy, their concern did not trans­
late into any kind of action. Their inactivity on the 
matter stemmed from the early unconcern by Washington 
of the impending Axis threat in the area. The extent 
of the State Department's preparedness was limited to 
the acquisition of field reports on Nazi-Fascist 
activities. By 1938 however, because of the worsening 
European crisis, the State Department was aroused enough 
to realize the potential threat that Nazi influence 
presented in the Western Hemisphere. The primary fear 
was that
...given the opportunity and the support of
arms and leadership, one or more of their
h-L
Pike, "Corporatism and Latin American-United 
States Relations," p. 146.
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transplanted colonies would in time start 
an Axis-inspired protest against an existing 
government in Latin America (the pattern de­
signed and executed in the Sudetenland in 
1939); that it soon would find occasion 
for local rebellion; and it thus would 
provide in the American hemisphere a 
ready-made bridgehead for intervention 
and later full-scale Invasion from Europe.
This, it was reasoned, could lead to a 
military occupation which, once established, 
would be far more difficult to dislodge 
than to have prevented in the first place.
Of the local Nazi's hopes and intentions, 
there were rumors sufficient to make 
American diplomatic agents uneasy and 
thereafter to arouse in the State Depart­
ment anxiety over a military coup that 
might be close at hand, and against which 
there was in 1938 no implemented plan of
protection.^5
As the European war became more imminent the United 
States began a military program in Latin America to 
compete with the Axis efforts. In the ensuing competi­
tion for the favor of the Latin Americans, the United 
States pulled out all stops in its efforts, even to the 
point of underbidding (at a loss) the Germans and 
Italians. Hence, the United States military forces 
were able to offer professional instruction to the Latin 
American armed forces at almost no cost to them. The
^Mark Skinner Watson, United States Army in World 
War II: The War Department, Chief of Staff; Pre-War
Plans and Preparations (Washington; Department of the 
Army, 1950), p. 87.
L A
Lieuwen, United States Policy In Latin America;
A Short History, p. 191; Bemis, The Latin American
Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpre­
tation, pp. 355-356.
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resultant monetary loss to America was compensated for
by the Increased influence that it was able to exert
on the governments through the military hardware sales.
As a result^ the United States was able to gain the
cooperation of the Latin Americans in its efforts to
build a hemispheric defense against the Nazi-Fascist 
47threat. '
At the December 1938 Lima Inter-American Conference, 
the United States attempted to thwart the growing Axis 
menace in Latin America. One of the primary objectives 
of the American delegation at the Conference was to line 
up the democracies against the totalitarian states of 
Germany, Italy and Japan. The United States also hoped 
to have adopted a treaty to assure continental security 
or at least to implement the previously approved Euenos 
Aires declaration of Pan-American solidarity of 1936.
The first American goal against totalitarianism was 
vigorously resisted by the Latin American delegates, many 
of whom represented dictatorial governments. They simply 
did not want their form of government interfered with 
just because it differed from that in the United States. 
Moreover, they did not want to destroy their trade rela­
tionships with Germany and Italy, the targets of the
47Whitaker, "From Dollar Diplomacy to the Good 
Neighbor," p. 17 •
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American attacks at the Conference. They were unwilling
to destroy themselves economically just to please the 
48United States. The United States had more luck in the 
Implementation of its second goal to assure continental 
security. After weeks of heated debate the Declaration 
of Lima was signed on December 24, 1938. The treaty 
stated that in case the peace, security or territorial 
integrity of any American republic was threatened by 
foreign intervention, it would be of concern to all and 
that the proper response would be determined through 
c o n s u l t a t i o n s on this matter the Central Americans, 
almost all "totalitarian," voted wholeheartedly with 
the United States.-^
As the European conflict worsened, the American 
influence on El Salvador increased. The belligerent 
nations took steps to curtail the importation and 
consumption of coffee by rationing the product. The
48Speech by William Castle, former Assistant Secre­
tary of State, before the Inter-American Congress, 
sponsored by the Graduate Faculty of Political Philosophy 
of Fordham University in New York City, April 22, 1939» 
file Addresses and Speeches, Castle Papers, Herbert Hoover 
Library, West Branch, Iowa.
4q
7James W. Gantenbein,. (ed.) The Evolution of Our 
Latin American Policy: A Documentary Record (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1950), pp. 356-3^0.
Samuel Guy Inman, "Lima Conference and the Totali­
tarian Issue," ’Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Sciences.'CCIV t'Julv 1939^. p. 12.
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Increased trade with the United States, tools: up the
slack in the lost trade with Europe. El Salvador sold
over sixty percent of its major export (coffee) to the
United States. Thus, the United States was guaranteed
a greater degree of Influence than Germany by virtue
of its greater purchases of coffee® Further, because
most Salvadorans were anti-Fasclsts, the Axis influence
*>1was considerably diminished. J
Sal'vadoran-Amerlcan lielat ions During World War II
Like the other nations of the Western Hemisphere,
El Salvador was directly affected by the outbreak of 
war in Europe. Being an export-oriented nation, El 
Salvador suffered from the disruption of normal commerce 
with Europe. The loss of the German coffee market and 
the cessation of the flow of merchandise from Germany 
was immediately felt by Salvadoran business interests.
The government efforts to guard against undue price 
raising and profiteering helped to keep the majority of 
the Salvadoran population from suffering unduly from 
the effects of the war.^2
The United States too was affected by the war in 
Europe, and at the height of German Successes in Europe
Martin, "Nazi Intrigues in Central America," p. 72.
■^Frazer to Hull, October 20, 19*4-1. file 816.00/
1088, R. G. 59, N. A.
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The Americans began to mobilize their efforts to combat 
the Axis advances in the Western Hemisphere. The ob­
jective was as enunciated at the consultative meetings 
of Foreign Ministers at Panama in 1939? and. Cuba in 
1940, and generally stated at the Lima Conferences to 
develop a unified stand among the nations of the hemis­
phere against the Axis powers. In the Central American 
region the paramount concern of the United States was 
the security of the Panama Canal. On August 1, 1940, 
President Roosevelt approved a statement of policy which 
provided for the followings
a) For arming the countries named to the 
extent Indicated, as determined in each case 
by our estimate of their requirements...
...Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba,
Haiti and the Cominican Republic.
To insure internal stability.
b) For providing these arms on financial 
terms these republics can meet.
c) For assistance in the matter of military, 
naval and industrial personnel.53
The policy provided two avenues for American activities
to combat the Axis menace. One was against Internal
subversive activities, and the other a joint cooperative
effort among the nations of the Western Hemisphere for
-^Conn and Fairchild, The United States Army in 
World War II, p. 213. ---------------- ----- --------
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the defense of one "by all. The joint effort included 
measures to maintain the stability of the monetary and 
commercial relationships of the American republics.
In this regard, the Congress of the United States pro­
vided loans through the Export-Import Bank to provide 
the countries with the means to maintain their exchange,
to develop transportation systems and to strengthen 
<Ll
defenses.
In El Salvador the objectives of the United States 
focused on the economic, military and cultural areas.
The goal there, as in the rest of Central America, was 
to preserve the stability of the country and as a result, 
help to maintain the security of the Panama Canal.
Because of Britain’s war efforts (blockade), German and 
Italian trade with El Salvador diminished considerably 
while trade with the United States increased dramatically. 
Between 1940-1944 El Salvador directed an average of 
77.2 percent of her total exports to the United States. 
This presented an average increase of 13.6 percent over 
the previous five years. A marked increase in imports 
from the United States also occurred during the same
54Department Report to Hull, (date missing, probably 
January 1941), "Latin American Totalitarian Activities,” 
folder 331. Latin American London Conference-Naval 
Conference, Box 76, Hull Papers.
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period as American manufacturers replaced German and 
other European suppliers.Moreover, with', the signing 
of the Inter-American Coffee Agreement in 194-0, El 
Salvador's economy over the next three years was 
virtually saved from what would certainly have been a 
severe setback. The American decision to purchase only 
a limited amount of the Latin American coffee production 
each year served to maintain the price at levels which 
allowed El Salvador to make a healthier profit than 
would have been available without the limitation.-^
In the military arena, the degree of cooperation 
between El Salvador and the United States, likewise 
Increased as the war in Europe intensified. American 
advisors began to arrive in San Salvador in the summer 
of 294-0. Captain Maxwell D. Taylor of the United States 
Army and Marine Major Clayton C. Jerome were sent in to 
consult with Salvadoran military officers.-^ The result 
of the American assessment of El Salvador1s military
-^Translation of Report by Dr. Juan E. Vasquez, M.I.D. 
February 194-0, Item no. 4-000 folder 3860-End, Box 819,
El Salvador 3850-4-130, E. G. 165, N. A.
Ellis to Hull, November 19, 194-1, O.S.S., Item 
no. 7008, R. G. 226, N. A.
-^Hull to Frazer, June 5, 194-0, file 810.20 Defense/ 
67A, printed in Foreign Relations, 194-0, V. p. 107*
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preparedness indicated that at full strength the nation's
standing army during peacetime numbered only six
thousand men, but that it coiild quickly be raised to
forty thousand if necessary* However, according to the
✓
Minister of National Defense, General Andres Menendez, 
the army was poorly armed except for the ten thousand 
Enfield rifles purchased from the United States in June 
1940. ^  The rifles proved to be useless to the Salva­
doran army because the two million rounds of ammunition 
they had ordered did not arrive until a year later. By 
late 1941, the United States could send only five hundred 
thousand rounds to El Salvador. Still, in spite of its 
deficiencies, the conclusion of the American Military 
Attache' in Costa Rica was that the Salvadoran army was 
the best of the Central American nations. ^
For its part, El Salvador cooperated with the 
American effort when it signed agreements which permitted 
American vessels to enter Salvadoran ports freely while
on patrol duty along the Pacific coast of Central
6 0America. Likewise, the Army Air Corps was granted
-^Frazer to Hull, July 22, 1940, file 816.24/79,
R . G . 59s N . A.
59Ibid.
6 0
uFrazer to Hull, January 5, 1940, file 740.0011A 
Neutrality Patrol/6o, printed in Foreign Relations. 1Q40. 
V, p. 107.
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permission to conduct photographic air missions over
6  *1
El Salvador.. The use of air space over Central
America had been granted by the nations of the area for
the purpose of ferrying planes from the United States
to Panama. Permission to stop at airfields or land in
other areas in case of emergency was also granted by El
6 2Salvador and the other Central American governments. 
Although the official Salvadoran position regarding the 
war was neutral, like many other Latin American nations, 
Salvadoran actions indicated that they were very much on 
the side of the Allies.
Probably the best indication of the change of 
direction taken by El Salvador during the war was the 
appointment of an American officer to be the director 
of the Escuela Militar. On March 27, 19^1, Lt. Col.
Robert L. Christian was given a two-year contract to head 
the Salvadoran military school which, only two years 
previously, had been under the directorship of a German 
officer. The American influence continued throughout the 
war as Lt. Col. Rufus E. Byers replaced Lt. Col. Christian 
on May 21, 19^ *3> with a two year appointment. Both
^Charge1 Gerhard Gade (El Salvador) to Hull, Septem­
ber 11, 19^ -0, file 810.20 Defense/6^ printed in 
Foreign Relations, 19^0, V, p. 107® *
f\ o
Conn and Fairchild, The United States Army in 
World War II. p. 312.
182
Christian and Byers were fluent in Spanish and in their 
capacities each had precedence over Salvadoran officers 
of the same rank. During the same period the United 
States legation in San Salvador became fully staffed 
with military attaches from the Army and Navy departments. 
Also, to more intensely investigate the activities of 
suspected aliens or subversives, the legation acquired 
the services of a legal attache in August 1942.
Since ideas and viewpoints were essential elements 
in hemispheric defense, the United States and El Salvador 
also conducted a cultural relations program. An exchange 
of students and professors between the two countries 
was actively promoted. By travel grants and scholarships 
outstanding Salvadorans were able to visit the United 
States. By the same token American students and lec­
turers were sent to El Salvador to exchange ideas. An 
association of prominent Salvadorans and Americans in 
San Salvador was formed to serve as a clearing house of 
Information on educational institutions and facilities
"Agreement Between the United States of America 
and El Salvador," Executive Agreement Series 214, March 27, 
19^1» Executive Agreement Series 328, March 21, 1943 
(Washington: Government Frinting Office, 194l, 1943).
64
Frazier to Hull, September 3» 19^2, M.I.D., Item 
no. 3500, folder 3500-3840, Box 818, El Salvador 3020- 
3850, R. G . 165, N. A. According to John Taylor of the 
Military Division of the National Archives, the Legal 
Attaches were representatives of the Office of Strategic 
Services.
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in El Salvador and the United States. The association 
also provided financial aid to exchange students from 
both countries.^ The cultural program was part of the 
State Department's efforts to curtail the Nazi-Fascist 
influence throughout Latin America and to a large degree, 
was very successful in El Salvador because of the 
cooperation of the Salvadoran government.
The objectives of the cultural, program were, of 
course, part of the overall propaganda efforts by the 
United States. Much of the work in this area was super­
vised by the office of the Coordinator of Inter-American 
Affairs in San Salvador. A 19^2 assessment of the pro­
paganda methods utilized and their effectiveness 
suggested that, 1) motion pictures which showed anti- 
Nazi themes were the most effective, 2) radio broadcasts, 
despite weak transmissions, were also very effective 
in generating a favorable opinion, 3) bribery accomplished 
certain objectives in a very direct manner, 4 )  occasional 
flights of United States army planes over the country 
were very effective in generating a feeling of security
^Department Report to Hull, (date missing, probably 
January 1941), "Latin American Totalitarian Activities," 
folder 331. Latin American-London Conference-Naval. 
Conference, Box ? 6 , Hull Papers; State Department Bulletin. 
June 28, 1941, Vol. IV, No. 105, Publication 1616 
(Washington; Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 768.
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and at the same time showed American air power which
the powerful Axis radio broadcasts minimized. It was
further pointed out that printed material was not a very
effective means of propaganda because of the high rate
of illiteracy, although illustrated magazines were very 
66popular. The propaganda measures, coupled with the 
well-publicized increase in American purchases of Sal­
vadoran coffee proved to be very effective in winning the 
support of the Salvadoran people.
One of the reasons American countermeasures 
against the Axis push succeeded so well was the willing­
ness of Congress to fund the programs. After the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor, El Salvador joined the United 
States in declaring war against Japan on December 8,
19^1* On the following day, El Salvador received a 
$1,6^0,000 armaments and munitions loan through the 
Lend-Lease program. (Three days later on December 12,
19^1» El Salvador declared war on Germany and Italy.)
The terms were so attractive that the ''Martfnez Doctrine" 
prohibiting external loans was temporarily abandoned.
Under the Lend-Lease program El Salvador was required
66
Military Attache Major C. P. Baldwin (El Salvador) 
to War Department, M.L.D., October 7, 19^2, Item no. 2900, 
folder El Salvador 2^00-2950, Box 817, El Salvador 2^00- 
3020, R. G. 165, N. A.
to repay only $ ^ , 8 8  percent of the loan over six years 
at no interest.^ El Salvador also received a $500,000 
grant to develop facilities to improve health and 
sanitation. Such facilities as water supply, sewage 
disposal and disease control were to be improved. In 
addition, American technical experts were sent to El 
Salvador to assist in the implementation of the projects 
The work was done through the office of the Coordinator 
for Inter-American Affairs. The largest sum of money 
granted to El Salvador during the war came from the 
Export-Import Bank. The money, $2.9 million, was used 
for public works programs such as in the construction of 
the Pan American and other highways, bridges, streets 
and improvements in the water supply systems In the 
interior.^
^Hull to Minister Eector David Castro (Washington) 
December 9» 1941, file 8l6.24/118a, R. G. 59, N. A.; 
Acting Chief, Treaty Division Wallace McLure to Hull, 
January 31» 1942, file 816.24/1261, R. G. 59, N. A.; 
Department Report to Hull, (date missing, probably 
January 1941), "Latin American Totalitarian Activities," 
folder 331 Latin American-London Conference-Naval 
Conference, Box 76, Hull Papers.
68"Health and Sanitation Program Agreement Between 
the United States and El Salvador." Executive Agreement 
Series 367. Way 4, 5, 1942 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1944).
^Frazer to Hull, August 26, 1941, file 816.51/1081
R. G. 59, N. A.
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The loan from the Export-Import Bank had been in
negotiationfor several months prior to December 1941,
Two matters complicated the loan. The first was the
reluctance of the United States to grant the new loan
while El Salvador was still in default on its 1922 loan.
No payments had been made since January 1938. It was
felt that if El Salvador could afford to undertake its
new loan obligations, it should first meet its old 
70obligations.' The other matter which complicated the
loan proceedings was the American desire to exert its
influence on El Salvador to oust certain Nazi sympathizers
in government. The American Minister in San Salvador
suggested that
...consideration might profitably be given when 
discussing these loan applications,
...of cleansing the Salvador government of 
a number of its ardently pro-Axis officials, 
certain of whom are in key positions. An 
oral assurance that this matter would be 
attended to could no doubt be relied on...
The writer feels that one good turn 
deserves another, and can perceive no reason, 
when we are giving so much, why we should not 
exact one or two of the things we want in 
return.™
Frazer to Hull, November 12, 1941, file 816.51/ 
1098, R. G. 59, N. A.; Frazer to Hull, September 26, 
1941, file 816.51/1092, R. G. 5 9 ,  N. A.
"^Frazer to Hull, August 26, 1941, file 816.51/
1081, R. G. 59, N. A.
Frazer's advice was heeded by the State Department and
as a result, the negotiations with the Export-Import
Bank bogged down. In October 1941 General Martfnez
finally backed down and removed one of the two men who
were personae non grata to the United States. On
October 21, Col. Juan Merino, Chief of the Salvadoran
National Police, was "kicked upstairs" to the post of
Minister to Nicaragua. His replacement was a pro-
72American officer, Col. Rudesindo Monterrosa. 1 Two
months later, on December 2, 1941> General Lufs Andreu,
the Commander of La Union, was transferred to a less
strategic location in the department of San Vicente and
he too was replaced by a pro-American officer, Col. Jose^
73Angel Avendano. 1 ^  The ouster of the two military officers 
was not only a conciliatory gesture by General Martfnez 
but a risky one as well because both .men were popular 
within the military without which General Martfnez could 
not have ruled. With the concessions by General Martfnez, 
the loan was granted by the United States.
72
' Military Attache' Lt. Col. J. H. Marsh to War 
Department, October 25, 1941, Item no. 3850, M.I.D., 
folder Stability Report, El Salvador 3020-3850, Box 818,
R. G. 165, N. A.
73Marsh to War Department, December 6 , 1941, Item 
no. 3020, M.I.D., folder Stability Report, El Salvador 
3020-3850, Box 818, R. G. 165, N. A.
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El Salvador also contributed to the war effort in 
other ways besides allowing the United States access to 
its airports, sea ports and certain other privileges. 
General Kartinez joined some of his neighbors and backed 
the Roosevelt-Churchill agreements to "destroy anti-
7 k
democratic doctrines."' Ey January 1942, El Salvador 
had become an active participant in the Allied effort 
to intern and deport Axis nationals suspected of subver­
sive activities. Several hundred German and Italian 
nationals were eventually deported to camps in the 
United States.^ By early 1942, only four hundred eighty 
German, Italian and Japanese nationals were left in 
El Salvador and of these twenty-six Germans, twenty-three 
Italians and two Japanese— all male— were interned at 
the National Police Headquarters. They were quartered 
in a dormitory on the second floor of the Police head­
quarters building but were permitted to make occasional 
visits, without guard, to points within the city limits.^
^New York Times, December 2, 1941.
7<
^Interview with Sr. Penate, December 1975. San 
Salvador.
Harsh to War Department, January 24, 1942, Item 
no. 3020, N.I.D., folder Stability Report, El Salvador 
3020-3850, Box 818, R. G. 165, N. A.
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An unsigned, memorandum to the liar Department, citing an 
P.B.I. Report as its source, criticized the x-xay the 
internment process was handled protesting that the 
prisoners were treated with hid gloves and almost with 
deference by the Director of Immigration, Col. L. Dreyfus. 
The Immigration chief made no effort to hide his 
sympathy for the German and Italian detainees and 
allowed them regular visits 'ey their families and ser­
vants who came laden with food. The visits often took 
the appearance of being a festive occasion. Thus, the
report urged that the detainees be immediately removed
77to the United States. Other measures taken against the 
Axis nationals were less stringent but nonetheless 
served to harass them— their telephones were disconnected,
n Q
conversations were reported and travel was restricted.
Although no Salvadoran troops were ever sent to 
the battlefront during World War II, Salvadoran men 
contributed directly to the war effort by serving as 
laborers in the maintenance of the Fanama Canal. The 
security of the waterway was one of the high priority
77''Unsigned memorandum to War Department, Way 27,
19^2, Item no. 3100, K.I.D., folder 3000-4000, El Salvador 
2400-3020, Box 817. R. G. 1.65, N . A.
^Warsh to War Department, January 24, ip42, Item 
no. 3020, K.I.D., folder Stability Reoort, El Salvador 
3020-3850, Box 818, R. G. 165, N . A.
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items in America's defense plans. Among the contin­
gency plans itfhich received serious consideration by 
the United States Army was the expansion of the canal 
and its lochs to accommodate larger warships. Some 
consideration was also given to the construction of 
additional lochs as a precaution against tombing hits 
on the existing lochs. During the 1940-1944 period, a 
total of 19,675 contract worhers were brought into 
Fanama from Central America and the ttest Indies to carry 
out the initial phases of the expansion projects as well 
as for the normal maintenance of the passageway. More 
than half of the total number of workers were from 51 
Salvador. ^  The worh on the canal did not win friends 
for the United States. For some, the assignment to 
worh there was the penalty for wrongdoing. Soldiers
charged with misconduct were punished with a stint at
80the canal. Most of the Salvadoran worhers sent to 
7 0
^Stetson Conn, Rose C. Sngleman, Byron Fairchild, 
The United States Army in World War II; The Western 
Hemisphere, Guarding the United States and its Outposts 
(Washington: Department of Army,1964), p. 322;
Clipping from Diario Nuevo. San Salvador, March 8, 1944, 
Item no. 4810, folder miscellaneous, El Salvador 4730- 
5060, Box 821, R. C-. 165, N. A.
on
Interview with Sr. Penate, December 1975, San 
Salvador. Sr. Penate was punished for misconduct in 
the army and sentenced to the Canal Zone for six months.
i-
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work at the canal returned home with a myriad of com­
plaints about their stay in the camps which were "like 
cemeteries.!! Nevertheless, the Salvadoran efforts at 
the Canal Zone were significant in that thousands 
of American troops were freed from doing "non-essential" 
jobs.81
The Fall of the Martfnez Regime
Throughout the war, the matter of General Martinez's 
loyalty to the Allied cause remained in doubt. Although 
he outwardly supported the Allies and cooperated in 
the American effort to establish a secure Western 
Hemisphere, he privately stated his desire to see the 
Axis powers win. This was especially so during the 
early stages of the war before the United States had
Op
turned the tide against Germany. His position however, 
was almost an isolated one in El Salvador. Most of the 
population and even in his own administration officials 
were openly in favor of the allies. General Martinez
81
Ibid.; Clipping from Diario Nuevo, San Salvador, 
March 8 , 1944, Item no. 4810, folder Miscellaneous,
El Salvador 4?30-506o, Box 821, R. G. 165, N. A.
8 2Department Report to Hull, (date missing, probably 
January 1941), "Latin American Totalitarian Activities," 
folder 331» Latin American-London Conference-Naval 
Conference, Box 76, Cordell Hull Papers; Frazer to 
Hull, October 20, 1941, file 816.00/1088, R. G. 59, N. A.
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was further out of tune from other Salvadorans when in 
late 1'9^3 he began to implement his plan to retain 
office after the expiration of his third term on January 1, 
19^5® He began to enact certain repressive measures 
to harass the opposition. Individuals who were known to 
be against him found that they could not get passports, 
new automobile licenses, or telephones. Moreover, they 
were followed by uniformed or secret police. It became 
apparent that their democratic rights were slowly being 
eroded. General Martinez had completely lost his earlier 
benevolence and had become a one-man government with a 
cabinet full of yes-men. In January 19*4, a Constitu­
tional Assembly once again convened to alter the 1939 
Constitution in order to grant General Martinez yet 
another term. By then the changes in the political 
atmosphere in El Salvador had become critical. While 
General Martinez may have been able to get away with 
authoritarian conduct early during his rule, by 19*4 the 
atmosphere had changed. The Salvadorans' aversion to 
General Martinez1s tactics in 19*4 nay have partly been 
brought about by the same worldwide revulsion with 
totalitarianism and dictatorships of the likes of Hitler 
and Mussolini. Vice-Consul Joseph E. Maleady assessed 
the situation in the following manners
tyC"’ •*>....
The President has now reached the point 
where he may be classified as 'the entire 
government.' While this has been true for
193
a long time, it is even more pronounced at 
present since he now hates to receive any 
advice that is not in line with his pre­
conceived ideas and opinions.°3
On April 2, 19*14, the years of pent-up frustrations 
finally erupted when the younger officers, dissatisfied 
with low salaries and General Martinez's autocratic 
methods, openly rebelled® In the disturbances which 
followed, bands of roving youths marched to the 
American Embassy and attempted to persuade the Ambassa­
dor to show some sign of recognition for their efforts
against dictatorship. Ambassador Thurston, however,
84abstained from making any comments on the events.
General Martinez was on a picnic at La Libertad 
with his family when the uprising began that Sunday 
afternoon, April 2, 1944. Two truckloads of rebel 
troops were dispatched to capture General Martinez and 
his family. An indication of the apparent ineptness of 
the revolutionary forces was the failure of the two 
truckloads of soldiers to capture their quarry inspite 
of the fact that there was only one road to the beach. 
Upon his return to San Salvador General Martinez re­
grouped his loyal troops in the National Guard and
^Survey of Salvadoran politics by Vice Consul 
Joseph E. Maleady (El Salvador) in Thurston to Eull, 
February 3, 19^. file 8l6 .00/1190, E. G. 59, N. A.
84Thurston to Hull, April 2, 1944, file 816.00/1721;
April 4, 1944, file 816.00/1236, R. G. 59, N. A.
19^
Police. Ey late Sunday evening the forces loyal to 
General Martinez had secured the city and by the 
following day, April 3» 19*4, all resistance from
o n:
the rebel forces had ended. D
Throughout the intermittent fighting during the 
revolt about one hundred deaths occurred, and while 
the citizens of San Salvador were concerned, there was 
no great fear or panic in the city. The Diplomatic 
Corps met on Monday the afternoon of April 3 in 
Ambassador's Thurston's office to discuss the situation 
and to decide what action if any to take, Nhile the 
meeting was talcing place a tank passed by the Embassy 
with its machine guns firing. The purpose of the shoot- 
ing by the tank was to clear the way toward the Embassy 
where the driver, Col. Tito Calvo, sought asylum.
Col. Calvo parked his Lend-Lease tank in front of the 
Embassy and along with two other officers asked the 
American Ambassador to grant them political asylum.
After he was turned down by Ambassador Thurston, he 
asked the other diplomats from Mexico, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua and Costa P.ica for protection. All refused 
to grant his request. After receiving assurances from 
General Martinez that the prisoners would be given the
^Thurston to Hull, Aoril 11, 19^4, file 816.00/
1259, B. C-. 59, N« A.
IQ K
benefits of Salvadoran law, Ambassador Thurston 
reluctantly relinquished Col, Calvo, Lt. Mancia, and 
2nd Lt, Gavidia to General Martinez's soldiers.88
Ambassador Thurston was justifiably apprehensive 
about turning the rebels over to General Martinez,
The memory of the 1932 mat^nza was still fresh in the 
memories of many people. In a telegram to the Secre­
tary of State, Ambassador Thurston expressed his fears 
that
...in view of the apparently wide scope 
of military and civilian participation 
in the uprising and the bitterness it 
must have aroused, there exists the 
danger of rather general retaliatory and 
punitive action by the government and I 
anticipate that we may be urged to inter­
pose on humanitarian grounds.
His fears were realized when on April 10, 19^» ten
officers were executed by firing squad for their role
88in the rebellion. The executions suppressed the 
uprising but did not end the protestsj it was only the
88Thurston to Hull, April 5, 19^4, file 816.00/12^9, 
E. G. 59, N. A.
^Thurston to Hull, April 19^ (4, file 816 .00/1236, 
H« G • 59» M. A.
8®Thurston to Hull, April 12, 19^4, file 816.00/1256, 
R. G. 59. M. A. Second Lt. Antonio Gavidia Castro, who 
was executed along with Col. Calvo was alleged to be the 
illegitimate son of General Martinez. Interview with 
Sr. Pelfate and Ambassador Serrano, December 1975» San 
Salvador.
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beginning. The death of Col. Tito Calvo and the others 
inspired other Salvadorans to resist the actions of 
General Martinez.
On April 28, 19*j4, a strike by students at the 
National University and doctors and interns at the
89main hospital took place to protest the executions. ^
By May the strikes had spread to other institutions.
The campaign of strikes and passive resistance were 
designed to compel General Martinez to resign. By 
May 5* 19^. virtually all employees of banking 
institutions were on strike and almost all the shops 
and businesses were closed.^ The whole city of San 
Salvador seemed to be on strike against General Martinez.
As the strikes spread to other parts of the country, it 
reached such massive proportions that it would have taken 
another matanza to stop it. This time General Martinez 
did not have the necessary support nor the desire to 
initiate one. Furthermore, he did not have the 
"communist11 ogre to blame for the troubles.
With no one to turn to, his army helpless before 
such massive resistance, General Martinez, upon the
^Thurston to Hull, April 28, 19^, file 186,00/
1289, H. G. 59, N. A.
^°Thurston to Hull, May 5, 19^, file 816.00/1299,
R. G. 59, N. A.
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advice of his Cabinet, stepped down on May 9* 1944.
91Two days later, he fled with his family to Guatemala.'
917 Interview with Ambassador Serrano and Sr. Barriere, 
December 1975. San Salvador; Thurston to Eull, May 9, 
19^4, file 816.00/1317; May 11, 1944, file 816.001/ 
Martfnez, May/77. G. 59. N. A.
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SUMMARY
During prolonged periods of political and economic 
crisis many people are willing to tolerate authoritarian­
ism in order to achieve some degree of peace and order. 
When given the option between anarchy and tyranny most 
will choose the latter.
El Salvador experienced such a dilemma during the 
early 1930’s when the economic depression and Communist 
revolt created an atmosphere of fear and apprehension.
As a result, the authoritarian, but "benevolent" rule 
of General Martinez had the support of most Salvadorans 
and the grudging toleration by the United States despite 
disagreements on some economic matters.
Ey the late 1930’s however, the benevolence of the 
earlier period had disappeared as General Martinez began 
to implement his plan to perpetuate himself in office.
Els efforts at contlnulsmo in 1939 resulted in opposition 
from prominent Salvadorans who had formerly been his 
strongest supporters during his earlier terms in office. 
General Manuel Castaneda, who had been his right-hand 
man during the 1932 rebellion, even accused him of being 
the most "anti democratic” leader in the Americas. More­
over, his authoritarian tactics of the late 1930’s led 
observers to conclude that his rule was fascist in nature.
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Actually the accusations of fascism were more 
exaggerated than deserved "because although some of 
his practices could admittedly be labelled authori­
tarian General Martinez was far from being an advocate 
of the Axis powers' cause in Latin America. However, 
in the climate of the late 1930's when Hitler and
Mussolini made everyone conscious of totalitarianism,
it did not require too much disciplinarian action to be 
grouped into the fascist league. Other Latin American 
leaders practiced similar tactics and were likewise 
accused of harboring fascist sympathies. Eut then 
again, so did many other people throughout the world 
who, in seeking the answers to the problems of the 1930’s, 
also turned to the ideas of Mussolini. Many Americans, 
even those among the New Dealers, sought to find the 
answers in corporatist ideas not unlike those practiced 
in Italy, Therefore, when General Martinez looked toward 
Europe for his ideas, he was not alone in his search
for the answer to his problems.
Other factors helped to facilitate the ideological
orientation toward Germany and Italy. Between 193^ and
1937 the trade between El Salvador and Germany rose
substantially as Germany launched a major trade offensive.
Likewise the Italians were successful in selling a number
of planes to El Salvador and at the same time training 
Salvadoran pilots to fly and service them. The Axis
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nations were also able to carry on a successful exchange 
of professors as well as send military advisers to 
El Salvador,. The appointment of General Eohnstedt to be 
Director of the Escuela Ml11tar was especially signifi­
cant and contributed a great deal to the accusation that 
General Martinez was a fascist sympathizer. Likewise, 
the appointment of Earon Eundelhausen, a German and 
suspected Nazi, to be Director of the Banco Hlpotecarlo 
caused further consternation among American diplomats 
in San Salvador.
In addition to the aliens, there were also Salvador­
ans whose ideological orientations were toward fascist 
ideas. General Luis Andreu and Colonel Juan Merino were 
important officers in General Martinez’s military. Their 
positions further gave credence to the allegations that 
General Martinez’s government was fascist oriented. More­
over, General Martinez's conduct toward all who opposed 
his ideas convinced many of his real political orientation 
toward fascism. As a result, the Salvadorans, the major­
ity of whom were pro-allies, successfully applied pressure 
to oust Eohnstedt and Hundelhausen. Both resigned in 
September 1939*
The United States had not taken any direct action 
on the Axis inroads in Latin America until 1938 when the 
European arena became inflamed. As a result, the United 
States initiated several steps to counteract the Axis
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influence. One measure was an Increase in military aid 
to Latin American nations* while another was the con­
vening of a Pan-American Conference to declare opposition 
to the spread of Axis ideas. In Salvadoran-American 
economic relations* no stimulus was necessary since 
most of the European markets for Salvadoran products had 
disappeared and the United States became the primary 
market for Salvadoran exports. As a result* United 
States influence in El Salvador increased significantly.
In 19^0 American arms were sold to El Salvador's army 
which, although small, was considered to be the best in 
Central America. On March 27, 19^1, Lt. Col. Robert 
Christian became Director of the Escuela Milltar. which 
only two years previously had been under the directorship 
of a German officer.
America's influence was also felt on the economic 
front. On December 9» 19^1 * after El Salvador declared 
war on Japan, the United States granted it a Lend-Lease 
armaments and munitions loan valued at $1.6 million 
dollars. Other loans through the Export-Import Bank were 
also granted after General Martinez consented to the 
American suggestion that he oust General Andreu and 
Colonel Merino, two pro-Nazi sympathizers.
In addition to cooperating with the American efforts,
El Salvador also contributed by providing the Panama Canal 
with most of its workers during the war. Also, El Salvador
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participated in the internment and deportation of German, 
Japanese and Italian nationals.
World War II altered the ideas of many people in the 
world. The attitude toward authoritarianism changed.
The worldwide revulsion to totalitarianism, as reflected 
in Mussolini and Hitler, also affected the Salvadoran 
people. When General Martfnez again sought to perpetuate 
himself in office in January, 1944, the Salvadorans led 
by a rebellious faction of the military resisted. After 
an abortive coup was crushed, a massive strike ensued 
and General Martfnez, no longer willing to carry out 
another matanza. stepped down. On May 11, 1944 he fled 
with his family to Guatemala.
The United States, asked to intervene for "humanitar­
ian reasons," had learned a lesson and refused to become 
involved in the internal affairs of El Salvador.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
During the critical days of April and May 1944, 
the American Ambassador to El Salvador, Walter Thurston, 
wrote to his superior in the State Department that he 
feared the government reprisals to the uprising would 
be violent and bloody. The last rebellion against 
General Martfnez in 1932, had resulted in the massacre 
of over ten thousand Salvadorans. The Ambassador sug­
gested that the United States might be asked to "interpose 
on humanitarian grounds." In reply, the Secretary of 
State, not wishing to become embroiled, emphasized that 
the problem was an internal matter and no authority to 
intercede would be granted. However, he did permit his 
Ambassador to "discreetly" mention to General Martfnez 
that the eyes of the world were upon El Salvador and to 
warn him that "severe or inhuman reprisals would seriously
injure the standing of the Salvadoran government with our
2
press and public opinion." In yet another appeal to
1Thurston to Hull, April 4, 1944, file 316.00/1236,
R. G. 59* N • A.
‘“Hull to Thurston, April 6, 1944, file 816.00/1236,
R. G. 59, N. A.
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grant assistance, Thurston forwarded to the Secretary 
of State a letter by Agustfn Alfaro, a prominent 
Salvadoran, to Overton Ellis of the United States 
Embassy in San Salvador. In his letter, Alfaro pleaded 
for American intercession against continuismo and 
repression by General Martinez„ Senior Alfaro noted that 
the United States gained the trust and friendship of 
the Salvadorans by its aid and encouragement during 
the war along with other good neighborly policies. He 
feared that this hard-earned friendship would be lost 
if, during this time of need, the United States did not 
come to their aid.-^ As the situation worsened, the 
diplomatic corps in San Salvador approached the American 
Ambassador and requested that the United States directly 
intervene to avoid bloodshed. The Peruvian Charge" 
d* Affaires, speaking on behalf of the diplomatic corps, 
threatened that "United States prestige would be damaged 
if it merely stood by impassively while a popular move­
ment took p l a c e T h e  State Department reply to all 
requests for intercession was negative. The United 
States would not intervene in the internal affairs of
^Thurston to Hull, April 21, 19^, file 816.00/1277, 
H. G. 59, N . A.
^Thurston to Hull, May 5, 19^. file 8l6.00/1303,
R. G. 59, N. A.
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El Salvador. The policy of strict neutrality was to 
be maintained.-*
This reaction in 19^4 was far different from the 
one taken by the United States in 1931-1932 when it 
took a very active part in the crisis before and after 
the coup which brought General Martinez to power. By 
the end of his term in office, Salvadoran-American 
diplomatic relations had undergone a complete transforma- 
tion. It had evolved from Charles Curtis1 inept inter­
vention during the 1931 coup to Walter Thurston’s cautious 
neutrality during the 19^ )4 rebellion. The desire to 
help was still there in 19*^ 4, but the lessons had been 
learned. Intervention in the internal affairs of another 
country had often led to unforeseen complications and in 
too many instances in the past the United States found 
it difficult to extricate herself from the entanglement.
As another Ambassador, George P. Kennan, later observed, 
participation in the internal affairs of other nations 
was inadvisable because
...even benevolence, when addressed to 
a foreign people represents a form of 
intervention into their internal affairs 
and always receives, at best, a divided 
reception.®
-*Hull to Thurston, May 6 , 19^ *4, file 816.00/1303,
R. G. 59, N. A.
6
G e o r g e  F .  K e n n a n ,  R e a l i t i e s  o f  A m e r i c a n  P o l i c y  
( N e w  Y o r k :  W .  W . N o r t o n  a n d  C o . ,  P *  57*
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By 19^4 however, the relationship between the small 
Central American country and its large "neighbor to 
the north," had matured substantially after going through 
a difficult period during the 1930's,,
A nation’s foreign policy is predicated on the 
fundamental premise that the national interest is 
paramount when determining goals, objectives and cor­
responding courses of action. The national interest 
is often difficult to define so that policymakers often 
act according to what they perceive to be the best 
interests of their people. General Martinez fully 
believed that the best interests of Salvadorans was in 
preserving territorial integrity and the nation's 
sovereignty from a large foreign power. At the same 
time, he also recognized that in protecting the national 
interest, he should not lose sight of his nation’s 
dependence on coffee exports to the United States, 
Therefore, his was a delicate balancing act to keep 
outside political considerations from dictating internal 
economic policies.
In the same manner, the proponents of the Good 
Neighbor policy of the United States also determined 
that the national interest be given top priority in all 
considerations. For example, in advocating his free- 
trade policies, Secretary of State Cordell Hull fully 
expected the United States to benefit in the long run.
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H e  h o p e d  t h a t  b y  l o w e r i n g  t h e  t a r i f f  b a r r i e r s ,  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a n  n a t i o n s  w o u l d  b e n e f i t ,  b u t  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  
s o  t o o  w o u l d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  I n  t h e  s a m e  m a n n e r ,  
P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t ,  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  A m e r i c a n  b a n k e r s  
c o n d u c t  t h e m s e l v e s  p r o p e r l y  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  s o  t h a t  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ’ i m a g e  m i g h t  b e  i m p r o v e d  a n d  c o n s e ­
q u e n t l y  e n a b l e  i t  t o  i n c r e a s e  i t s  e c o n o m i c  p e n e t r a t i o n  
o f  t h e  r e g i o n .
B u t  w h e r e a s  a  s m a l l  n a t i o n  l i k e  E l  S a l v a d o r  c o u l d  
n o t  a f f o r d  t o  c o m p r o m i s e  i t s  n a t i o n a l  s o v e r e i g n t y  b y  
c o n c e d i n g  t o  t h e  w i s h e s  o f  a  l a r g e r  p ox^er, t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s ,  i n  i t s  o w n  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t ,  c o u l d  a f f o r d  t o  
b e  l e s s  d e m a n d i n g  i n  o r d e r  t o  i m p r o v e  r e l a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
f u t u r e .  T h i s  x^as b a s i c a l l y  t h e  m e s s a g e  o f  t h e  G o o d  
N e i g h b o r  p o l i c y  t o  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .  N o t  a l l  A m e r i c a n s  
a g r e e d  w i t h  t h e  w a y  t h e  p o l i c y  w a s  i m p l e m e n t e d  h o w e v e r .
I n  a  c r i t i c a l  s p e e c h  a g a i n s t  t h e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
o f  t h e  N e w  D e a l ,  f o r m e r  A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  
W i l l i a m  C a s t l e ,  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a d  g o n e  
t o o  f a r  i n  i t s  e f f o r t  t o  c o r r e c t  t h e  w r o n g s  o f  t h e  p a s t  
i n  L a t i n  . A m e r i c a .  U n d e r  R o o s e v e l t ,  h e  s a i d ,  t h e  g o v e r n  
m e n t  w a s  " f o r c e d  t o  a d o p t  a  p o l i c y  o f  s e l f - a b n e g a t i o n ,  
t o  m a k e  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a p p e a r  r e a d y  t o  g i v e  u p  a l l  
i t s  r i g h t s  r a t h e r  t h a n  r i s k  o f f e n s e . . . I t  d o e s  n o t  m a k e  
t h e m  ( L a t i n  A m e r i c a n s )  l o v e  u s ;  a l t h o u g h  i t  g i v e s  t h e m
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a chance to feather their nests at our expense. ” '
Castle was obviously referring to the matter of loan 
defaults. Many bondholders too, believed that the 
United States had not given them adequate support in 
their effort to get payments.
When the goals and objectives of two nations are 
complementary, the diplomatic tasks of their representa­
tives become less difficult. In Salvadoran-American 
relations during the period of General Martfnez 1931- 
1944, goals were not as divergent as those between other 
nations. Each complemented the other. El Salvador 
had ’’mild” coffee which United States importers wanted 
to purchase in order to blend with the stronger Brazilian 
product. In turn, El Salvador desired recognition in 
the world community, and the United States could be ins­
trumental in. helping her to achieve it. Furthermore, the 
United States had the means with which to meet El Salva­
dor’ s need for financial assistance.
However, complementary goals were not common during 
the early 1900’s. Curing that time, although Salvadoran- 
Amerioan relations began on a cordial footing, the 
foundations for future problems were being laid.
American concern for the security of the Panama 
Canal prompted moves for political stability in the area.
"^Speech by William Castle, April 22, 1939. file 
Addresses and Speeches, Castle Papers, Herbert Hoover 
Library.
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To accomplish this goal the United States believed it 
necessary to promote democratic practices, especially 
among the nations of Central America and the Caribbean.
At the same time, the United States did not hesitate to 
use its "moral influence" in this regard. In some cases, 
this prompted direct intervention in the internal affairs 
of the countries involved.
In an attempt to maintain stability and to prevent 
recurring coups d ’etat, the Central American nations, 
with the encouragement of the United States, concluded 
the 1907 and 1923 Central American Treaties of Peace and 
Amity. Though noble in its conception, the treaties 
failed in their objectives. They served to keep those 
who were already in power secure in their positions, 
notwithstanding the questionable nature of their rule.
The Salvadoran Congress took exception to Article II 
of the 1923 Treaty, which dealt with non-recognition of 
revolutionary governments. But since no one could 
foresee the future implications of such an inflexible 
treaty, no serious issue was made of it at the time.
Another matter during the 1920‘s which later 
complicated relations for El Salvador and other Latin 
American nations was the free-lending practice of American 
bankers. In dire financial straits, El Salvador needed 
the funds that American bankers offered. Both sides 
entered into arrangements under false assumptions. Amer-
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lean bankers made loans with the belief that the United 
States Department of State fully backed them and, in a 
sense, guaranteed their payment. They advertised this 
misconception to prospective bond buyers in spite of 
the fact that the State Department disclaimed any guaran­
tees for repayment of the debts.
In 1922, El Salvador borrowed over sixteen million 
dollars from American and British bondholders, one of the 
first Latin American nations to receive such a loan. The 
terms were onerous even by the standards of the day. But 
El Salvador was on the verge of bankruptcy and badly 
needed the funds. Fortunately for the small nation, her 
coffee production was adequate to keep up the maintenance 
of the loan service. It was not until the depression of 
the 1930’s that serious problems arose from the loans.
To further exacerbate matters, El Salvador had 
the misfortune to receive American diplomats whose poor 
attitudes toward their assignments and the people they 
were to deal with left much to be desired. Montgomery 
Schuyler exemplified this attitude best in the conduct 
of his duties as minister. He is remembered by some in 
El Salvador as a man Mmuy duro, muy violento.” He did 
not make many friends among the Salvadorans. One of his 
successors, Minister Charles B. Curtis suffered a similar 
experience because of his poor performance during the
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1 9 3 1  c o u p  d ' e t a t . E i s  e r r a t i c  c o n d u c t  d u r i n g  t h e  c o u p  
c a u s e d  e v e n  h i s  s u p e r i o r ,  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  H e n r y  L .  
S t i m s o n ,  t o  l o s e  f a i t h  i n  h i m ®
W i t h  t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  t h e  c o u p , p o l i t i c a l  a n d  
e c o n o m i c  p r o b l e m s  l y i n g  d o r m a n t  b e t w e e n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
a n d  E l  S a l v a d o r  e r u p t e d .  A r t i c l e  I I  o f  t h e  1 9 2 3  T r e a t y  
p r e v e n t e d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f r o m  g r a n t i n g  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  
t h e  n e w  r e g i m e  o f  G e n e r a l  M a x i m i l i a n o  H e r n a n d e z  M a r t i n e z .  
M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  s e v e r e  d r o p  i n  c o f f e e  p r i c e s  f o r c e d  E l  
S a l v a d o r  t o  d e f a u l t  o n  i t s  1922 l o a n .  T h u s ,  w i t h  t h e  
M a r t i n e z  p r e s i d e n c y ,  a n  a g o n i z i n g  p e r i o d  i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  
b e t w e e n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  E l  S a l v a d o r  b e g a n .
U n d o u b t e d l y ,  t h e  m o s t  s e r i o u s  d i s a g r e e m e n t  b e t w e e n  
E l  S a l v a d o r  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e s i d e n c y  
o f  G e n e r a l  M a r t i n e z  1 9 3 1 - 1 9 ^ >  o c c u r r e d  i n  1 9 3 1 - 1 9 3 ^ *
T h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  r e f u s e d  t o  r e c o g n i z e  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  
G e n e r a l  M a r t i n e z .  T h e  n e w  S a l v a d o r a n  g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  
f o r c e d  t o  r e - a s s e s s  i t s  n a t i o n a l  p r i o r i t i e s .  I f  t h e  
f u n d a m e n t a l  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e  o f  e v e r y  n a t i o n  i s  
s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n ,  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  a c c e p t a n c e  b y  
t h e  c o m m u n i t y  o f  n a t i o n s  m u s t  r e c e i v e  s e c o n d a r y  c o n s i d e r ­
a t i o n .  B e c a u s e  o f  t h e  1 9 2 3  T r e a t y ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
r e f u s e d  t o  g r a n t  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  G e n e r a l  
M a r t i n e z .  Y e t ,  t h e  S a l v a d o r a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n  g u a r a n t e e d  
h i m  t h e  r i g h t  t o  h o l d  h i s  o f f i c e .  M o r e o v e r ,  b e c a u s e  t h e
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Salvadoran Congress, in 1923* had ratified the treaty 
with certain reservations regarding the non-recognition 
provision, General Martfnez concluded that Article II 
did not apply in his case. He received moral support 
from Mexico and other Latin American nations, most of 
whom believed that because he had firm control of his 
government and the popular support of the people, he 
qualified for de facto recognition. The United States, 
however, maintained its non-recognition position and 
stood by Article II of the 1923 Treaty. Indeed,
Article II was designed to prevent such occurrences 
as the coup of 1931 in 31 Salvador. Eut in 1923, the 
treaty's authors tacitly depended on United States mili­
tary and economic power, and the willingness to use it 
to force any would-be rebel to reconsider before acting. 
Eut by 1931t conditions had changed and America was no 
longer willing to use force to carry out its policies.
Thus, the applied doctrine of non-recognition had 
become a burden to the State Department. A major 
debate ensued in the United States over its usefulness. 
Some credited the policy with having provided stability 
by discouraging potential revolutionaries. Others 
contended that the provisions of the 1923 Treaty served 
to perpetuate tyrannical rulers in power. The State 
Department faced a dilemma. It could not recognize 
General Martfnez because of the 1923 Treaty provisions,
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yet despite non-recognition, the regime was stable and 
destined to grow stronger. In early 1932, General 
Martfnez was strong enough to crush violently a Communist 
attempt to take over his government. For his efforts 
he was described by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson 
as a "bulwark” against Communism. Although the United 
States sympathized with its anti-Communist neighbor, it 
still refused to recognize his government.
The change came with the "Good Neighbor" policy 
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Americans were 
influenced to act favorably on the Salvadoran question 
by nations not bound to the 1923 Treaty. In late 1932, 
lt was apparent that continued non-recognition of SI 
Salvador only increased the danger of greater instability. 
Eritain and France, eager to do business in El Salvador 
under normal economic and political conditions, led the 
other European nations to recognize the regime of 
General Martfnez in September of 1932. On December 2 b ,  
1932, Costa Rica officially abrogated the 1923 Treaty 
followed two days later by El Salvador. On January 26, 
193^* the United States recognized the de facto govern­
ment of General Martfnez.
Facing serious difficulties in his diplomatic 
relations with the United States, General Martfnez did 
not allow foreign affairs to take precedence over 
domestic matters. This was evident during the coffee
price crash of 1931-1932. In an effort to stabilize 
the Salvadoran economy, General Martfnez enacted several 
measures, one of which was the suspension of her debt 
payments to American bondholders. The default had far- 
reaching effects on relations already strained by the 
non-recognition controversy. However, this time, the 
State Department decided to avoid further deterioration 
of relations by not observing its contractual obliga­
tion to facilitate a settlement under the 1922 loan 
agreement. Washington was reluctant to act. Other 
Latin American nations had also defaulted, and to pres­
sure a small nation to pay would have done nothing more 
than add tarnish to the image of the United States in 
the area. While Washington1s decision may have improved 
America's image in Latin America, it angered the Amer­
ican bondholders considerably. They felt "sacrificed" 
by their own government. Many of them truly believed 
that the State Department had guaranteed the payments.
But in 1933s under the leadership of Cordell Hull 
and Sumner Welles, the State Department affirmed that 
it would not intercede on behalf of the bondholders.
The United States would no longer intervene In such an 
overt fashion In the Internal affairs of another nation 
in order to advance the Interests of private parties.
Too much of this type of Intervention had occurred in 
the past and the State Department was determined not to
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continue the practice. Despite the protests of inte­
rested parties, the policy of non-intervention was 
maintained and the United States over-extended Itself 
to insure consistency in its Good Neighbor policy 
toward El Salvador. The State Department's participation 
in the bondholders' dispute was limited to the promotion 
of negotiations between the Bondholders Protective 
Committee and the Salvadoran government. Through 
aggressive and persistent negotiations the Salvadoran 
Bondholders Protective Committee was more successful 
than other similar organizations in reaching agreements.
While the default created some moments of appre­
hension in the overall relations between the United 
States and El Salvador, there were areas of cooperation 
which fostered closer ties between the two nations.
One was the action of Germany in 1934 when it instituted 
the compensation or ASKI system of trade. This did not 
work well for El Salvador. As a result, El Salvador's 
trade shifted from Germany to the United States.
Secondly, trade agreements such as the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement of 1937 and- the Inter-American Coffee Conven­
tion of 1940 were reached. Under the 1940 agreement, 
the United States subsidized over one-third of El 
Salvador's coffee export. American consumers paid for 
the friendship of Latin American nations by buying their 
coffee at artificially higher prices. VJithout the
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agreement, a surplus of coffee would certainly have 
lowered its market price with dire consequences for 
El Salvador.
A final assessment of Salvadoran-American economic 
relations reveals that the small country received major 
advantages. It was able to postpone service on the 
1922 loan until after- 19^6, and then at greatly reduced 
terms. Its success in this matter was due in part to the 
unwillingness of the State Department to wholeheartedly 
support the Bondholders Protective Committee and Council. 
Throughout most of the 1930’s El Salvador was able to 
maintain a favorable balance of trade with the United 
States while disposing of the bulk of its exports at 
substantially higher prices. It is clear that the 
State Department let bondholders and coffee consumers 
pay the price for the friendship and support of Salvado­
rans and other Latin Americans, especially in the 
hemisphere defense program during the war. The United 
States, however, was also able to extract concessions 
in return for its economic assistance. Cne xtfas the 
ousting of two high ranking Salvadoran military officers 
because of their fascist orientation.
Ideological differences also influenced relations 
between the two nations. General Kart£nez, like many 
other leaders during the early 1930's, admired the 
seeming success experienced by Italy under Mussolini.
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He saw similarities in the way he and Mussolini fought 
Communism. Moreover, he believed that the chaotic 
circumstances which prevailed in SI Salvador called for 
a highly centralized government and a planned economy 
like Italy's. The popular support that he received 
encouraged him. Apparently, the Salvadoran population, 
fearful and apprehensive because of the economic 
depression and the Communist threat, was willing to 
accept an authoritarian but "benevolent" ruler such as 
General Hartfnez.
But, while General Martinez was an admirer of 
totalitarian ideas as trade with Azis powers developed 
during the early 1930's, he was not above serving the 
best interests of SI Salvador. Such was the case in 
1939 when he responded to pressures and ousted General 
Sberhardt Eohnstedt and Earon Wilhelm von Hundelhausen 
from their posts as directors of the Sscuela Militar and 
Banco Hipotecario respectively. Although a believer 
in totalitarian ideas, he openly supported the Allied 
cause and wholeheartedly supported the hemispheric 
defense efforts of the United States. His support of 
the American efforts led to the replacement of two army 
friends from public posts. In 19^1» the ranking officers 
of the Department of La Union, General L u i s  Andreu, and 
of the National Police, Col. Juan Merino, were both 
dismissed under pressure from the United States.
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The difficult measures taken by General Hartfnez 
were balanced by liberal financial assistance from the 
United States. The Lend-Lease program enabled El 
Salvador to arm itself sufficiently to have one of the 
best military forces in Central America. Ironically, 
some of the equipment acquired through this program were 
used in the rebellion which led to the collapse of 
General Martinez’s government. El Salvador was also 
able to receive a loan from the Export-Import Sank to 
build its badly needed highway system and other public 
works programs. The United States made the loan despite 
the fact that El Salvador was still in default on its 
1922 loan.
Relations between the United States and El Salvador ■ 
during the period of study reflect the traditional 
ingredients of domestic politics in a Latin American 
country, the changing priorities of a powerful neighbor, 
and the threat of European intervention. They mark a 
test of the Good Neighbor policy, a significant turn 
in the attitude and interest of the United States in 
Latin America.
A nation with a previous history of independence in 
its relations with the United States since the turn of 
the century, El Salvador had successfully avoided 
external intervention in domestic affairs, unlike the 
experience of Nicaragua, Cuba and the Dominican Republic.
However, the Martinez period represents the likely 
breaking-point as extended de facto authoritarian rule 
in El Salvador strained the non-recognition principle 
of the United States. This was further aggravated by 
the non-payment of outstanding loans by the smaller 
nation. These difficulties in the 1930's could conceiva­
bly have been the source of considerable ill**will had 
the United States interfered directly in El Salvador or 
had it forced on El Salvador the desired settlement on 
the default matter. The United States did not, hoxvever, 
adopt such policies. The policy declared by President 
Franklin E. Hoosevelt in his 1933 inaugural address, 
later identified with Latin America, withstood the test. 
The Martfnez period of government 1931-19^ in El Salva­
dor proved the substance of President Roosevelt's 
statement on April 12, 1933. when he addressed the 
governing board of the Pan American Union. He stated 
that "The essential qualities of a true Panamericanism 
must be the same as those which constitute a good 
neighbor, namely, mutual understanding and, through 
such understanding, a sympathetic appreciation of the
O
other's point of view." The lesson was not lost through­
out the Western Hemisphere.
Q
Roosevelt's Foreign Policy; 1933-19^1; Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's Unedited Speeches and Messages (hew York:
Funk and Wagnalls, 19^2), p. as quoted in Federico G. 
Gil, Latin American - United States Relations (New York: 
Hare ourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., i9r^l J, p.' 156.
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